Missing quarterly earnings benchmarks, CEO cash compensation and institutional ownership

Research suggests that transient institutions, i.e., institutions with short-term investment horizon,make management focus on short-term earnings goals. This study examines incentive in terms of CEO cash compensation that explains why management concentrates on short-term earnings results when transient institutions hold high levels of ownership. Using quarterly consensus analysts＇ expectations as a proxy for short-term earnings benchmarks, the author finds that CEO cash compensation and the frequency with which management misses quarterly earnings benchmarks in a year （MISSNUMt） are more strongly negatively associated in firms with high transient institutional ownership than in firms with low transient institutional ownership, suggesting that transient institutions strengthen the inverse relation between CEO cash pay and missing short-term earnings benchmarks and hence increase pressure on management in terms of cash pay for short-term results. Moreover, the author shows that change in CEO cash compensation is positively associated with change in transient institutional ownership, consistent with the idea that selling shares by transient institutions influences the boards of portfolio firms in CEO cash compensation decision. This study contributes to the governance literature and is relevant to business managers by providing additional evidence that transient institutions provide less patient capital and may not benefit long-run firm value creation.

Institutional Ownership, Risk Disclosure, and Potential Benefits： From the Perspective of Internal Control and Firm Risk

This study investigates risk reporting practices of Chinese listed manufacturing companies. More specifically, it empirically examines the relationship between the percentage of institutional shareholding, the disclosure of risk related information and the impact of risk disclosure on internal control and firm risk. Three risk disclosure attributes indicative of good risk related information disclosure are employed in this research. As hypothesized, we find that firms with higher institutional ownership provide more informative disclosure on distinct risk factors and take more actions in response to the risk factors. Results drawn from the potential benefits of risk reporting suggest that risk disclosure has positive effects on the quality of internal control. We also find that risk disclosure can effectively decrease future downside systemic risk.

Ownership Structure and Earnings Quality of Listed Financial Firms in Nigeria

The study determined the effect of ownership structure on earnings quality of listed financial firms in Nigeria.The study employed secondary data.The study population comprised all the 16 listed financial firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.Purposive sampling technique was adopted to select top 10 banks whose shares are consistently traded on the stock market.Data for ownership structure and earnings quality were sourced from the audited financial statements of the selected firms and the Nigerian Stock Exchange Factbook over a period of 10 years(2009-2018).Collected data were analyzed using pooled ordinary least square,fixed effect and random effect estimation techniques.The result from the study showed that institutional ownership(t=4.3,p˂0.05)had a positive and statistically significant relationship with earnings quality while ownership concentration(t=-2.5,p˂0.05)had a negative and significant relationship with earnings quality.The study recommended that the institutional ownership which shows a positive relationship with earnings quality enables improved earnings of the sampled listed banks.More institutional participation should be allowed in the Nigerian listed banks as it was proved that they have the power to monitor the affairs of managers as this will have a positive impact on earnings.Concentration ownership gives managers incentives to manage earnings to achieve short term opportunistic interest;therefore it should not be encouraged.

Good Corporate Governance （GCG） Mechanism and Audit Delay： An Empirical Study on Companies Listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange （IDX） in the Period of 2009-2011

Audit delay is a delay in reporting audit to the Indonesia Stock Exchange （IDX） after the allotted time of 90 days after closing the book. Delay to publish audit report will affect the value of infromation, causing a bad sign for the company. As good corporate governance （GCG） is one way to solve the different interests, practices, and culture, companies implement GCG in an attempt to get more value. This study aims to measure the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on audit delay in companies listed on the IDX in the period of 2009-2011. Variables of GCG mechanism consist of institutional ownership, number of audit committee members, and the percentage of independent commissioners. Purposive sampling method is used in sample selection procedure. Samples comprise 42 companies listed on the IDX. The simultaneous test results show that all the variables have a significant influence on audit delay. By the partial test, number of audit committee members has significantly affected audit delay, while institutional ownership and independent commissioners have no significant effect on audit delay. This study is limited to use only three variables to study their influence on audit delay in the reseach period of only three years.