Nowadays the answer to the question ＂what is logic？＂ seems very simple and obvious--＂logic is a science,＂ and after that usually one says what is this science about. As for the expressions ＂logic is an art＂ or ...Nowadays the answer to the question ＂what is logic？＂ seems very simple and obvious--＂logic is a science,＂ and after that usually one says what is this science about. As for the expressions ＂logic is an art＂ or ＂the art of logic,＂ then they are only metaphors or some kind of ＂facon de parler＂ used in serious scientific discourse. One of my aims here is to trace （on the base of as authentic texts as a commentator literature） the line of development of dichotomy ＂logic as an art--logic as a science＂ and to demonstrate that both these feat uses of logic have fundamental historical roots and play very important conceptual role in any theorizing about logic. Despite the fact that （modern） logic is undoubtedly a science, it can be interpreted as an art, moreover, the analysis of logic from this point of view expands, it seems to me, the researching possibilities in the field of the philosophy of logic at least in better understanding what is logic, what creates its unity independently from the historical period of its development, topics, and methods.展开更多
There is no patina of doubt that the central philosophical theories of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn concerning the nature, substance and method for acquiring scientific knowledge constitute milestones in 20th century p...There is no patina of doubt that the central philosophical theories of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn concerning the nature, substance and method for acquiring scientific knowledge constitute milestones in 20th century philosophy of science. Just as Popper＇s fundamental work on the subject, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, marked a decisive break with inductivist epistemologies, Kuhn＇s magnum opus, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions （1962, enlarged ed. 1970）, inaugurated the coming of age of the historical turn in the philosophy of science. Some scholars seem to consider the main doctrines of both philosophers as irreconcilables or contradictories. This explains why, for example Popper and Popperians such as Imre Lakatos and John Watkins describe themselves as ＂critical rationalists＂, whereas they refer to Kuhn as an ＂irrationalist＂ or ＂relativist＂-appellations that the latter has consistently rejected. The debate between Popper and Kuhn, especially as contained in an important work, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge （1970）, highlights some of the knotty problems connected with philosophical appraisals of science. It also demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of logistic approaches in the philosophy of science, on the one hand, and of historically informed socio-psychological analysis of science, on the other. In this paper, we reexamine the Popper-Kuhn controversy from an experimentalist perspective. In other words, we argue that the ideas of testing and normal science can be systematically accommodated by fine-structure dissection of empirical research through which scientists learn about the world, based on the assumption that the progress of science is the growth of experimental knowledge-a fact often neglected in theory-dominated philosophies of science. Taking discovery of the cosmic background radiation by Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson as example, the paper argues that important scientific discoveries have been accomplished even in the absence of theory in any obvious sense, a situation that conflicts with the theory-dominated models of Popper and Kuhn. Thus, it offers an account of how practicing scientists learn from research to control errors and avoid blind alleys. The paper affirms, in conclusion, that going beyond the theories of Popper and Kuhn requires that philosophers of science should take what scientists learn from experiments seriously when theorising about science, by taking into account normal testing or error detection and control strategies through which scientific knowledge is acquired and extended展开更多
To combat the well-known state-space explosion problem in Prop ositional Linear T emp o- ral Logic （PLTL） model checking, a novel algo- rithm capable of translating PLTL formulas into Nondeterministic Automata （NA...To combat the well-known state-space explosion problem in Prop ositional Linear T emp o- ral Logic （PLTL） model checking, a novel algo- rithm capable of translating PLTL formulas into Nondeterministic Automata （NA） in an efficient way is proposed. The algorithm firstly transforms PLTL formulas into their non-free forms, then it further translates the non-free formulas into their Normal Forms （NFs）, next constructs Normal Form Graphs （NFGs） for NF formulas, and it fi- nally transforms NFGs into the NA which ac- cepts both finite words and int-mite words. The experimental data show that the new algorithm re- duces the average number of nodes of target NA for a benchmark formula set and selected formulas in the literature, respectively. These results indi- cate that the PLTL model checking technique em- ploying the new algorithm generates a smaller state space in verification of concurrent systems.展开更多
