The criticisms of the falsity of universal recognition carried| out by leftists, led by Karl Max, and the queries of its desirability proposed by rightists, represented by Friedrich Nietzsche, raise challenges to Fran...The criticisms of the falsity of universal recognition carried| out by leftists, led by Karl Max, and the queries of its desirability proposed by rightists, represented by Friedrich Nietzsche, raise challenges to Francis Fukuyama’s theory of “the end of history” from two opposite directions. At present, Chinese-style political meritocracy based on the party state is a political form that combines these left-wing and right-wing challenges and has the potential to move beyond “the end of history”. However, whether it can truly surpass “the end of history” depends on whether it can form a desirable and stable alternative political form under modern conditions. To this end, Chinese-style political meritocracy must respond positively to the three challenges it faces under modern conditions: the tension between “debicheng- wei” (one’s virtue must have a matching position, 德必称位) and moral universal- ism, the corrosion of social justice from the hierarchical social structure caused by “weibichenglu” (one’s position must have a matching salary, 位必称禄), and the threat of social indoctrination to individual autonomy. The “introversive political meritocracy” jointly shaped by “advocating morals for the public,” “arete based on altruism,” and “introversive self-cultivation” is a desirable political form that can successfully respond to these three challenges.展开更多
Scholars often contend that civil examinations were what made imperial China a political meritocracy. They point to the examination system to show that the selection process served more as a common training program fo...Scholars often contend that civil examinations were what made imperial China a political meritocracy. They point to the examination system to show that the selection process served more as a common training program for literati than as a gate-keeper to keep non-elites out. Despite the symbiotic relations between the court and its literati, the emperor played the final card in the selection process. The asymmetrical relations between the throne and its elites nevertheless empowered elites to seek upward mobility as scholar-officials through the system. But true social mobility, peasants becoming officials, was never the goal of state policy in late imperial China; a modest level of social circulation was an unexpected consequence of the meritocratic civil service. Moreover, the meri^t-based bureaucracy never broke free of its dependence on an authoritarian imperial system. A modem political system might be more compatible with meritocracy, however. One of the unintended consequences of the civil examinations was creation of classically literate men （and women）, who used their linguistic talents for a variety of non-official purposes, from literati physicians to local pettifoggers, from fiction-writers to examination essay teachers, from Buddhist and Daoist monks to mothers and daughters. If there was much social mobility, i.e., the opportunity for members of the lower classes to rise in the social hierarchy, it was likely here. Rather than ＂social mobility,＂ this phenomenon might be better described as a healthy ＂circulation＂ of lower and upper elites when compared to aristocratic Europe and Japan.展开更多
文摘The criticisms of the falsity of universal recognition carried| out by leftists, led by Karl Max, and the queries of its desirability proposed by rightists, represented by Friedrich Nietzsche, raise challenges to Francis Fukuyama’s theory of “the end of history” from two opposite directions. At present, Chinese-style political meritocracy based on the party state is a political form that combines these left-wing and right-wing challenges and has the potential to move beyond “the end of history”. However, whether it can truly surpass “the end of history” depends on whether it can form a desirable and stable alternative political form under modern conditions. To this end, Chinese-style political meritocracy must respond positively to the three challenges it faces under modern conditions: the tension between “debicheng- wei” (one’s virtue must have a matching position, 德必称位) and moral universal- ism, the corrosion of social justice from the hierarchical social structure caused by “weibichenglu” (one’s position must have a matching salary, 位必称禄), and the threat of social indoctrination to individual autonomy. The “introversive political meritocracy” jointly shaped by “advocating morals for the public,” “arete based on altruism,” and “introversive self-cultivation” is a desirable political form that can successfully respond to these three challenges.
文摘Scholars often contend that civil examinations were what made imperial China a political meritocracy. They point to the examination system to show that the selection process served more as a common training program for literati than as a gate-keeper to keep non-elites out. Despite the symbiotic relations between the court and its literati, the emperor played the final card in the selection process. The asymmetrical relations between the throne and its elites nevertheless empowered elites to seek upward mobility as scholar-officials through the system. But true social mobility, peasants becoming officials, was never the goal of state policy in late imperial China; a modest level of social circulation was an unexpected consequence of the meritocratic civil service. Moreover, the meri^t-based bureaucracy never broke free of its dependence on an authoritarian imperial system. A modem political system might be more compatible with meritocracy, however. One of the unintended consequences of the civil examinations was creation of classically literate men （and women）, who used their linguistic talents for a variety of non-official purposes, from literati physicians to local pettifoggers, from fiction-writers to examination essay teachers, from Buddhist and Daoist monks to mothers and daughters. If there was much social mobility, i.e., the opportunity for members of the lower classes to rise in the social hierarchy, it was likely here. Rather than ＂social mobility,＂ this phenomenon might be better described as a healthy ＂circulation＂ of lower and upper elites when compared to aristocratic Europe and Japan.
