The urban transit fare structure and level can largely affect passengers’travel behavior and route choices.The commonly used transit fare policies in the present transit network would lead to the unbalanced transit a...The urban transit fare structure and level can largely affect passengers’travel behavior and route choices.The commonly used transit fare policies in the present transit network would lead to the unbalanced transit assignment and improper transit resources distribution.In order to distribute transit passenger flow evenly and efficiently,this paper introduces a new distance-based fare pattern with Euclidean distance.A bi-level programming model is developed for determining the optimal distance-based fare pattern,with the path-based stochastic transit assignment(STA)problem with elastic demand being proposed at the lower level.The upper-level intends to address a principal-agent game between transport authorities and transit enterprises pursing maximization of social welfare and financial interest,respectively.A genetic algorithm(GA)is implemented to solve the bi-level model,which is verified by a numerical example to illustrate that the proposed nonlinear distance-based fare pattern presents a better financial performance and distribution effect than other fare structures.展开更多
Public authorities frequently mandate public or private agencies to manage their renewable natural resources.Contrary to the agency,which is an expert in renewable natural resource management,public authorities usuall...Public authorities frequently mandate public or private agencies to manage their renewable natural resources.Contrary to the agency,which is an expert in renewable natural resource management,public authorities usually ignore the sustainable level of harvest.In this note,we first model the contractual relationship between a principal,who owns the renewable natural resource,and an agent,who holds private information on its sustainable level of harvest.We then look for the Pareto-optimal allocations.In the situation of an imperfect information setting,we find that the Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that the harvesting level stands outside the sustainability interval.The information rent held by the agent turns out to be unavoidable,such that stepping outside the sustainability interval implies the possibility of depletion of the renewable natural resource.This,in turn,compromises the maintenance of the ecological balance in natural ecosystems.展开更多
To break through the academic research tradition of isolating subjective performance evaluation (SPE) with objective evaluation, and enhance the application and explanation power of analytical research findings, thi...To break through the academic research tradition of isolating subjective performance evaluation (SPE) with objective evaluation, and enhance the application and explanation power of analytical research findings, this paper adopts a one-period principal-agent model, and solves programming problems by internalizing validity conditions for SPE as constraints according to revelation principle. We find that both SPE and its objectivization can achieve Pareto improvement for both the principal and the agent. Our findings have a general application beyond bonus contracts; it not only explains the pervasive existence of SPE, but also helps to interpret phenomena of the objectification of SPE.展开更多
In the organizational setting of marine engineering,a significant number of information security incidents have been arised from the employees’failure to comply with the information security policies(ISPs).This may b...In the organizational setting of marine engineering,a significant number of information security incidents have been arised from the employees’failure to comply with the information security policies(ISPs).This may be treated as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard between the employer and the employee for the practical compliance effort of an employee is not observable without high cost-.On the other hand,according to the deterrence theory,the employer and the employee are inherently self-interested beings.It is worth examining to what extent the employee is self-interested in the marine ISPs compliance context.Moreover,it is important to clarify the proper degree of severity of punishment in terms of the deterrent effect.In this study,a marine ISPs compliance game model has been proposed to evaluate the deterrence effect of punishment on the non-compliance behavior of employee individuals.It is found that in a non-punishment contract,the employee will decline to comply with the marine ISPs;but in a punishment contract,appropriate punishment will lead her to select the marine ISPs compliance effort level expected by the employer,and cause no potential backfire effect.展开更多
We consider a general framework of optimal contract design under the heterogeneity and short-termism of agents.Our research shows that the optimal contract must weigh the agent's information rent,incentive cost,an...We consider a general framework of optimal contract design under the heterogeneity and short-termism of agents.Our research shows that the optimal contract must weigh the agent's information rent,incentive cost,and benefit to overcome the contract's adverse selection and moral hazards.Agents with higher moral levels were more likely to choose higher effort and lower manipulation.Simultaneously,the principal offers lower incentives and receives more significant payoff.We also extend our model to investigate the benefits of Bayesian learning.Furthermore,we compare the principal's returns in general and learning models and find that the learning contract can bring more profit to the principal。展开更多
基金the Humanities and Social Science Foundation of the Ministry of Education of China(Grant No.20YJCZH121).