The causes and the problems of integration of scientific ＆ technical innovation （ISTI） and inevitability are proposed. The status of domestic scientific ＆ technical innovation is analysed. A series of emergent man...The causes and the problems of integration of scientific ＆ technical innovation （ISTI） and inevitability are proposed. The status of domestic scientific ＆ technical innovation is analysed. A series of emergent managerial problems caused by the system ISTI （SISTI） are pointed out. Because of Hall three dimensions structure＇s enlightenment, a three dimensional logical net diagram in which the system integration of innovation based on problem in real world but not on disciplinary logic is drawn. The intelligent group＇ s need span is greater under the conditions of relatively low material level than common groups who have lower degree of education. The SISTI is composed by multi-rule and intelligent multi-agent behavior. It is concluded that the logical relationships of integrated technology which based on the author＇s experience and observation must be considerded for a valid management of SISTI.展开更多
Different programming languages can be used for discrete, abstract and process-oriented programming. Depending on the application, there exist additional requirements, which are not fulfilled by every programming lang...Different programming languages can be used for discrete, abstract and process-oriented programming. Depending on the application, there exist additional requirements, which are not fulfilled by every programming language. Flexible programming and maintainability are especially important requirements for process engineers. In this paper, the programming languages Activity Diagram, State Chart Diagram and Sequential Function Chart are compared and evaluated with regard to these requirements. This evaluation is based on the principles of cognitive effectiveness and cognitive dimensions. The aim of this paper is to identify the programming language suited best for controlling sequential processes, e.g. thermomechanical or batch processes.展开更多
Hilbert’s complete perfect (HCP) logic is introduced. The Gdel’s incompleteness theorem discloses the limit of logic.Huang’s universal consistent theorem and relative consistent theorem extends the limit of logic...Hilbert’s complete perfect (HCP) logic is introduced. The Gdel’s incompleteness theorem discloses the limit of logic.Huang’s universal consistent theorem and relative consistent theorem extends the limit of logic.The proofs of these theorems are in 2-valued logic but the completeness can be extended in the three-valued HCP logic. The author proposes HCP logic for the foundation of uncertainty computing as well.展开更多
The Monty Hall problem has received its fair share of attention in mathematics. Recently, an entire monograph has been devoted to its history. There has been a multiplicity of approaches to the problem. These approach...The Monty Hall problem has received its fair share of attention in mathematics. Recently, an entire monograph has been devoted to its history. There has been a multiplicity of approaches to the problem. These approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The design of the present paper is to add one more approach by analyzing the mathematical structure of the Monty Hall problem in digital terms. The structure of the problem is described as much as possible in the tradition and the spirit—and as much as possible by means of the algebraic conventions—of George Boole’s Investigation of the Laws of Thought (1854), the Magna Charta of the digital age, and of John Venn’s Symbolic Logic (second edition, 1894), which is squarely based on Boole’s Investigation and elucidates it in many ways. The focus is not only on the digital-mathematical structure itself but also on its relation to the presumed digital nature of cognition as expressed in rational thought and language. The digital approach is outlined in part 1. In part 2, the Monty Hall problem is analyzed digitally. To ensure the generality of the digital approach and demonstrate its reliability and productivity, the Monty Hall problem is extended and generalized in parts 3 and 4 to related cases in light of the axioms of probability theory. In the full mapping of the mathematical structure of the Monty Hall problem and any extensions thereof, a digital or non-quantitative skeleton is fleshed out by a quantitative component. The pertinent mathematical equations are developed and presented and illustrated by means of examples.展开更多
In Advances in Pure Mathematics (www.scirp.org/journal/apm), Vol. 1, No. 4 (July 2011), pp. 136-154, the mathematical structure of the much discussed problem of probability known as the Monty Hall problem was mapped i...In Advances in Pure Mathematics (www.scirp.org/journal/apm), Vol. 1, No. 4 (July 2011), pp. 136-154, the mathematical structure of the much discussed problem of probability known as the Monty Hall problem was mapped in detail. It is styled here as Monty Hall 1.0. The proposed analysis was then generalized to related cases involving any number of doors (d), cars (c), and opened doors (o) (Monty Hall 2.0) and 1 specific case involving more than 1 picked door (p) (Monty Hall 3.0). In cognitive terms, this analysis was interpreted in function of the presumed digital nature of rational thought and language. In the present paper, Monty Hall 1.0 and 2.0 are briefly reviewed (§§2-3). Additional generalizations of the problem are then presented in §§4-7. They concern expansions of the problem to the following items: (1) to any number of picked doors, with p denoting the number of doors initially picked and q the number of doors picked when switching doors after doors have been opened to reveal goats (Monty Hall 3.0;see §4);(3) to the precise conditions under which one’s chances increase or