Under the condition of asymmetric information,the Spence 's Job Market Signaling Model is generally applied to inspect the design capability of a designer and his labor and efforts to be invested; however,since th...Under the condition of asymmetric information,the Spence 's Job Market Signaling Model is generally applied to inspect the design capability of a designer and his labor and efforts to be invested; however,since the"prior probability"and "posterior probability"have great uncertainties,the practical effect of this model is poor. On the basis of analyzing reverse selection questions,this paper provides a design capability screening model,which can make a designer automatically expose his hidden information so that necessary actions can be taken as required by the owner to realize risk sharing. A calculation example is finally given to demonstrate that the new model is helpful for an owner to select a designer with high professional level and to lead the designer to work hard,so it is of significant application value.展开更多
基金Sponsored by State Key Laboratory of Subtropical Building Science,Autonomous Research Topics(Grant No.x2tjc7100870)
文摘Under the condition of asymmetric information,the Spence 's Job Market Signaling Model is generally applied to inspect the design capability of a designer and his labor and efforts to be invested; however,since the"prior probability"and "posterior probability"have great uncertainties,the practical effect of this model is poor. On the basis of analyzing reverse selection questions,this paper provides a design capability screening model,which can make a designer automatically expose his hidden information so that necessary actions can be taken as required by the owner to realize risk sharing. A calculation example is finally given to demonstrate that the new model is helpful for an owner to select a designer with high professional level and to lead the designer to work hard,so it is of significant application value.
