Introduction 2013 saw the sixth anniversary of the formulation of Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Disclosure of Government Information (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations) and the fifth ann...Introduction 2013 saw the sixth anniversary of the formulation of Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Disclosure of Government Information (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations) and the fifth anniversary of their being put into effect. As the Regulations were stipulated and put into force,展开更多
The weak enforcement and monitoring systems employed in China (e.g., insufficient inspection resources and negligible fines for noncompliance) are widely blamed for the growing unrest over food safety in the country...The weak enforcement and monitoring systems employed in China (e.g., insufficient inspection resources and negligible fines for noncompliance) are widely blamed for the growing unrest over food safety in the country. Given this development, we consider a model where quality inspection performed by agencies is a means of disclosing information on product quality. We analyze the price-quality equilibrium scheme and show that a higher probability of inspection leads to lower price premiums attached to qualified products. We further investigate the welfare effect of minimum quality standards and inspection efforts and show that they should be complementary. We finally suggest that a state dependent inspection strategy, such as not inspecting those firms that have previously been found to be noncompliant, will enhance social welfare.展开更多
This paper studies the trading behavior of an irrational insider and its influence on the market equilibrium in the presence of market regulation.We find that the market with only one insider with private information ...This paper studies the trading behavior of an irrational insider and its influence on the market equilibrium in the presence of market regulation.We find that the market with only one insider with private information is almost close to a strong efficient market,under the condition of market regulation.In the equilibrium,the probability of the insider being caught trading with private information is zero,which shows that the reasonable behavior of the regulator is to essentially give up regulation.But the market efficiency and the irrational trader’s trading intensity all greatly improve because of the existence of the market regulation.展开更多
We investigate how product market competition affects corporate voluntary disclosure decisions,specifically regarding supply-chain information.Our results,based on a sample of manufacturing companies listed in China f...We investigate how product market competition affects corporate voluntary disclosure decisions,specifically regarding supply-chain information.Our results,based on a sample of manufacturing companies listed in China from 2010 to 2016,show that companies in more competitive industries disclose less customer/supplier information.The main results stand through several robustness tests.Further analyses show that the negative relationship between product market competitiveness and supply-chain information disclosure is stronger when the disclosure contains more incremental information and when competitors are more capable of gaining competitive advantage using the disclosed information.Our study contributes to the understanding of both the relationship between product market competition and voluntary disclosure decisions and the regulation of information disclosure to build a transparent capital market.展开更多
文摘Introduction 2013 saw the sixth anniversary of the formulation of Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Disclosure of Government Information (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations) and the fifth anniversary of their being put into effect. As the Regulations were stipulated and put into force,
文摘The weak enforcement and monitoring systems employed in China (e.g., insufficient inspection resources and negligible fines for noncompliance) are widely blamed for the growing unrest over food safety in the country. Given this development, we consider a model where quality inspection performed by agencies is a means of disclosing information on product quality. We analyze the price-quality equilibrium scheme and show that a higher probability of inspection leads to lower price premiums attached to qualified products. We further investigate the welfare effect of minimum quality standards and inspection efforts and show that they should be complementary. We finally suggest that a state dependent inspection strategy, such as not inspecting those firms that have previously been found to be noncompliant, will enhance social welfare.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 11971097, 11201060,11126107)Fundamental Research Funds for Central Universitiesthe financial support from the General Project of Science and Technology Plan of Beijing Municipal Commission of Education (No. KM202010017001)
文摘This paper studies the trading behavior of an irrational insider and its influence on the market equilibrium in the presence of market regulation.We find that the market with only one insider with private information is almost close to a strong efficient market,under the condition of market regulation.In the equilibrium,the probability of the insider being caught trading with private information is zero,which shows that the reasonable behavior of the regulator is to essentially give up regulation.But the market efficiency and the irrational trader’s trading intensity all greatly improve because of the existence of the market regulation.
基金financial support from the China National Natural Science Foundation(Grant numbers:71502185,71802207,71872199,71972193)the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China Humanities and Social Sciences Youth Foundation(Grant numbers:18YJC630271)Young Talents Development Support Scheme of Central University of Finance and Economics(QYP2004)
文摘We investigate how product market competition affects corporate voluntary disclosure decisions,specifically regarding supply-chain information.Our results,based on a sample of manufacturing companies listed in China from 2010 to 2016,show that companies in more competitive industries disclose less customer/supplier information.The main results stand through several robustness tests.Further analyses show that the negative relationship between product market competitiveness and supply-chain information disclosure is stronger when the disclosure contains more incremental information and when competitors are more capable of gaining competitive advantage using the disclosed information.Our study contributes to the understanding of both the relationship between product market competition and voluntary disclosure decisions and the regulation of information disclosure to build a transparent capital market.