decrease in instances of Monty Hall 3.0 (Monty Hall 3.2;see §6);and (4) to any number of switches of doors (s) (Monty Hall 4.0;see §7). The afore-mentioned article in APM, Vol. 1, No. 4 may serve as a useful introduction to the analysis of the higher variations of the Monty Hall problem offered in the present article. The body of the article is by Leo Depuydt. An appendix by Richard D. Gill (see §8) provides additional context by building a bridge to modern probability theory in its conventional notation and by pointing to the benefits of certain interesting and relevant tools of computation now available on the Internet. The cognitive component of the earlier investigation is extended in §9 by reflections on the foundations of mathematics. It will be proposed, in the footsteps of George Boole, that the phenomenon of mathematics needs to be defined in empirical terms as something that happens to the brain or something that the brain does. It is generally assumed that mathematics is a property of nature or reality or whatever one may call it. There is not the slightest intention in this paper to falsify this assumption because it cannot be falsified, just as it cannot be empirically or positively proven. But there is no way that this assumption can be a factual observation. It can be no more than an altogether reasonable, yet fully secondary, inference derived mainly from the fact that mathematics appears to work, even if some may deem the fact of this match to constitute proof. On the deepest empirical level, mathematics can only be directly observed and therefore directly analyzed as an activity of the brain. The study of mathematics therefore becomes an essential part of the study of cognition and human intelligence. The reflections on mathematics as a phenomenon offered in the present article will serve as a prelude to planned articles on how to redefine the foundations of probability as one type of mathematics in cognitive fashion and on how exactly Boole’s theory of probability subsumes, supersedes, and completes classical probability theory. §§2-7 combined, on the one hand, and §9, on the other hand, are both self-sufficient units and can be read independently from one another. The ultimate design of the larger project of which this paper is part remains the increase of digitalization of the analysis of rational thought and language, that is, of (rational, not emotional) human intelligence. To reach out to other disciplines, an effort is made to describe the mathematics more explicitly than is usual.展开更多
The present paper is part of a large scale project in Intelligence Science. The nearterm aim of this project is the increased digitalization of the analysis of human intelligence in as far as intelligence is rational....The present paper is part of a large scale project in Intelligence Science. The nearterm aim of this project is the increased digitalization of the analysis of human intelligence in as far as intelligence is rational. The ultimate aim is to draw up a complete and definitive map of the totality of rational human intelligence or rational thought and language. As far as the mathematical component of this project is concerned, two contributions have appeared so far, the following: 1) “The Monty Hall Problem and beyond: Digital-Mathematical and Cognitive Analysis in Boole’s Algebra, Including an Extension and Generalization to Related Cases”, in Advances in Pure Mathematics (www.scirp.org/journal/apm), Vol. 1, No. 4 (July 2011), pp. 136-154;2) “Higher Variations of the Monty Hall Problem (3.0, 4.0) and Empirical Definition of the Phenomenon of Mathematics, in Boole’s Footsteps, as Something the Brain Does”, in Advances in Pure Mathematics (www.scirp.org/journal/apm), Vol. 2, No. 4 (July 2012), pp. 243-273, including an appendix by Richard D. Gill. The present paper pertains to the linguistics branch of the project. It is concerned with linguistic cognition. The focus of this paper is on a single phenomenon, the relative clause and all its possible types. The method of analyzing the structure of rational thought and language that is advanced in this paper and applied to the relative clause claims validity on the following three grounds. First, it is mathematical and digital in the strictest possible sense. Second, the empirical data to which this mathematical method is applied are fully accessible in language. After all, all that is essential to that structure must be exteriorized in sounds or written symbols for the structure to be transported from one brain to another and understood. The structure must somehow be encoded in its entirety in the airwaves or light beams that travel to a hearer’s ear or a reader’s eye. And these airwaves and light beams are accessible to observation. Third, general inspiration and encouragement can be drawn from the fact that it has already been long established that the brain teems with digital activity, including in the prefrontal cortex. In sum, there is every incentive for dissecting language in search of the digital structure of rational thought and its expression in language. The design of the present paper is to demonstrate that the structure can be found.展开更多
