The Infeasibility of Establishing Land Development Rights in China Based on the Path of Real Rights

Using comparative analysis and documentation method,this paper reveals infeasibility of establishing land development rights in China based on the path of real rights,in the hope of providing recommendations for improving the research route on localization of land development rights. Results indicate that at the level of legislative techniques,the land development rights rooted from property right paradigm do not contain possess the elements of object of real rights and conflict with the principle of statutory real rights and single ownership. At the level of legal logic,individual case of TDR conflicts with real right in rem. In conclusion,it is infeasible to introduce land development rights based on the path of real rights. In future,it is required to discard the concept of mechanical transplantation and explore feasible path and seek feasible way for establishing land development rights along with the direction of quasi-property and improving regulation efficiency.

Analysis of the Price of Development Right of Agricultural Land in China

According to the viewpoints of predecessors, we define the signification of development right of agricultural land and connotation of the price of development right of agricultural land as follows: the development right of agricultural land is to change the former use nature of agricultural land, so as to become the right of construction use land; the price of development right of agricultural land refers to the price that is difference between the price of construction use land, and summation of the price of former agricultural land, the expense of developing agricultural land, the expense of management, and profit, after the agricultural land is transformed into non-agricultural construction use land. By using the principle of economics of land, this paper expounds the generation mechanism of the price of development right of agricultural land, namely the diversity of agricultural land use and the change of demand and supply of development right of agricultural land. The influencing factors of the development right of agricultural land are analyzed, and there are mainly the price of agricultural land, the price of construction use land, the contradiction of demand and supply of urban land, land use, and agricultural land.

Optimal allocation of land resources in the process of economic development

In this paper,the writer uses a mathematical model to analyze:a theoretical model of land resources optimal allocation with the constraint of sustainable development;equilibrium and defects of land resources allocation in a competitive market;and how effective governmental supervision can change the equilibrium in the market and promote the optimization of land resources allocation.The main points of this paper are:continuous and excessive conversions that change land resources from agricultural use to non-agricultural use in the process of economic development are economic rules;a competitive market is an important way to improve the efficiency of land resources allocation;effective governmental supervision can cover the shortage of market and promote the optimization of land resources allocation;a reasonable arrangement of land property rights can reduce the transaction costs of government management in optimizing land resources allocation;and,the targets of land resources optimal allocation are developing along with economic development.

Developing the Commons: Models of Rural Land Trust in China

In recent years,experiments on land trusts(xin tuo)have been made in the rural areas of China.To better understand such practice,this research identifies four case studies based on their operational structures and divides them into government-led models and market-led models.The government-led models include the Yiyang Model in Hunan Province,and the Longgang Model in Hubei Province.The market-led models include the Suzhou Model in Anhui Province,and the Golden Field Series Model in Jiangsu Province.This paper compares their profit-sharing mechanisms with specific attention given to the incentives for the villagers.Findings suggest that the villagers’profits are limited in both models.The government-led models concern less about profits but more on reusing the desolated agricultural land.The market-led models are profit-driven therefore tend to exclude the villagers from the profit-sharing process.

Trading Land Development Rights under a Planned Land Use System:The“Zhejiang Model”

China＇ s state planned land use system, including regulations such as setting planned quotas for land use, basic cropland preservation, and pursuing a balance between the conversion of arable land into non-agricultural use and the supplement of new agricultural land, has substantially constrained the economic growth of industrial provinces in China. This article explores the innovative reforms adopted by Zhejiang Province through land development rights （LDR） transfer within a locality and LDR trading across localities. We argue that there is a ＂Zhejiang model of LDR transferring and trading,＂ which, we believe, has significant implications not only for fostering an efficiency-enhancing market for land development rights and agricultural land preservation, but also for optimal use of land and a more balanced regional development. One important policy issue relating to China＇s rural land system is that under China＇ s land requisition system, farmers are usually under compensated for urban land-taking.

State Fragmentation and Rights Contestation:Rural Land Development Rights in China

The functionalist reasoning of institutional changes builds on individual rationality and explains institutional changes from the demand side. While insightful, a comprehensive understanding also needs to take into account the supply side, The state, as the ultimate supplier of institutional changes, plays the pivotal role of agency; therefore, its willingness and ability decide how such regime change occurs and what partieular form the new regime takes. Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese economy has embarked on a path of rapid industrialization and urbanization. The contestation over rural land development rights in China offers an excellent case to illuminate the importance of state agency in institutional changes. Drawing on case studies in China＇s three major urbanizing regions, this article analyzes how villages brought their own land directly to the land market and reaped handsome profits. We argue that the three successful cases, Nanhai in Guangdong, Kunshan in Jiangsu and Zhenggezhuang in Beijing, all represent a product of active agency on the supply side. The Chinese state＇s fragmented authority provides a favorable institutional environment for such changes.

