Decentralized Optimal Control and Stabilization of Interconnected Systems With Asymmetric Information

The paper addresses the decentralized optimal control and stabilization problems for interconnected systems subject to asymmetric information.Compared with previous work,a closed-loop optimal solution to the control problem and sufficient and necessary conditions for the stabilization problem of the interconnected systems are given for the first time.The main challenge lies in three aspects:Firstly,the asymmetric information results in coupling between control and estimation and failure of the separation principle.Secondly,two extra unknown variables are generated by asymmetric information(different information filtration)when solving forward-backward stochastic difference equations.Thirdly,the existence of additive noise makes the study of mean-square boundedness an obstacle.The adopted technique is proving and assuming the linear form of controllers and establishing the equivalence between the two systems with and without additive noise.A dual-motor parallel drive system is presented to demonstrate the validity of the proposed algorithm.

Farmers' seed choice behaviors under asymmetrical information: Evidence from maize farming in China

the financial support of the National Social Science Foundation of China （14ZDA038）;the National Natural Science Foundation of China （71222302;71373255;71573133）;the Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences （2012RC102）

Quantity discount contracts for supply chain coordination under asymmetric information and disruptions

The quantity discount contracts are investigated for a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain with asymmetric information when the retailer's cost is disrupted. While the retailer's cost structure is asymmetric information, two all-unit quantity discount contract models, fixed expected-profit percentage discount(FEPD) and fixed wholesale-pricing percentage discount(FWPD) under asymmetric information are proposed in a regular scenario. When the retailer's cost distribution fluctuates due to disruptions, the optimal emergency strategies of supply chains are obtained under asymmetric information. Using numerical methods, the impact of cost disruptions on decisions about the regular wholesale price, discount wholesale price, order quantity and expected profits of the retailer, the supplier as well as the total system are analyzed. It is found that the FEPD policy is more robust and adaptable than the FWPD policy in disruption circumstances.

Cooperative Mechanism of Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information

The cooperative mechanism is one main issue in the decentralized supply chain system, especially in an asymmetric information structure. We analyze the non-cooperative game behavior of a 2-echelon distribution supply chain, compare the results with the system optimal solution, and give the supplier dominated cooperative mechanisms. We also analyze the validity of our contract under the asymmetric retailers' holding cost information and give some useful conclusions.

Design Capability Identify under Asymmetric Information

Under the condition of asymmetric information,the Spence 's Job Market Signaling Model is generally applied to inspect the design capability of a designer and his labor and efforts to be invested; however,since the"prior probability"and "posterior probability"have great uncertainties,the practical effect of this model is poor. On the basis of analyzing reverse selection questions,this paper provides a design capability screening model,which can make a designer automatically expose his hidden information so that necessary actions can be taken as required by the owner to realize risk sharing. A calculation example is finally given to demonstrate that the new model is helpful for an owner to select a designer with high professional level and to lead the designer to work hard,so it is of significant application value.

Quantity Discount Scheme in Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information

Quantity discount scheme plays an important role in supply chain management. The different quantity discount schemes under symmetric （full） information and asymmetric information, are analyzed by using principal-agent and optimal control theory. As a result, the research reveals that the optimal quantity discount solution under symmetric information is a special case of that under asymmetric information. At the same price, the critical value of quantity discount under asymmetric information is much lower than that under asymmetric information. Therefore, this leads to less cost for retailers and smaller profit for their supplier.

Endogenous Explanation for Random Fluctuation of Stock Price and Its Application: Based on the View of Repeated Game with Asymmetric Information

In this paper, we characterize the players’ behavior in the stock market by the repeated game model with asymmetric information. We show that the discount price process of stock is a martingale driven by Brownian motion, and give an endogenous explanation for the random fluctuation of stock price: the randomizations in the market is due to the randomizations in the strategy of the informed player which hopes to avoid revealing his private information. On this basis, through studying the corresponding option pricing problem furtherly, we can give the expression of function φ.

