This article discusses the problem of utility maximization in a market with random-interval payoffs without short-selling prohibition. A novel expected utility model is given to measure an investor's subjective vi...This article discusses the problem of utility maximization in a market with random-interval payoffs without short-selling prohibition. A novel expected utility model is given to measure an investor's subjective view toward random interval wealth. Some techniques are proposed to transfer a complex programming involving interval numbers into a simple non-linear programming. Under the existence of the optimal strategy, relations between the optimal strategy and assets' prices are discussed. Some properties of the maximal utility function with respect to the endowment are given.展开更多
This paper deals with rnxn two-person non-zero sum games with interval pay-offs. An analytic method for solving such games is given. A pair of Nash Equilibrium is found by using the method. The analytic method is effe...This paper deals with rnxn two-person non-zero sum games with interval pay-offs. An analytic method for solving such games is given. A pair of Nash Equilibrium is found by using the method. The analytic method is effective to find at least one Nash Equilibrium （N.E） for two-person bimatrix games. Therefore, the analytic method for two-person bimatrix games is adapted to interval bimatrix games.展开更多
基金Supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central University(10D10909)
文摘This article discusses the problem of utility maximization in a market with random-interval payoffs without short-selling prohibition. A novel expected utility model is given to measure an investor's subjective view toward random interval wealth. Some techniques are proposed to transfer a complex programming involving interval numbers into a simple non-linear programming. Under the existence of the optimal strategy, relations between the optimal strategy and assets' prices are discussed. Some properties of the maximal utility function with respect to the endowment are given.
文摘This paper deals with rnxn two-person non-zero sum games with interval pay-offs. An analytic method for solving such games is given. A pair of Nash Equilibrium is found by using the method. The analytic method is effective to find at least one Nash Equilibrium （N.E） for two-person bimatrix games. Therefore, the analytic method for two-person bimatrix games is adapted to interval bimatrix games.