Local Practices on Transfer of Development Rights in China: Background, Mode, Challenge and Breakthrough

In the past decade, the transfer of development rights (referred to TDR hereafter) has been emerged and developed to a large scale amid China's fast urbanization. Different from the practices in countries with private land ownership like the United States, the practices of TDR in China are still dominated by local governments, which are trying hard to obtain extra construction land-use quota under China's current centralized land management system since the late 1990s. In this process, the land-use efficiency may be improved at the prices of social equity and harmony.

土地资本化与乡村治理转型的耦合机理研究

随着农村市场化的逐步深入和农地产权制度的逐步细化,农村土地逐步由原生的自然资源走向资本化,乡村治理的架构也相应发生变化。文章从土地资本化的视角,试图构建一个理论框架解释乡村治理演化的逻辑机理。研究认为,土地资本化从城乡关系、人地关系、制度变迁和主体重构等4个维度推动了乡村治理结构的转型,传统的乡村治理裂变成6种主要的模式原型(政府主导型、集体主导型、集体中介型、集体自治型、村民主导型和资本嵌入型)以及多种亚型。土地资本化与乡村治理模式的耦合机理在城郊和远域有所不同:在城郊大体形成了政府主导型的土地资本化和乡村治理、集体自主型土地资本化下的集体与资本协商型治理、政府—集体协商型土地资本化下的集体中介型治理;在远域乡村大体形成了村民主导土地资本化下的政府—集体—资本互动型治理、集体主导土地资本化下的集体—资本—村民协商型治理、个体与集体主导土地资本化下的集体—村民互动型治理。未来走向善治的乡村治理,需建立政府、市场和集体平等协商的治理格局。

制度变迁视域下土地储备治理体系的优化逻辑

土地储备治理体系是国家加强全民所有土地资产管理、优化土地资产配置、增强土地市场有效供给的重要基础。随着我国城市化进程的加快,土地发展权利益分配、权利归属等问题凸显,其中因土地储备治理体系滞后而带来的问题较为常见。以制度变迁为视域,梳理土地储备体系的法理考察与实践演进,探讨土地储备治理体系的优化逻辑和具体路径,将为高效配置土地资源、提升城市品质、促进经济社会发展提供新动能、新模式和新路径,具有重要的理论和现实意义。本研究以重庆为例,从土地储备治理体系的现状出发,对近年来土地储备总体经营情况、重点功能片区土地经营效益、土地储备治理体系展开实证分析,实践表明土地储备治理体系土地储备融资渠道得到拓宽,有力支持了当地经济建设,土地储备财务风险得到控制,土地储备监管更为便捷,土地储备促进了重大项目工程建设的推进,土地储备中心加强了一级市场调控,建立储备土地信息库,科学编制储备计划,加快推进前期开发,统筹安排各类资金等工作。不足之处在于,土地储备机构职能权限界限不清,储备整治工作资金保障机制不太健全,国土空间规划引领土地储备整治工作的机制尚未建立,土地储备前期开发、系统性风险问题未得到足够重视。基于理论和实证分析,研究认为应以土地确权带动土地流转,以土地流转激活土地储备,强化土地价值管理,增强土地附加功能,健全土地储备体系有助于有效利用未开发的土地资源、减少土地资源的闲置和流失、保障土地资源发展权。进而从宏观上提出以土地确权带动农村土地流转,以土地流转激活土地储备不断创新的改革路径;从微观上提出应理顺土地储备组织治理体系、优化土地储备资金融资体系、完善土地增值收益分配体系、优化城市空间治理体系、加强土地储备系统性风险应对,进一步规制宏观经济下行、土地价值下跌等系统性风险等方面进行完善的具体路径。

国土空间规划治理体系对乡村产业振兴的影响与赋能路径

乡村产业振兴是实现国家乡村振兴战略的核心内容,但长期面临产业用地供需失配、土地发展权配置失衡、土地用途管控刚弹失调等问题,有待国土空间规划治理体系的优化。文章围绕规划编制、实施和监督三个方面,解析国土空间规划治理体系对乡村产业发展的制约,进而提出国土空间规划治理体系优化的措施和路径,包括着眼于土地发展权均衡配置构建实施导向的县镇村空间规划编制体系,建立土地权益调节与土地综合整治的互促机制,建立多方参与协商的乡村规划治理体系。