Venture Capital Finance-Eliminating Double Sided Moral Hazards through Trade-off between Economic and Behavioural Economic Aspects-A Case Analysis

Venture capital finance has two aspects,the economic aspect and the behavioural economic aspect.The economic aspect includes issues such as conflict of interest between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist(VC),asymmetric information,moral hazard,and compensation issues for both the parties.The behavioural economic aspect is related to relational factors such as empathy and a feeling of fairness and trust shown by both the parties.Therefore,while deciding the financer,entrepreneur should consider both relational aspect and value add services of the financier and strike optimal trade-off.The ensuing case analysis has been carried out focusing on elimination of double-sided moral hazards through a proper trade-off between economy and behavioural economic theories(aspects).The performance of the venture can be enhanced by balancing both of these theories in practice.An equity distribution that represents economic reward is a source of motivation for both the parties to put optimal efforts towards the success of the venture.This was seen in the case analysis,when the parties perceived the initial equity distribution agreement as fair,the satisfaction level of all the parties increased,leading to the reduction in the possibility of double-sided moral hazard and ensuring the success of the venture.Moreover,the analysis shows that information sharing and two-way communication increases trust and improves decision quality.It further focusses on how feedback and proper work distribution results in efficiency of performance for each of the stakeholders,leading to reduced probability of double-sided moral hazards.

Benign Interaction Between Rural Information Service and Farmers' Income

Based on the improvement of interactive relationship between rural information service system and farmers＇ income, accompanied by the serious restriction to its mutual promotion caused by such problems as asymmetric information, focusing on introduction of rural information service infrastructure while ignored the application of them, shortage of human resource on information and so on, this paper proposed corresponding measures respectively to promote the benign interaction development between rural information service and farmers＇ income.

Incentive Contracts for Venture Capital Syndication

Aiming at the incentive problems of venture capital syndication at the second and later stages, an game model is set up by principal agent and incentive theory, given that the lead venture capitalist has already some knowledge of the project quality from his initial funding of the project. Under symmetric and asymmetric information, the model analyzes how the optimal syndication contracts induce venture capitalists to truthfully reveal their information to each other, and vary with the level of venture capitalists＇ expertise and information in evaluating projects.

Study on Pollution Cost Control Model under Asymmetric Information Based on Principal Agent

Pollution cost control is key to solve pollution problem.The paper takes pollution control cost of pollution control contract between management authority and pollutant discharge enterprise as research object,considers pollution control quality level,pollution control quality inspection and pollution control cost model,and establishes pollution control cost model of management authority and pollutant discharge enterprise,including rational constraints of pollutant discharge enterprise.And it analyzes principal-agent relationship between the two under condition of asymmetric information,and un-observability of pollution control level is shown as hiding information of sewage enterprises.In essence,it is problem of adverse selection in principal-agent.Pollution control cost of management is objective function.The first order condition of pollution control cost of sewage enterprise is transformed into state space equation,and optimal control of problem is solved by using maximum principle.In particular,management authority,as principal,uses pollution control provisions to reward,punish and encourage pollutant discharge enterprises as agents.

SCM Implementation Decisions Under Asymmetric Information: An Agency Approach

The optimization investment policy decision of SCM-supply chain management-implementation has been analysed under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions.For both conditions,SCM implementation optional decision optimizing models have been developed.In these models,both clients and vendors try to pursue their own benefits.Based upon the principal-agent theory,the models show to what extent a principal(a client)needs to pay more to an agent(a vendor)in a context of asymmetric information.For the client it is important to understand the extra costs to be able to adopt effective strategies to stimulate a vendor to perform an optimal implementation of a SCM system.The results of a simulation experiment regarding SCM implementation options illustrate and verify the theoretical findings and confirm the general notion that the less informed party is obliged to pay information rent to the better-informed party.

Asymmetric Information in Combating Terrorism: Is the Threat Just a Bluff?

This paper explores the mitigation of terrorism risks based on dynamic interactions between terrorist organizations and governments with asymmetric information.Uncertainties in the objectives and capabilities of terrorists complicate defensive resource allocations for the public safety.Simultaneous and sequential game models are developed to investigate the asymmetric information effects on defensive strategies and terrorism risk analysis.The government can detect explicit or implicit signals to support decisions and update its beliefs according to a Bayesian law after it receives a terrorist threat.Analyses of the equilibrium for the signaling game indicate that the optimal government defensive strategy will significantly impact the actions of the terrorists.Asymmetric information is shown to play a crucial role in security decision making and terrorism risk mitigation,with the optimal defensive strategy changing according to terrorists and government capabilities.