Often conceived as metaphysical approach, in the XX Century, philosophy is object of a crusade antimetaphysical in the movement of Logical Positivism. I will try to demonstrate that a philosophical perspective is conc...Often conceived as metaphysical approach, in the XX Century, philosophy is object of a crusade antimetaphysical in the movement of Logical Positivism. I will try to demonstrate that a philosophical perspective is conceivable even in the scientific conception of the world elaborated by the neopositivists. I discuss this point of view with attention to the turn represented by pragmatic philosophy of Neurath, which represents a crucial passage for the future of philosophy. In this vision, the science is not conceivable without philosophy, namely without an open and pluralist scientific philosophy. The philosophy--so--is not insufficient too for the perspective of scientific conception of the world.展开更多
文摘Nowadays the answer to the question ＂what is logic？＂ seems very simple and obvious--＂logic is a science,＂ and after that usually one says what is this science about. As for the expressions ＂logic is an art＂ or ＂the art of logic,＂ then they are only metaphors or some kind of ＂facon de parler＂ used in serious scientific discourse. One of my aims here is to trace （on the base of as authentic texts as a commentator literature） the line of development of dichotomy ＂logic as an art--logic as a science＂ and to demonstrate that both these feat uses of logic have fundamental historical roots and play very important conceptual role in any theorizing about logic. Despite the fact that （modern） logic is undoubtedly a science, it can be interpreted as an art, moreover, the analysis of logic from this point of view expands, it seems to me, the researching possibilities in the field of the philosophy of logic at least in better understanding what is logic, what creates its unity independently from the historical period of its development, topics, and methods.
文摘There is no patina of doubt that the central philosophical theories of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn concerning the nature, substance and method for acquiring scientific knowledge constitute milestones in 20th century philosophy of science. Just as Popper＇s fundamental work on the subject, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, marked a decisive break with inductivist epistemologies, Kuhn＇s magnum opus, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions （1962, enlarged ed. 1970）, inaugurated the coming of age of the historical turn in the philosophy of science. Some scholars seem to consider the main doctrines of both philosophers as irreconcilables or contradictories. This explains why, for example Popper and Popperians such as Imre Lakatos and John Watkins describe themselves as ＂critical rationalists＂, whereas they refer to Kuhn as an ＂irrationalist＂ or ＂relativist＂-appellations that the latter has consistently rejected. The debate between Popper and Kuhn, especially as contained in an important work, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge （1970）, highlights some of the knotty problems connected with philosophical appraisals of science. It also demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of logistic approaches in the philosophy of science, on the one hand, and of historically informed socio-psychological analysis of science, on the other. In this paper, we reexamine the Popper-Kuhn controversy from an experimentalist perspective. In other words, we argue that the ideas of testing and normal science can be systematically accommodated by fine-structure dissection of empirical research through which scientists learn about the world, based on the assumption that the progress of science is the growth of experimental knowledge-a fact often neglected in theory-dominated philosophies of science. Taking discovery of the cosmic background radiation by Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson as example, the paper argues that important scientific discoveries have been accomplished even in the absence of theory in any obvious sense, a situation that conflicts with the theory-dominated models of Popper and Kuhn. Thus, it offers an account of how practicing scientists learn from research to control errors and avoid blind alleys. The paper affirms, in conclusion, that going beyond the theories of Popper and Kuhn requires that philosophers of science should take what scientists learn from experiments seriously when theorising about science, by taking into account normal testing or error detection and control strategies through which scientific knowledge is acquired and extended
基金The first author of this paper would like to thank the follow- ing scholars, Prof. Joseph Sifakis, 2007 Turing Award Winner, for his invaluable help with my research and Dr. Kevin Lu at Brunel University, UK for his excellent suggestions on this paper. This work was supported by the National Natural Sci- ence Foundation of China under Grant No.61003079 the Chi- na Postdoctoral Science Foundation under Grant No. 2012M511588.
文摘To combat the well-known state-space explosion problem in Prop ositional Linear T emp o- ral Logic （PLTL） model checking, a novel algo- rithm capable of translating PLTL formulas into Nondeterministic Automata （NA） in an efficient way is proposed. The algorithm firstly transforms PLTL formulas into their non-free forms, then it further translates the non-free formulas into their Normal Forms （NFs）, next constructs Normal Form Graphs （NFGs） for NF formulas, and it fi- nally transforms NFGs into the NA which ac- cepts both finite words and int-mite words. The experimental data show that the new algorithm re- duces the average number of nodes of target NA for a benchmark formula set and selected formulas in the literature, respectively. These results indi- cate that the PLTL model checking technique em- ploying the new algorithm generates a smaller state space in verification of concurrent systems.