土地发展权视角下全域土地综合整治工具探索——以佛山市南海区“三券”为例

全域土地综合整治是稳妥推进农村土地制度改革的关键抓手。在全域土地综合整治中,不同的整治模式会造成土地发展权的非均衡配置,使得被赋予土地发展权的项目容易实施、被削减或终止土地发展权的项目难以实施。本文从土地发展权视角出发,探究了南海区“三券”政策的三个典型案例,分析了“三券”政策的实施机制,指出“三券”政策实质上是通过土地发展权的补偿和转移来保护村集体利益、助力实施全域土地综合整治的有效工具和重要路径。建立和完善土地发展权转移和补偿机制,有利于推进实施全域土地综合整治、解决因土地性质变化而产生的土地收益“暴损”问题,有利于以全域土地综合整治为牵引深化农村土地制度改革,促进乡村振兴和城乡融合发展。

土地发展权视角下南海区村级工业园升级改造困局辨析

为了盘活土地存量,释放产业发展空间,村级工业园的升级改造是新时代背景下广东省佛山市南海区政府迫在眉睫的“头号工程”,辨析村级工业园的改造困局对南海区的空间优化具有指导意义。本文探究了土地发展权的非均衡配置对村级工业园升级改造结果的影响机制,认为现有规划造成了土地发展权的非均衡配置,村级工业园不同的升级改造模式落实并强化了这种非均衡配置。被赋予土地发展权的项目改造容易推进,被削减或剥夺的土地发展权项目改造难以实现。针对此困境,本文基于土地发展权提出3点对策:强化规划权威,降低村庄集体预期;构建土地发展权转移机制,逐步实现公平性发展;建立利益平衡机制,激活市场参与度。

城市更新规划的框架体系与内在逻辑研究——以广深为例

基于土地发展权配置的视角,以广深城市更新实践为例,提出了国土空间规划体系背景下城市更新规划的编制与管控内在逻辑、空间层次和内容框架。进而从城市更新背景、土地发展权配置方式两方面解释了城市更新规划编制与管控模式的差异。研究发现,城市更新中的“政府—市场”关系、土地增值收益分配机制和实施主体选择决定了更新规划的框架体系和编制逻辑。广州城市更新由政府深度主导土地增值收益分配,更新规划管控要素广泛,强调更新专项规划的统筹引领和要素层级传导;深圳城市更新在政府统筹下坚持市场化运作,在规划管控等方面向市场分权。分析广深两地城市更新规划管控体系及更新绩效的差异,应深入理解更新规划背后的“技术—政策—实施”逻辑。

汲取与包容性治理视角下的土地发展权转移与乡村发展

土地发展权转移是通过土地增值收益的再分配来推动乡村发展的重要政策。然而,地方政府对该政策的实施呈现出不同的结果。从汲取与包容性治理视角出发,采用案例比较法,分别以德州与成都为典型案例,分析不同地方治理路径下发展权转移对乡村发展的差异化影响。在汲取性管制路径下,地方政府以土地财政为导向,主导发展权转移并垄断了土地交易,指标进城却并未引入资本下乡,最终造成农民权益受损。而在包容性治理路径下,地方政府以统筹城乡发展为导向,发挥村民的自主性,明晰产权、搭建交易平台并维护市场运行,乡村凭借土地资源撬动城市资本下乡,并通过市场机制推动土地增值收益的多主体共享。以土地发展权转移助推乡村发展,更应注重治理路径选择,推进集体建设用地全面确权,并建立市场化交易机制显化土地发展权。

新发展格局下土地发展权配置的需求逻辑与实现路径

土地发展权配置兼顾政治秩序、经济效率、社会公平、生态效益与文化价值,是在土地开发、利用和保护过程中,平衡公共利益与私人权益的一种政府调控和市场优化的混合型政策工具。土地发展权配置与新发展格局具有价值目标趋同、制度内容耦合、推进手段相似等内在关联特征。在新发展格局下,土地发展权配置呈现多重需求逻辑,包括“权益+机会+规则”的公平逻辑、“空间+结构+规模”的效率逻辑、“经济+政治+社会”的秩序逻辑和“生态+文化”的可持续逻辑。在新时期,为有效运用土地发展权政策工具,助力新发展格局构建,需要优化以权利立法、规划导向为核心的顶层设计,细化土地发展权配置原则、转移范围和二维尺度的操作细则,强化收益分配、财政金融、技术支撑、监管奖惩等配套机制,以全面激发城乡区域经济循环发展动力,推进国家土地治理体系和治理能力现代化建设。

快速工业化地区土地发展权演化中的村村差异——以佛山市南海区为例

以效率为导向的规划充斥在高速增长时期,各类空间尺度均展现出巨大的发展差异。聚焦于村域尺度的经济与空间差异表征,建立机会公平——结果公平的过程论分析框架,对土地发展权配置——行使过程中村村差异的形成机制进行解构,结果表明:1、制度与市场偏差分别影响土地发展权的配置与行使过程,进而产生机会不公平与结果不公平;2、南海区的村村差异经历市场偏差为主——制度与市场双重偏差——制度偏差为主的形成过程;3、在国土空间规划时代,以南海区为代表的快速工业化地区面临空间层面建设状态锁定,经济层面穷者恒穷、富者恒富的村村差异锁定困局;4、需要建立土地发展权转移与交易的制度响应,推动增值收益共享、保护责任共担,破解村村差异锁定困局,支撑全域空间格局优化。

