We study a supply chain in which an original equipment manufacturer(OEM)outsources manufacturing functions to a contract manufacturer(CM)for cost saving.In addition to accepting the OEM's order,the CM can develop ...We study a supply chain in which an original equipment manufacturer(OEM)outsources manufacturing functions to a contract manufacturer(CM)for cost saving.In addition to accepting the OEM's order,the CM can develop self-branded products and enter the end-market.Because of the OEM's well-known brand and long-term good reputation,we take the asymmetric customer loyalty into consideration-a fraction of customers are loyal customers(LCs)who only consider buying the product from the OEM,while other customers in the market are non-loyal customers(NCs)who might switch to purchasing the CM7s product because of the lower selling price.We explore whether the CM will enter the end-market and if so,what is the impact of the market entry on the OEM and the entire supply chain.Counterintuitively,we find that there will be no market entry when the CM is relatively strong,i.e.,the CM is able to provide self-branded products with relatively high acceptance and the CM has a relatively large bargaining power.In addition,when the NC segment is an important profit source for the OEM,i.e.,the NCs7 market size is relatively large and their willingness-to-pay is relatively high,the market entry will not occur,either.The OEM's profit is always hurt by the CM's market entry unless the OEM always only sells the product to the LCs,while the supply chain sometimes can get benefit.Through numerical simulations,we reveal the relationships between the profit change of different parties and the key parameters,such as the relative willingness-to-pay and market sizes of two types of customers,the CMrs bargaining power and the acceptance of the CMrs product,when the market entry becomes an available option for the CM.The impact of production cost difference on the market entry decision and profit changes is also analyzed in the extension when producing the OEM's product is more costly for the CM than producing the self-branded product.展开更多
To meet the demands posed by the socialist market economy, to foster the close integration of science & technology with the national economy and thus to promote the development of the forces of production are targ...To meet the demands posed by the socialist market economy, to foster the close integration of science & technology with the national economy and thus to promote the development of the forces of production are targets pursued by the current drive of restructuring China’s existing S&T system.For this,the CAS Shenyang Branch has conducted rewarding exploration by diversifying various approaches when moving into the market.As a result,it is not only boosting its own development,but also increasing the strength of the local economy.展开更多
This paper compares the development of telecom regulation and deregulation between some typical Asian countries, and analyzes the telecom regulatory systems and industrial organizations of China. This paper also inves...This paper compares the development of telecom regulation and deregulation between some typical Asian countries, and analyzes the telecom regulatory systems and industrial organizations of China. This paper also investigates the approaches and strategies of Asian countries to reduce the regulation, reinforce the competition and establish efficient telecom industries. Having examined the Asian telecommunication markets, the paper attempts to apply the lessons learned from the opening of the telecoms markets of the developed economies. Finally the paper contends that if Asian economies wish to have nationally based companies, state or private enterprises, in a competitive postion, the format of the implementation of the WTO/GATS basic telecoms agreement should be carefully examined.展开更多
基金supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universitiesthe National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.71732003 and 71671085.
文摘We study a supply chain in which an original equipment manufacturer(OEM)outsources manufacturing functions to a contract manufacturer(CM)for cost saving.In addition to accepting the OEM's order,the CM can develop self-branded products and enter the end-market.Because of the OEM's well-known brand and long-term good reputation,we take the asymmetric customer loyalty into consideration-a fraction of customers are loyal customers(LCs)who only consider buying the product from the OEM,while other customers in the market are non-loyal customers(NCs)who might switch to purchasing the CM7s product because of the lower selling price.We explore whether the CM will enter the end-market and if so,what is the impact of the market entry on the OEM and the entire supply chain.Counterintuitively,we find that there will be no market entry when the CM is relatively strong,i.e.,the CM is able to provide self-branded products with relatively high acceptance and the CM has a relatively large bargaining power.In addition,when the NC segment is an important profit source for the OEM,i.e.,the NCs7 market size is relatively large and their willingness-to-pay is relatively high,the market entry will not occur,either.The OEM's profit is always hurt by the CM's market entry unless the OEM always only sells the product to the LCs,while the supply chain sometimes can get benefit.Through numerical simulations,we reveal the relationships between the profit change of different parties and the key parameters,such as the relative willingness-to-pay and market sizes of two types of customers,the CMrs bargaining power and the acceptance of the CMrs product,when the market entry becomes an available option for the CM.The impact of production cost difference on the market entry decision and profit changes is also analyzed in the extension when producing the OEM's product is more costly for the CM than producing the self-branded product.
文摘To meet the demands posed by the socialist market economy, to foster the close integration of science & technology with the national economy and thus to promote the development of the forces of production are targets pursued by the current drive of restructuring China’s existing S&T system.For this,the CAS Shenyang Branch has conducted rewarding exploration by diversifying various approaches when moving into the market.As a result,it is not only boosting its own development,but also increasing the strength of the local economy.
文摘This paper compares the development of telecom regulation and deregulation between some typical Asian countries, and analyzes the telecom regulatory systems and industrial organizations of China. This paper also investigates the approaches and strategies of Asian countries to reduce the regulation, reinforce the competition and establish efficient telecom industries. Having examined the Asian telecommunication markets, the paper attempts to apply the lessons learned from the opening of the telecoms markets of the developed economies. Finally the paper contends that if Asian economies wish to have nationally based companies, state or private enterprises, in a competitive postion, the format of the implementation of the WTO/GATS basic telecoms agreement should be carefully examined.