Evolution of Transitional Institutions for Urban Land Redevelopment in China——Case in Guangzhou

Building effective institutions for markets is a great challenge to China's transitional economy. China's experience in establishing urban land markets is characterized by trial and error and the gradual evolution of transitional institutions. Based on archive data and interviews in a neighborhood(Jinhuajie) of Guangzhou,this research reveals that China's land redevelopment in the past two decades has followed an approach of partial and gradual reform,which was structured by the gradual evolution of transitional institutions to speed up local land redevelopment within the existing property rights system. Transitional institutions,including highly compensated residents' land use rights,in-kind land lease payment,flexible control on development rights of developers and short-term actual ownership of work units,are generated by the local government sequentially to dispel existing land use rights of different land users and make further development be able to follow market mechanisms.

Analysis of the Declining of Open Field System in the Medieval England from the Perspective of Institutional Transition

Open field system is the most important land farming system in the middle part of the Medieval England. It has the property of private property and common property right and exited for very long time. This article analyzed how the open field system was replaced by the enclosure system from the perspective of institutional t transition. By carrying on the detailed investigation, it can provide certain enlightenments and references to deepen rural reform, especially promoting the reasonable transfer of rural land use rights in China.

Regional Guanxi Culture and Entrepreneurs＇ Action Logic： A Multilevel Analysis

At the beginning of the reform period, though informal institutions as a substitute for formal institutions efficiently promoted the development of private enterprises, it eroded and destroyed the authority and execution efficiency of formal institutions with guanxi behaviors and implicit rules. With the progress of marketization, how to restrain and guide the evolution of informal institutions is an tmavoidable obstacle for the development of private enterprises-- transforming their competitive strategy from ＂non-market＂ dominance to ＂market＂ dominance. Based on survey data of 2,628 private enterprises from 31 provinces in China, we establish a regional commercial culture index to empirically investigate the different influences of guanxi behavior between entrepreneurs of different ages and regional guanxi culture. The results show that, compared with entrepreneurs who started businesses in recent years, i.e., after the 1990s, those who started businesses during the 1970s and the 1980s are more dependent on guanxi behaviors. Meanwhile, the higher the level of education, the less an entrepreneur is likely to be dependent on guanxi behaviors. However, compared with the constraint of the degree of regional marketization, regional guanxi culture promotes entrepreneurs＇ guanxi behaviors. Further research indicates that the more enterprises depart from regional guanxi culture, the stronger the ability to innovation. This study can not only enrich the institutional analysis of entrepreneurs＇ guanxi behaviors, but also provide a theoretical foundation for further expansion and deepening of reform.

From administering administrative divisions to regional public administration： a game analysis of evolution in the pattern of governance by the government

Regional public administration represents in essence an institutional change in the pattern of governance by the government, in that it breaks down the original institutional arrangements of the administration of administrative divisions and embarks on a new process of institutional evolution of the patterns of interest distribution in society. Present throughout this process is a game between different interests, leading to the final emergence of a new system - a new contractual setup resulting from the playing out of the relevant factors. These games take place mainly between the central and the local authorities and among the latter. Setting up a cooperative approach of ＂repeated gaming＂ when the game runs into possible difficulties, developing mechanisms conducive to better information exchange and to bilateral or multilateral consultation, further reshaping government functions by cutting the interest ties that link local authorities with socioeconomic entities, and strengthening the central authorities＇ macro-control functions are efficient guidance measures for setting up a system of regional public administration and realizing change in governance patterns.

The Nature and Avoidance of the ＂Middle Income Trap＂

The ＂middle income trap＂ is a significant theoretical and practical issue closely related to the economic and social transition and sustainable development of a country. This paper explores the essence of the ＂middle income trap＂ and ways to avoid it. It reveals that the inner nature of the ＂middle income trap＂ lies in the institutional transition dilemma, which results essentially from a lack of reasonable and clear definitions of governance boundaries between government and market as well as government and society. This lack of boundaries causes coexistent and interrelated government inefficiency, market distortion/failure and social anomie, leading to a stagnant transition from a factor-driven to an efficiency-driven and further innovation-driven economy. Moreover, this paper proposes that the proper way to avoid the ＂trap＂ can be found in the reconstruction of the state governance mode, that is, to transition from a development-oriented and omnipotent government to a public service-oriented and limited government, from factor-driven to efficiency-driven and further innovation-driven development, and from a traditional society to a modem civil society through defining reasonable and clear boundaries between government and market as well as government and society. Thus, reconstruction can establish a state public governance mode featuring the interactive role of government, market and society, and achieve the modernization of state governance systems and capacity.