基金Sponsored bythe National Innovation Basein Management on National Defense Science Technology National Economy Mobilization of the SecondPhase of"985"Project
文摘The causes and the problems of integration of scientific ＆ technical innovation （ISTI） and inevitability are proposed. The status of domestic scientific ＆ technical innovation is analysed. A series of emergent managerial problems caused by the system ISTI （SISTI） are pointed out. Because of Hall three dimensions structure＇s enlightenment, a three dimensional logical net diagram in which the system integration of innovation based on problem in real world but not on disciplinary logic is drawn. The intelligent group＇ s need span is greater under the conditions of relatively low material level than common groups who have lower degree of education. The SISTI is composed by multi-rule and intelligent multi-agent behavior. It is concluded that the logical relationships of integrated technology which based on the author＇s experience and observation must be considerded for a valid management of SISTI.
文摘Different programming languages can be used for discrete, abstract and process-oriented programming. Depending on the application, there exist additional requirements, which are not fulfilled by every programming language. Flexible programming and maintainability are especially important requirements for process engineers. In this paper, the programming languages Activity Diagram, State Chart Diagram and Sequential Function Chart are compared and evaluated with regard to these requirements. This evaluation is based on the principles of cognitive effectiveness and cognitive dimensions. The aim of this paper is to identify the programming language suited best for controlling sequential processes, e.g. thermomechanical or batch processes.
文摘Hilbert’s complete perfect (HCP) logic is introduced. The Gdel’s incompleteness theorem discloses the limit of logic.Huang’s universal consistent theorem and relative consistent theorem extends the limit of logic.The proofs of these theorems are in 2-valued logic but the completeness can be extended in the three-valued HCP logic. The author proposes HCP logic for the foundation of uncertainty computing as well.
文摘The Monty Hall problem has received its fair share of attention in mathematics. Recently, an entire monograph has been devoted to its history. There has been a multiplicity of approaches to the problem. These approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The design of the present paper is to add one more approach by analyzing the mathematical structure of the Monty Hall problem in digital terms. The structure of the problem is described as much as possible in the tradition and the spirit—and as much as possible by means of the algebraic conventions—of George Boole’s Investigation of the Laws of Thought (1854), the Magna Charta of the digital age, and of John Venn’s Symbolic Logic (second edition, 1894), which is squarely based on Boole’s Investigation and elucidates it in many ways. The focus is not only on the digital-mathematical structure itself but also on its relation to the presumed digital nature of cognition as expressed in rational thought and language. The digital approach is outlined in part 1. In part 2, the Monty Hall problem is analyzed digitally. To ensure the generality of the digital approach and demonstrate its reliability and productivity, the Monty Hall problem is extended and generalized in parts 3 and 4 to related cases in light of the axioms of probability theory. In the full mapping of the mathematical structure of the Monty Hall problem and any extensions thereof, a digital or non-quantitative skeleton is fleshed out by a quantitative component. The pertinent mathematical equations are developed and presented and illustrated by means of examples.