文摘The urban transit fare structure and level can largely affect passengers’travel behavior and route choices.The commonly used transit fare policies in the present transit network would lead to the unbalanced transit assignment and improper transit resources distribution.In order to distribute transit passenger flow evenly and efficiently,this paper introduces a new distance-based fare pattern with Euclidean distance.A bi-level programming model is developed for determining the optimal distance-based fare pattern,with the path-based stochastic transit assignment(STA)problem with elastic demand being proposed at the lower level.The upper-level intends to address a principal-agent game between transport authorities and transit enterprises pursing maximization of social welfare and financial interest,respectively.A genetic algorithm(GA)is implemented to solve the bi-level model,which is verified by a numerical example to illustrate that the proposed nonlinear distance-based fare pattern presents a better financial performance and distribution effect than other fare structures.
基金financially supported by a grant overseen by the French National Forestry Office through the Forests for Tomorrow International Teaching and Research Chair(Convention particulière n°1/2013)supported by the French National Research Agency through the Laboratory of Excellence ARBRE,a part of the Investments for the Future Program(ANR 11--LABX-0002-01).
文摘Public authorities frequently mandate public or private agencies to manage their renewable natural resources.Contrary to the agency,which is an expert in renewable natural resource management,public authorities usually ignore the sustainable level of harvest.In this note,we first model the contractual relationship between a principal,who owns the renewable natural resource,and an agent,who holds private information on its sustainable level of harvest.We then look for the Pareto-optimal allocations.In the situation of an imperfect information setting,we find that the Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that the harvesting level stands outside the sustainability interval.The information rent held by the agent turns out to be unavoidable,such that stepping outside the sustainability interval implies the possibility of depletion of the renewable natural resource.This,in turn,compromises the maintenance of the ecological balance in natural ecosystems.
基金This paper is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 50539130).
文摘To break through the academic research tradition of isolating subjective performance evaluation (SPE) with objective evaluation, and enhance the application and explanation power of analytical research findings, this paper adopts a one-period principal-agent model, and solves programming problems by internalizing validity conditions for SPE as constraints according to revelation principle. We find that both SPE and its objectivization can achieve Pareto improvement for both the principal and the agent. Our findings have a general application beyond bonus contracts; it not only explains the pervasive existence of SPE, but also helps to interpret phenomena of the objectification of SPE.
基金funded in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.70972058,No.71272092 and No.71431002)。
文摘In the organizational setting of marine engineering,a significant number of information security incidents have been arised from the employees’failure to comply with the information security policies(ISPs).This may be treated as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard between the employer and the employee for the practical compliance effort of an employee is not observable without high cost-.On the other hand,according to the deterrence theory,the employer and the employee are inherently self-interested beings.It is worth examining to what extent the employee is self-interested in the marine ISPs compliance context.Moreover,it is important to clarify the proper degree of severity of punishment in terms of the deterrent effect.In this study,a marine ISPs compliance game model has been proposed to evaluate the deterrence effect of punishment on the non-compliance behavior of employee individuals.It is found that in a non-punishment contract,the employee will decline to comply with the marine ISPs;but in a punishment contract,appropriate punishment will lead her to select the marine ISPs compliance effort level expected by the employer,and cause no potential backfire effect.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant numbers:71701164,71671142,and 72271249).
文摘We consider a general framework of optimal contract design under the heterogeneity and short-termism of agents.Our research shows that the optimal contract must weigh the agent's information rent,incentive cost,and benefit to overcome the contract's adverse selection and moral hazards.Agents with higher moral levels were more likely to choose higher effort and lower manipulation.Simultaneously,the principal offers lower incentives and receives more significant payoff.We also extend our model to investigate the benefits of Bayesian learning.Furthermore,we compare the principal's returns in general and learning models and find that the learning contract can bring more profit to the principal。