宅基地发展权转移交易:逻辑、演进与机制——基于“集地券”和“复垦券”的双案例比较

宅基地发展权转移交易通过闲置土地资源的优化配置,焕发“沉睡资产”的生机与活力。运用双案例对比分析方法,比较宅基地发展权转移交易“集地券”和“复垦券”的共性与异质性。研究发现:宅基地发展权转移交易是“集地券”和“复垦券”的实质核心,蕴含着增减挂钩占补平衡、土地节余指标交易、土地增值收益分配、票券利用和再利用的核心特征;“产生—交易—利用”的运作范式搭建了“集地券”和“复垦券”的逻辑流程框架,刻画了宅基地发展权转移交易的故事线;“人—地—权—利”四维要素和诱导、整治、竞合、契约、分配、共享的六大机制贯穿于整个运作流程之中。各要素、各机制、各阶段之间的相互耦合确保了政策的长效运作和目标实现。因此,应厘清宅基地发展权转移交易的逻辑、演进与机制,助推闲置宅基地的再利用和资产价值发挥,从而为政府深化土地改革提供智力支持。

共同富裕视域下农村宅基地增值收益分配法律制度——以土地发展权共享论为分析框架

分配制度是促进共同富裕的基础,宅基地增值收益分配制度是判断宅基地制度改革质量的重要依据。土地征收制度的局限性和宅基地收益权能的显化,使得我们开始重新反思“土地发展权私有论”与“土地发展权国有论”的法律正当性。基于社会主义公有制的所有制形式,国家必然享有土地发展权并参与分配;社会主义市场经济体制,也为土地所有权人及用益物权人的土地发展权奠定了充分的法律基础,从而形成“土地发展权共享论”。构建宅基地增值收益分配制度,需要结合中国国情,以“初次分配、再分配、第三次分配协调配套”为基本原则。在初次分配中,以产权为分配基础,促进土地发展权人机会平等,探索土地要素收入;在二次分配中,以现有税收法律体系为基础,规范收入分配秩序、调节过高收入;在三次分配中,确定“无偿原始取得宅基地使用权”的特殊情形,实现农民集体对集体成员的自愿性、自治性、公益性救助帮扶。三环节环环相扣、三层次层层递进,扎实推进共同富裕。

农地产权稳定性与农业低碳发展——基于新一轮农地确权改革的考察

研究目的:探析增强农地产权稳定性对农业低碳发展的影响及其内在机制,为深化农村土地产权制度改革和促进农业低碳发展提供理论支撑和经验证据。研究方法:基于2012—2021年中国市级面板数据,以2013—2019年开展的新一轮农地确权改革为准自然实验,采用交错双重差分模型探讨农地产权制度改革对农业低碳发展的影响。研究结果:农地产权稳定性的增强显著降低了农业碳强度,提升了农业碳效率,对农业低碳发展产生积极影响。这一结果在考虑内生性问题、异质性处理效应并进行一系列稳健性检验后依然成立。进一步分析表明,增强农地产权稳定性通过“规模经营”和“长期投资”效应促进农业低碳发展,同时也因市场化程度和普惠金融发展水平的不同产生异质性。研究结论:农地产权稳定性的增强在农业低碳发展过程中发挥了重要作用,应深化农村土地产权制度改革,因地制宜优化内外部发展环境,优化配套政策,多措并举推进农业低碳发展。

重构城市更新利益博弈机制——一个土地发展权“产权差”的新视角

因土地发展权配置而产生的土地增值收益,是城市更新中政府、社会、市场多主体复杂利益博弈的核心。土地发展权配置存在着法律上的“名义赋予”和现实中的“实际行使”两大过程,且“名义与实际”之间普遍存在差异。本文将土地发展权的“名与实之差”定义为“产权差”,以控制权为理论视角,提出了影响土地发展权配置的三大控制权——政策制定权、博弈表决权和监督审批权,并以深圳湖贝片区更新改造为例,详细论述了多元主体利用三大控制权对土地发展权产权差进行争夺博弈的过程。从中发现,土地发展权的产权差争夺是城市更新利益博弈的关键,产权差大小伴随着控制权的强弱行使呈现出“抑制—释放—扩增—弥合”的演变特征,可以用来表征利益博弈的复杂激烈程度。产权差博弈为城市更新中的政策优化和空间治理能力提升提供了一种全新的视角。