Simple Contracts to Coordinate the Capacity Procurement Model with Asymmetric Demand Information

This paper studies the important problem of how to coordinate the capacity procurement model with asymmetric demand information.Under the model,the supplier has to secure necessary capacity before receiving a firm order from the manufacturer who possesses private demand information for her product.Optimal supply chain performance requires the manufacturer to share her forecast truthfully and the supplier to build enough capacity.In the literature,some elaborate contracts are designed to solve the problem.However,the authors prove that two simple conventional contracts(linear capacity reservation contract and payback agreement)can coordinate the supply chain and guarantee credible information sharing.Besides,the authors propose a new mechanism in which punishment is imposed in the payment function to bind the parties.To avoid punishment,the firms will choose the best decision for the entire supply chain.The contracts in this paper are all simple and easy to implement.The authors believe this work provides some insights to design coordination contracts in theory or in practice.

Asymmetric Information, Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Market Regulation

This paper studies the trading behavior of an irrational insider and its influence on the market equilibrium in the presence of market regulation.We find that the market with only one insider with private information is almost close to a strong efficient market,under the condition of market regulation.In the equilibrium,the probability of the insider being caught trading with private information is zero,which shows that the reasonable behavior of the regulator is to essentially give up regulation.But the market efficiency and the irrational trader’s trading intensity all greatly improve because of the existence of the market regulation.

Asymmetric Perceptions of Information, Transparency, and Learning Intentions: An Investigation and Analysis of Undergraduates’ Willingness to Study General Elective Courses in Eastern Chinese Colleges

To implement quality-oriented education in colleges and universities,the courses guide and significantly promote the holistic cultivation of students’personalities,while also rounding out the university curriculum.However,the learning effects are not expected.The authors develop a model on student learning intentions based on a questionnaire survey of 5,000 undergraduates in Eastern China,utilizing multiple regression analyses.Our results show that learning intention is closely related to course information transparency,teachers’opportunistic behaviors,the perceptions of students towards the course,and their trust in the classroom experience.Consequently,to decrease the degree of student asymmetric perceptions of information,course information transparency should be improved,and opportunistic teacher behaviors should be eliminated.This may result in enhancing students’learning intentions.

Product Quality Coordination in Outsourcing with Asymmetric Information

This paper investigates agency relationship composed by different risk preference between original equipment manufacturer（ OEM） and contract manufacturer（ CM）. The quality level of contractor CM has a significant influence to market demand,and also influences mutual benefits. To improve the level of quality,contractor has to pay the cost price and the effort,which are not observed and private information,so in this agency relationship there may exist adverse selection and moral hazard. OEM designs menu-driven contractual mechanisms to encourage contractor. In this contractual mechanism,contractor takes initiative to reveal its own effort cost information and maximize mutual profits. This paper set up Stackerlberg game model dominated by OEM,then it gives contract parameters through solving the model and it also analyzes property of incentive contract.

Incentive regulation of banks on third party logistics enterprises in principal-agent-based inventory financing

In inventory financing,asymmetric information between banks and the third party logistics enterprises may incur moral risks,often causing economic losses of banks.To effectively solve this problem,a pure incentive scheme and a regulatory incentive scheme are designed with the principal-agent theory.By comparison,it is found that the pure incentive model is not applicable to practical conditions,and regulatory incentive model can not only solve practical problems substantially but also outbalance pure incentive model under certain conditions.The research results from example analysis given in this paper offer theoretical instruction and a practical method for effective regulation of banks.

Mechanism of R&D network formation based on a network embeddedness game model

This paper explains the mechanism of R&D network formation based on a game model of network embeddedness.To describe the game relationship between a new member and an original R&D network,this game model is set up by introducing three factors:R&D efficiency of the new member,asymmetric information,and trust.By solving the game model,this paper analyzes their impact on the level of embeddedness and transaction cost within the Network.Study results show that,during the formation of an R&D network,low efficiency and asymmetric information will do harm to the level of embeddedness and raise the transaction cost,while trust will have a complicated impact on them because of the probability of misplaced-trust.