Moral property rights and harmonious society

To build the harmonious society needs the effect of morality.There are various kinds of moral values.Moral values can be divided into proper ones and improper ones according to whether the social benefit is bigger than the social cost of the moral behavior.The former is helpful to the optimal allocation of resources and improve the formation of the harmonious society; while the latter is harmful to the optimal allocation of resource and bad to the formation of the harmonious society.The proper and scientist moral values include： sustainable development view on ecology,fair,just and win win view on morality,credibility,right view on rich and poor,right view on consumption and so on.To build the proper and scientific moral value,the more important way is building proper moral property rights institution by recognizing properly and constructing moral property rights besides legislation,setting up moral surroundings,valuing moral penetration,strengthening moral education etc.Harmonious society;Moral property rights;Moral value

On the Dilemma of Contemporary Liberal Theory of Moral Rights for Penalty Justification——Exemplified by the Right to Personal Liberty

Contemporary liberal theory on moral rights argues that moral rights associated with personal liberty constitute a strong constraint on the boundaries of state power.Therefore,the core issue of the penalty justification is not the purpose of the penalty,but the reason for the penalty to refrain from infringing on the moral rights of individuals.In order to justify the penal system,scholars have explored solutions such as limiting the content of rights,waiving rights,and finally rights forfeiture.However,the concept of rights forfeiture cannot be reasonably integrated into the framework of the liberal theory of moral rights.The failure of these attempts stems from the patchwork understanding of rights presupposed by the liberal theory of moral rights.There is another systematic way of understanding rights that offers a better justification.Individual rights are not an independent non-derivative moral justification,and both individual rights and the penal power of the state are only part of a specific(realistic or ideal)system of rules that collectively serve certain values.The real question of penalty justification is not why the punishment does not infringe on the moral rights of individuals,but whether the overall institutional arrangements,including the penal system,are justifiable for all citizens,including the punished.

Human Rights as Placeholders

Two prevailing ＂traditional＂ notions of human rights also cause the current skeptical mood concerning human rights. Either human rights are seen in a morally exaggerated way as ＂trump cards＂ in political negotiations, or they are pruned back to a purely juridical level, absorbed into legal instances that accord them at most the rank of constitutional rights. In contrast to this, the author defends a political conception of human rights that overcomes the problems besetting both conceptions, but without having to sacrifice their critical, normative content or a realistic role for human rights in international politics. A political conception of human rights assumes, the author argues firstly, that human rights grow out of concrete experiences of injustice and are the product of political struggles. Human rights are, secondly, placeholders for the public thematization of oppression, humiliation, marginalization, and despotism. A third characteristic feature of a political conception of human rights is that human rights raise claims to a rule system that permits access to the freedoms and resources formulated by human rights. And finally, the obligations imposed by human rights are not duties of assistance but institutional duties to realize the conditions for exercising human rights. Human rights, the author concludes, can be ＂used＂ by any person to criticize existing ordering structures and can be activated for political purposes directed to the common good.