The effectiveness of evaluating an investment project based on predicting cash flows depends on the uncertainty of its future cash flows. The remoter the cash flows are, the higher the uncertainty is. Because of this,...The effectiveness of evaluating an investment project based on predicting cash flows depends on the uncertainty of its future cash flows. The remoter the cash flows are, the higher the uncertainty is. Because of this, this paper suggests to discount cash flows by applying risky index of time （RIT）. Thus, the discount rate used to discount the distant cash flows is higher that the discount rate used to discount the near cash flows. By this systematic method, the risk caused by the uncertainty of future cash flows can be hedged in making investment decision. To a certain degree, this approach is reasonable in evaluating investment alternatives under uncertainty. Furthermore, the paper puts forward a practical approach on determining RIT in practice.展开更多
Renewable energy,such as wind and solar energy,may vary signifi cantly over time and locations depending on the weather and the climate conditions.This leads to the supply uncertainty in the electricity(power) market ...Renewable energy,such as wind and solar energy,may vary signifi cantly over time and locations depending on the weather and the climate conditions.This leads to the supply uncertainty in the electricity(power) market with renewable energy integrated to power grid.In this paper,electricity in the market is classified into two types:stablesupply electricity(SSE) and unstablesupply electricity(USE).We investigate the investment and pricing strategies under the electricity supply uncertainty in wholesale and retail electricity market.In particular,our model combines the wholesale and retail market and capture the dominant players,i.e.,consumers,power plant(power operator),and electricity supplier.To derive the market behaviors of these players,we formulate the market decision problems as a multistage Stackelberg game.By solving the game model,we obtain the optimal,with closedform,wholesale investment and retail pricing strategy for the operator.We also obtain the energy supplier's best price mechanism numerically under certain assumption.We fi nd the price of SSE being about 1.4 times higher than that of USE will benefi t energy supplieroptimally,under which power plant's optimal strategy of investing is to purchase USE about 4.5 times much more than SSE.展开更多
We devise a model for security investment that reflects dynamic interaction between a defender, who faces uncertainty, and an attacker, who repeatedly targets the weakest link. Using the model, we derive and compare o...We devise a model for security investment that reflects dynamic interaction between a defender, who faces uncertainty, and an attacker, who repeatedly targets the weakest link. Using the model, we derive and compare optimal security investment over multiple periods, exploring the delicate balance between proactive and reactive security investment. We show how the best strategy depends on the defender’s knowledge about prospective attacks and the recoverability of costs when upgrading defenses reactively. Our model explains why security under-investment is sometimes rational even when effective defenses are available and can be deployed independently of other parties’ choices. Finally, we connect the model to real-world security problems by examining two case studies where empirical data are available: computers compromised for use in online crime and payment card security.展开更多
Other than traditional valuation methods, the real option approach captures the flexibility inherent in investment decisions to make the optimal decision of a finn in isolation from its competitors. In reality, howeve...Other than traditional valuation methods, the real option approach captures the flexibility inherent in investment decisions to make the optimal decision of a finn in isolation from its competitors. In reality, however, the actions or decisions of competing fn-ms （practical or potential） often affect each other＇s investment opportunity. The value of the project for the firms is assumed to follow a Geometric Brownian motion, and the model combines game theory and the theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty. This paper characterizes the resulting Nash equilibrium under different assumptions on the information that the firms have each other＇s valuation for the project.展开更多
文摘The effectiveness of evaluating an investment project based on predicting cash flows depends on the uncertainty of its future cash flows. The remoter the cash flows are, the higher the uncertainty is. Because of this, this paper suggests to discount cash flows by applying risky index of time （RIT）. Thus, the discount rate used to discount the distant cash flows is higher that the discount rate used to discount the near cash flows. By this systematic method, the risk caused by the uncertainty of future cash flows can be hedged in making investment decision. To a certain degree, this approach is reasonable in evaluating investment alternatives under uncertainty. Furthermore, the paper puts forward a practical approach on determining RIT in practice.
基金supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(NSFC)No.61372116 and NSFC No.61201202 and NSFC No.61320001the Importation and Development of High-Caliber Talents Project of Beijing Municipal Institutions under Grant YETP0110
文摘Renewable energy,such as wind and solar energy,may vary signifi cantly over time and locations depending on the weather and the climate conditions.This leads to the supply uncertainty in the electricity(power) market with renewable energy integrated to power grid.In this paper,electricity in the market is classified into two types:stablesupply electricity(SSE) and unstablesupply electricity(USE).We investigate the investment and pricing strategies under the electricity supply uncertainty in wholesale and retail electricity market.In particular,our model combines the wholesale and retail market and capture the dominant players,i.e.,consumers,power plant(power operator),and electricity supplier.To derive the market behaviors of these players,we formulate the market decision problems as a multistage Stackelberg game.By solving the game model,we obtain the optimal,with closedform,wholesale investment and retail pricing strategy for the operator.We also obtain the energy supplier's best price mechanism numerically under certain assumption.We fi nd the price of SSE being about 1.4 times higher than that of USE will benefi t energy supplieroptimally,under which power plant's optimal strategy of investing is to purchase USE about 4.5 times much more than SSE.
文摘We devise a model for security investment that reflects dynamic interaction between a defender, who faces uncertainty, and an attacker, who repeatedly targets the weakest link. Using the model, we derive and compare optimal security investment over multiple periods, exploring the delicate balance between proactive and reactive security investment. We show how the best strategy depends on the defender’s knowledge about prospective attacks and the recoverability of costs when upgrading defenses reactively. Our model explains why security under-investment is sometimes rational even when effective defenses are available and can be deployed independently of other parties’ choices. Finally, we connect the model to real-world security problems by examining two case studies where empirical data are available: computers compromised for use in online crime and payment card security.
文摘Other than traditional valuation methods, the real option approach captures the flexibility inherent in investment decisions to make the optimal decision of a finn in isolation from its competitors. In reality, however, the actions or decisions of competing fn-ms （practical or potential） often affect each other＇s investment opportunity. The value of the project for the firms is assumed to follow a Geometric Brownian motion, and the model combines game theory and the theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty. This paper characterizes the resulting Nash equilibrium under different assumptions on the information that the firms have each other＇s valuation for the project.
