Large shareholders and accounting research

Large shareholders are a potentially very important element of firms' corporate governance system. Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are, in practice there are important variations in the types of large owners(and the different types of large owners could play very different governance roles). After briefly reviewing the standard agency cost arguments, in this article I emphasize the heterogeneity of concentrated ownership and in particular focus on the roles of families, institutions, governments, and employee ownership. I also discuss the role of large shareholders in private(i.e., unlisted) firms, where ownership tends to be more concentrated than in publicly traded firms. Finally, I briefly discuss variations in ownership structures across selected countries.

Multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment:Evidence from the Chinese listed companies

Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders.However,multiple large shareholders may collude,thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the company.This paper uses a sample of companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges between 2008 and 2017 to investigate the relationship between multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment(CEPI).We find that multiple large shareholders will significantly reduce CEPI.Specifically,external supervision and a company’s ownership structure affect the relationship between multiple large shareholders and CEPI.In addition,after participating in SOEs,non-state-owned shareholders will significantly improve CEPI of SOEs.

Large Shareholder Tunneling and Risk of Stock Price Crash： Evidence from China

Although several studies have examined the economic consequences of large shareholders＇ tunneling behavior, little attention has been paid to the negative effects of tunneling on firms＇ extreme events. In this article, we investigate how tunneling behavior affects firm-level stock price crashes. The findings indicate that the probability of stock price crashes is positively associated with the extent of tunneling behavior by large shareholders. The positive relationship is more pronounced after the split of share structure reform and is moderated by the firm＇s financial conditions. This study contributes to the emerging body of literature focusing on the economic consequences of tunneling and stock price crashes. The conclusions drawn from the study also provide a frame of reference for investor protection and investment portfolios based on large shareholders＇ tunneling behavior in China.

Does strengthening large shareholders'cash flow rights reduce their expropriation motivation?Evidence from China's dividend tax reforms

According to classic corporate governance theory,strengthening large shareholders’cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with those of minority shareholders.However,due to the weaker investor protections and low dividend payouts of listed firms in China,large shareholders typically extract private benefits instead of seeking shared benefits through dividends.They therefore care more about control rights than cash flow rights.An empirical study using the exogenous changes of two rounds of dividend tax reductions reveals that strengthening the largest shareholders’cash flow rights leaves their expropriation activities unchanged and firm value does not increase.However,when other shareholders supervise the largest shareholder,expropriation activities ease significantly.

The Effect of Social Responsibility Report Audit on the Quality of CSR Information Disclosure --Empirical Data from Chinese Listed Companies

As an important corporate govemance mechanism, external audit helps to improve corporate economic performance. Social responsibility report audit can supervise and constrain the disclosure of corporate social responsibility information, risk assessment and consulting planning, and improve the quality of information disclosure. Taking 2010-2013 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen as samples for empirical test, we found that social responsibility report audit significantly improved the quality of corporate social responsibility information disclosure. Further study found that the greater the intensity of corporate shareholder oversight, social responsibility report audit on the quality of social responsibility to promote the quality of information disclosure more obvious. In addition, compared with the state-owned enterprises, the supervision of the major shareholders in the private enterprises to a greater extent enhanced the quality of social responsibility information disclosure.

“Swimming Ducks Forecast the Coming of Spring”—The predictability of aggregate insider trading on future market returns in the Chinese market

This study systematically examines the ability of aggregate insider trading to predict future market returns in the Chinese A-share market. After controlling for the contrarian investment strategy, aggregate executive(large shareholder)trading conducted over the past six months can predict 66%(72.7%) of market returns twelve months in advance. Aggregate insider trading predicts future market returns very accurately and is stronger for insiders who have a greater information advantage(e.g., executives and controlling shareholders).Corporate governance also affects the predictability of insider trading. The predictability of executive trading is weakest in central state-owned companies,probably because the "quasi-official" status of the executives in those companies effectively curbs their incentives to benefit from insider trading.The predictive power of large shareholder trading in private-owned companies is higher than that in state-owned companies, probably due to their stronger profit motivation and higher involvement in business operations. This study complements the literature by examining an emerging market and investigating how the institutional context and corporate governance affect insider trading.