We consider queueing networks （QN＇s） with feedback loops roamed by ＂intelligent＂ agents, able to select their routing on the basis of their measured waiting times at the QN nodes. This is an idealized model to di...We consider queueing networks （QN＇s） with feedback loops roamed by ＂intelligent＂ agents, able to select their routing on the basis of their measured waiting times at the QN nodes. This is an idealized model to discuss the dynamics of customers who stay loyal to a service supplier, provided their service time remains below a critical threshold. For these QN＇s, we show that the traffic flows may exhibit collective patterns typically encountered in multi-agent systems. In simple network topologies, the emergent cooperative behaviors manifest themselves via stable macroscopic temporal oscillations, synchronization of the queue contents and stabilization by noise phenomena. For a wide range of control parameters, the underlying presence of the law of large numbers enables us to use deterministic evolution laws to analytically characterize the cooperative evolution of our multi-agent systems. In particular, we study the case where the servers are sporadically subject, to failures altering their ordinary behavior.展开更多
ZTE Corporation is China’s largest listedtelecommunications equipment provider spe-cialized in offering a full range of tailor-madesolutions for customers in high-,middle-andlow-end markets.
We study a supply chain in which an original equipment manufacturer(OEM)outsources manufacturing functions to a contract manufacturer(CM)for cost saving.In addition to accepting the OEM's order,the CM can develop ...We study a supply chain in which an original equipment manufacturer(OEM)outsources manufacturing functions to a contract manufacturer(CM)for cost saving.In addition to accepting the OEM's order,the CM can develop self-branded products and enter the end-market.Because of the OEM's well-known brand and long-term good reputation,we take the asymmetric customer loyalty into consideration-a fraction of customers are loyal customers(LCs)who only consider buying the product from the OEM,while other customers in the market are non-loyal customers(NCs)who might switch to purchasing the CM7s product because of the lower selling price.We explore whether the CM will enter the end-market and if so,what is the impact of the market entry on the OEM and the entire supply chain.Counterintuitively,we find that there will be no market entry when the CM is relatively strong,i.e.,the CM is able to provide self-branded products with relatively high acceptance and the CM has a relatively large bargaining power.In addition,when the NC segment is an important profit source for the OEM,i.e.,the NCs7 market size is relatively large and their willingness-to-pay is relatively high,the market entry will not occur,either.The OEM's profit is always hurt by the CM's market entry unless the OEM always only sells the product to the LCs,while the supply chain sometimes can get benefit.Through numerical simulations,we reveal the relationships between the profit change of different parties and the key parameters,such as the relative willingness-to-pay and market sizes of two types of customers,the CMrs bargaining power and the acceptance of the CMrs product,when the market entry becomes an available option for the CM.The impact of production cost difference on the market entry decision and profit changes is also analyzed in the extension when producing the OEM's product is more costly for the CM than producing the self-branded product.展开更多
基金the Fonds National Suisse de la Recherche Scientifique under Grant No.200021-109191/1the Portuguese Fundaao para a Cinca e a Tecnologica(FCT Bolsa FEDER/POCTI-SFA-1-219)The original version was presented on ICSSSM'06.
文摘We consider queueing networks （QN＇s） with feedback loops roamed by ＂intelligent＂ agents, able to select their routing on the basis of their measured waiting times at the QN nodes. This is an idealized model to discuss the dynamics of customers who stay loyal to a service supplier, provided their service time remains below a critical threshold. For these QN＇s, we show that the traffic flows may exhibit collective patterns typically encountered in multi-agent systems. In simple network topologies, the emergent cooperative behaviors manifest themselves via stable macroscopic temporal oscillations, synchronization of the queue contents and stabilization by noise phenomena. For a wide range of control parameters, the underlying presence of the law of large numbers enables us to use deterministic evolution laws to analytically characterize the cooperative evolution of our multi-agent systems. In particular, we study the case where the servers are sporadically subject, to failures altering their ordinary behavior.
文摘ZTE Corporation is China’s largest listedtelecommunications equipment provider spe-cialized in offering a full range of tailor-madesolutions for customers in high-,middle-andlow-end markets.
基金supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universitiesthe National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.71732003 and 71671085.
文摘We study a supply chain in which an original equipment manufacturer(OEM)outsources manufacturing functions to a contract manufacturer(CM)for cost saving.In addition to accepting the OEM's order,the CM can develop self-branded products and enter the end-market.Because of the OEM's well-known brand and long-term good reputation,we take the asymmetric customer loyalty into consideration-a fraction of customers are loyal customers(LCs)who only consider buying the product from the OEM,while other customers in the market are non-loyal customers(NCs)who might switch to purchasing the CM7s product because of the lower selling price.We explore whether the CM will enter the end-market and if so,what is the impact of the market entry on the OEM and the entire supply chain.Counterintuitively,we find that there will be no market entry when the CM is relatively strong,i.e.,the CM is able to provide self-branded products with relatively high acceptance and the CM has a relatively large bargaining power.In addition,when the NC segment is an important profit source for the OEM,i.e.,the NCs7 market size is relatively large and their willingness-to-pay is relatively high,the market entry will not occur,either.The OEM's profit is always hurt by the CM's market entry unless the OEM always only sells the product to the LCs,while the supply chain sometimes can get benefit.Through numerical simulations,we reveal the relationships between the profit change of different parties and the key parameters,such as the relative willingness-to-pay and market sizes of two types of customers,the CMrs bargaining power and the acceptance of the CMrs product,when the market entry becomes an available option for the CM.The impact of production cost difference on the market entry decision and profit changes is also analyzed in the extension when producing the OEM's product is more costly for the CM than producing the self-branded product.