文摘In Advances in Pure Mathematics (www.scirp.org/journal/apm), Vol. 1, No. 4 (July 2011), pp. 136-154, the mathematical structure of the much discussed problem of probability known as the Monty Hall problem was mapped in detail. It is styled here as Monty Hall 1.0. The proposed analysis was then generalized to related cases involving any number of doors (d), cars (c), and opened doors (o) (Monty Hall 2.0) and 1 specific case involving more than 1 picked door (p) (Monty Hall 3.0). In cognitive terms, this analysis was interpreted in function of the presumed digital nature of rational thought and language. In the present paper, Monty Hall 1.0 and 2.0 are briefly reviewed (§§2-3). Additional generalizations of the problem are then presented in §§4-7. They concern expansions of the problem to the following items: (1) to any number of picked doors, with p denoting the number of doors initially picked and q the number of doors picked when switching doors after doors have been opened to reveal goats (Monty Hall 3.0;see §4);(3) to the precise conditions under which one’s chances increase or decrease in instances of Monty Hall 3.0 (Monty Hall 3.2;see §6);and (4) to any number of switches of doors (s) (Monty Hall 4.0;see §7). The afore-mentioned article in APM, Vol. 1, No. 4 may serve as a useful introduction to the analysis of the higher variations of the Monty Hall problem offered in the present article. The body of the article is by Leo Depuydt. An appendix by Richard D. Gill (see §8) provides additional context by building a bridge to modern probability theory in its conventional notation and by pointing to the benefits of certain interesting and relevant tools of computation now available on the Internet. The cognitive component of the earlier investigation is extended in §9 by reflections on the foundations of mathematics. It will be proposed, in the footsteps of George Boole, that the phenomenon of mathematics needs to be defined in empirical terms as something that happens to the brain or something that the brain does. It is generally assumed that mathematics is a property of nature or reality or whatever one may call it. There is not the slightest intention in this paper to falsify this assumption because it cannot be falsified, just as it cannot be empirically or positively proven. But there is no way that this assumption can be a factual observation. It can be no more than an altogether reasonable, yet fully secondary, inference derived mainly from the fact that mathematics appears to work, even if some may deem the fact of this match to constitute proof. On the deepest empirical level, mathematics can only be directly observed and therefore directly analyzed as an activity of the brain. The study of mathematics therefore becomes an essential part of the study of cognition and human intelligence. The reflections on mathematics as a phenomenon offered in the present article will serve as a prelude to planned articles on how to redefine the foundations of probability as one type of mathematics in cognitive fashion and on how exactly Boole’s theory of probability subsumes, supersedes, and completes classical probability theory. §§2-7 combined, on the one hand, and §9, on the other hand, are both self-sufficient units and can be read independently from one another. The ultimate design of the larger project of which this paper is part remains the increase of digitalization of the analysis of rational thought and language, that is, of (rational, not emotional) human intelligence. To reach out to other disciplines, an effort is made to describe the mathematics more explicitly than is usual.
文摘The present paper is part of a large scale project in Intelligence Science. The nearterm aim of this project is the increased digitalization of the analysis of human intelligence in as far as intelligence is rational. The ultimate aim is to draw up a complete and definitive map of the totality of rational human intelligence or rational thought and language. As far as the mathematical component of this project is concerned, two contributions have appeared so far, the following: 1) “The Monty Hall Problem and beyond: Digital-Mathematical and Cognitive Analysis in Boole’s Algebra, Including an Extension and Generalization to Related Cases”, in Advances in Pure Mathematics (www.scirp.org/journal/apm), Vol. 1, No. 4 (July 2011), pp. 136-154;2) “Higher Variations of the Monty Hall Problem (3.0, 4.0) and Empirical Definition of the Phenomenon of Mathematics, in Boole’s Footsteps, as Something the Brain Does”, in Advances in Pure Mathematics (www.scirp.org/journal/apm), Vol. 2, No. 4 (July 2012), pp. 243-273, including an appendix by Richard D. Gill. The present paper pertains to the linguistics branch of the project. It is concerned with linguistic cognition. The focus of this paper is on a single phenomenon, the relative clause and all its possible types. The method of analyzing the structure of rational thought and language that is advanced in this paper and applied to the relative clause claims validity on the following three grounds. First, it is mathematical and digital in the strictest possible sense. Second, the empirical data to which this mathematical method is applied are fully accessible in language. After all, all that is essential to that structure must be exteriorized in sounds or written symbols for the structure to be transported from one brain to another and understood. The structure must somehow be encoded in its entirety in the airwaves or light beams that travel to a hearer’s ear or a reader’s eye. And these airwaves and light beams are accessible to observation. Third, general inspiration and encouragement can be drawn from the fact that it has already been long established that the brain teems with digital activity, including in the prefrontal cortex. In sum, there is every incentive for dissecting language in search of the digital structure of rational thought and its expression in language. The design of the present paper is to demonstrate that the structure can be found.
文摘Often conceived as metaphysical approach, in the XX Century, philosophy is object of a crusade antimetaphysical in the movement of Logical Positivism. I will try to demonstrate that a philosophical perspective is conceivable even in the scientific conception of the world elaborated by the neopositivists. I discuss this point of view with attention to the turn represented by pragmatic philosophy of Neurath, which represents a crucial passage for the future of philosophy. In this vision, the science is not conceivable without philosophy, namely without an open and pluralist scientific philosophy. The philosophy--so--is not insufficient too for the perspective of scientific conception of the world.
