Trading Land Development Rights under a Planned Land Use System:The“Zhejiang Model”

China＇ s state planned land use system, including regulations such as setting planned quotas for land use, basic cropland preservation, and pursuing a balance between the conversion of arable land into non-agricultural use and the supplement of new agricultural land, has substantially constrained the economic growth of industrial provinces in China. This article explores the innovative reforms adopted by Zhejiang Province through land development rights （LDR） transfer within a locality and LDR trading across localities. We argue that there is a ＂Zhejiang model of LDR transferring and trading,＂ which, we believe, has significant implications not only for fostering an efficiency-enhancing market for land development rights and agricultural land preservation, but also for optimal use of land and a more balanced regional development. One important policy issue relating to China＇s rural land system is that under China＇ s land requisition system, farmers are usually under compensated for urban land-taking.

State Fragmentation and Rights Contestation:Rural Land Development Rights in China

The functionalist reasoning of institutional changes builds on individual rationality and explains institutional changes from the demand side. While insightful, a comprehensive understanding also needs to take into account the supply side, The state, as the ultimate supplier of institutional changes, plays the pivotal role of agency; therefore, its willingness and ability decide how such regime change occurs and what partieular form the new regime takes. Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese economy has embarked on a path of rapid industrialization and urbanization. The contestation over rural land development rights in China offers an excellent case to illuminate the importance of state agency in institutional changes. Drawing on case studies in China＇s three major urbanizing regions, this article analyzes how villages brought their own land directly to the land market and reaped handsome profits. We argue that the three successful cases, Nanhai in Guangdong, Kunshan in Jiangsu and Zhenggezhuang in Beijing, all represent a product of active agency on the supply side. The Chinese state＇s fragmented authority provides a favorable institutional environment for such changes.

Analysis of the Price of Development Right of Agricultural Land in China

According to the viewpoints of predecessors, we define the signification of development right of agricultural land and connotation of the price of development right of agricultural land as follows: the development right of agricultural land is to change the former use nature of agricultural land, so as to become the right of construction use land; the price of development right of agricultural land refers to the price that is difference between the price of construction use land, and summation of the price of former agricultural land, the expense of developing agricultural land, the expense of management, and profit, after the agricultural land is transformed into non-agricultural construction use land. By using the principle of economics of land, this paper expounds the generation mechanism of the price of development right of agricultural land, namely the diversity of agricultural land use and the change of demand and supply of development right of agricultural land. The influencing factors of the development right of agricultural land are analyzed, and there are mainly the price of agricultural land, the price of construction use land, the contradiction of demand and supply of urban land, land use, and agricultural land.

Interregional compensation for farmland protection:From the perspective of farmland allocation optimization

Interregional compensation for farmland protection(IRCFP)is a policy instrument for encouraging farmland protection through interregional fiscal transfer payments.Previous practices and studies on IRCFP have generally determined the payers and recipients of compensation based on the present distribution of farmland,and the compensation standards did not combine farmland development right value with farmland deficit and surplus,resulting in insignificant effects on farmland protection and even policy failure.Therefore,in this study,we proposed an interregional compensation mechanism for farmland protection based on farmland allocation optimization by considering 31 provincial-level regions in China.The results showed that(1)the determination of farmland surplus or deficit areas based on farmland allocation optimization met the regional construction land demand from the perspective of achieving food security.(2)The combination of the compensation value standard and cropland deficit and surplus had a positive effect on farmland protection.(3)Interregional compensation for farmland protection based on farmland allocation optimization can coordinate economic development,farmland protection,and ecological conservation.Finally,we discussed the rationality of interregional compensation for farmland protection based on farmland allocation optimization and designed the operation mechanism of IRCFP.