Empirical Evaluation of Information Leakage Detection Using Net-flow Analysis

Because of the widespread of Trojans,organizations and Internet users become more vulnerable to the threat of information leakage.This paper describes an information leakage detection system( ILDS) to detect sensitive information leakage caused by Trojan.In particular,the principles of the system are based on the analysis of net-flows in four perspectives: heartbeat behavior analysis,DNS abnormal analysis,uploaddownload ratio and content analysis.Heartbeat behavior analysis and DNS abnormal analysis are used to detect the existence of Trojans while upload-download ratio and content analysis can quickly detect when the information leakage happens.Experiments indicate that the system is reliable and efficient in detecting information leakage.The system can also help to collect and preserve digital evidence when information leakage incident occurs.

Cryptanalysis and improvement of quantum broadcast communication and authentication protocol with a quantum one-time pad

The security of quantum broadcast communication（QBC） and authentication protocol based on Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger（GHZ） state and quantum one-time pad is analyzed. It is shown that there are some security issues in this protocol.Firstly, an external eavesdropper can take the intercept–measure–resend attack strategy to eavesdrop on 0.369 bit of every bit of the identity string of each receiver without being detected. Meanwhile, 0.524 bit of every bit of the secret message can be eavesdropped on without being detected. Secondly, an inner receiver can take the intercept–measure–resend attack strategy to eavesdrop on half of the identity string of the other＇s definitely without being checked. In addition, an alternative attack called the CNOT-operation attack is discussed. As for the multi-party QBC protocol, the attack efficiency increases with the increase of the number of users. Finally, the QBC protocol is improved to a secure one.

Information Leakage in Quantum Dialogue by Using Non-Symmetric Quantum Channel

In this paper [Commun. Theor. Phys. 53(2010) 648], Zhan et al. proposed a quantum dialogue protocol by using non-symmetric quantum channel. We study the security of the protocol and find that it has the drawback of information leakage. That is, Zhan et al.'s protocol is proved to be insecure by us.

A Study on the EM Leakage Arising from Braided Shielding Cable

To investigate the electromagnetic leakage caused by braided shidding cable, the finite-difference formulation of braided shielding cable for both the inner shield-conductor circuit and outer shield-ground circuit are proposed. Then, the current in shield-ground circuit induced by the transmitting signal in the cable is computed in time-domain, and the shielding effectiveness of braided shield against trapezoid signals is studied. Further more, the video EM leakage in far zone is calculated. At last, the information leakage caused by EM radiation of braided cable is intercepted and recovered using the simulation platform. It is proved that EM radiation of braided cable can give rise to information leakage. It is a key factor that should be concerned in the information secure field.

Cryptanalysis and improvement of several quantum private comparison protocols

Recently, Wu et al(2019 Int. J. Theor. Phys. 58 1854) found a serious information leakage problem in Ye and Ji’s quantum private comparison protocol(2017 Int. J. Theor. Phys. 561517), that is, a malicious participant can steal another’s secret data without being detected through an active attack means. In this paper, we show that Wu et al’s active attack is also effective for several other existing protocols, including the ones proposed by Ji et al and Zha et al(2016 Commun. Theor. Phys. 65 711;2018 Int. J. Theor. Phys. 57 3874). In addition,we propose what a passive attack means, which is different from Wu et al’s active attack in that the malicious participant can easily steal another’s secret data only by using his own secret data after finishing the protocol, instead of stealing the data by forging identities when executing the protocol. Furthermore, we find that several other existing quantum private comparison protocols also have such an information leakage problem. In response to the problem, we propose a simple solution, which is more efficient than the ones proposed by Wu et al, because it does not consume additional classical and quantum resources.

Security analysis of two recently proposed RFID authentication protocols

Radio frequency identification （RFID） systems suffer many security risks because they use an insecure wireless communication channel between tag and reader. In this paper, we analyze two recently proposed RFID authentication protocols. Both protocols are vulnerable to tag information leakage and untraceability attacks. For the attack on the first protocol, the adversary only needs to eavesdrop on the messages between reader and tag, and then perform an XOR operation. To attack the second protocol successfully, the adversary may execute a series of carefully designed challenges to determine the tag＇s identification.