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Bi-Level Programming for the Optimal Nonlinear Distance-Based Transit Fare Structure Incorporating Principal-Agent Game
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作者 Xin Sun Shuyan Chen Yongfeng Ma 《Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology(New Series)》 CAS 2022年第5期69-77,共9页
The urban transit fare structure and level can largely affect passengers’travel behavior and route choices.The commonly used transit fare policies in the present transit network would lead to the unbalanced transit a... The urban transit fare structure and level can largely affect passengers’travel behavior and route choices.The commonly used transit fare policies in the present transit network would lead to the unbalanced transit assignment and improper transit resources distribution.In order to distribute transit passenger flow evenly and efficiently,this paper introduces a new distance-based fare pattern with Euclidean distance.A bi-level programming model is developed for determining the optimal distance-based fare pattern,with the path-based stochastic transit assignment(STA)problem with elastic demand being proposed at the lower level.The upper-level intends to address a principal-agent game between transport authorities and transit enterprises pursing maximization of social welfare and financial interest,respectively.A genetic algorithm(GA)is implemented to solve the bi-level model,which is verified by a numerical example to illustrate that the proposed nonlinear distance-based fare pattern presents a better financial performance and distribution effect than other fare structures. 展开更多
关键词 bi-level programming model principal-agent game nonlinear distance-based fare path-based stochastic transit assignment
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SHORT COMMUNICATION Principal-agent Relationships: A Note on Biomass Depletion
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作者 Arnaud Z.Dragicevic Serge Garcia 《Research in Ecology》 2021年第4期9-15,共7页
Public authorities frequently mandate public or private agencies to manage their renewable natural resources.Contrary to the agency,which is an expert in renewable natural resource management,public authorities usuall... Public authorities frequently mandate public or private agencies to manage their renewable natural resources.Contrary to the agency,which is an expert in renewable natural resource management,public authorities usually ignore the sustainable level of harvest.In this note,we first model the contractual relationship between a principal,who owns the renewable natural resource,and an agent,who holds private information on its sustainable level of harvest.We then look for the Pareto-optimal allocations.In the situation of an imperfect information setting,we find that the Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that the harvesting level stands outside the sustainability interval.The information rent held by the agent turns out to be unavoidable,such that stepping outside the sustainability interval implies the possibility of depletion of the renewable natural resource.This,in turn,compromises the maintenance of the ecological balance in natural ecosystems. 展开更多
关键词 BIOECONOMICS Natural resource management SUSTAINABILITY principal-agent model
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地方政府耕地保护激励契约设计研究 被引量:14
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作者 李广东 邱道持 王平 《中国土地科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第3期31-37,共7页
研究目的:运用委托代理理论探索中央政府与地方政府间耕地保护最优激励契约设计问题,为破解经济发展与耕地保护两难困境提供理论依据。研究方法:基于多任务委托代理模型对地方政府的耕地保护与经济发展任务进行了分析,并对激励契约进行... 研究目的:运用委托代理理论探索中央政府与地方政府间耕地保护最优激励契约设计问题,为破解经济发展与耕地保护两难困境提供理论依据。研究方法:基于多任务委托代理模型对地方政府的耕地保护与经济发展任务进行了分析,并对激励契约进行了设计。研究结果:现行激励机制存在诸多缺陷,迫切要求改进。多任务激励成本相互独立下地方政府激励是绝对风险规避度、边际激励成本变化率和可观测变量方差的递减函数;多任务激励成本相互替代时,增强耕地保护激励必须弱化经济发展的激励,而完全替代时不同委托任务的边际收益必须相等。研究结论:完善地方政府激励机制,要积极推进耕地保护绩效与政绩挂钩制,建立耕地保护动态督查制度,促进政绩考核体系"绿色化";完善耕地保护经济补偿机制,发挥市场机制的基础性作用。 展开更多
关键词 耕地保护 多任务委托代理 激励契约 地方政府
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考虑零售商多任务参与下的供应链激励合约研究 被引量:7
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作者 陈伟 但斌 《商业经济与管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第12期10-17,共8页
运用多任务委托代理模型研究零售商产品销售和市场知识共享两项工作任务的最优激励合约后得出,若两项工作任务的成本函数之间相互独立,那么激励相容条件下两项工作任务的最优业绩报酬也是相互独立的,且最优激励因子是各项任务下制造商... 运用多任务委托代理模型研究零售商产品销售和市场知识共享两项工作任务的最优激励合约后得出,若两项工作任务的成本函数之间相互独立,那么激励相容条件下两项工作任务的最优业绩报酬也是相互独立的,且最优激励因子是各项任务下制造商边际收益的增函数、是零售商绝对风险规避系数、各项任务边际成本变化率和业绩方差的减函数,同时提出了效率风险的概念;而如果两项工作任务的成本函数是相互依存的,那么在激励相容条件下,产品销售任务的最优激励合约是"门槛型激励合约",并定量地给出了零售商的"门槛激励条件",最后结合模型结论从理论上解释了供应链企业间普遍存在的一些现实问题。 展开更多
关键词 供应链 市场知识共享 多任务委托代理 效率风险 门槛型激励合约
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机载电子产品外场可靠性评估适用模型
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作者 魏玉凡 曹竟如 《电光系统》 2015年第4期38-42,共5页
对于机载电子产品,传统的外场可靠性评估模型,是把空中工作时间和地面工作时间简单相累积,并没有考虑任务剖面,而实际实验中,由于不同的任务剖面会造成设备故障率不同,在做可靠性评估时,要考虑环境对设备故障的影响。文章结合外... 对于机载电子产品,传统的外场可靠性评估模型,是把空中工作时间和地面工作时间简单相累积,并没有考虑任务剖面,而实际实验中,由于不同的任务剖面会造成设备故障率不同,在做可靠性评估时,要考虑环境对设备故障的影响。文章结合外场试飞试验可靠性评估,总结前人经验,给出了在外场可靠性评估中引入环境因子的算法,试验表明,引入环境因子是扩大样本量的一种有效且可行的方法;同时对于零故障小样本的可靠性评估,给出了综合Bayes评估方法,并结合外场可靠性评估数据,进行模型验证;验证表明,在进行机载电子设备外场可靠性评估时,引入环境因子,并利用综合Bayes评估方法,不仅扩大了评估样本,而且提高了评估置信度。 展开更多
关键词 可靠性评估 多任务剖面 环境因子 小样本 Bayes评估模型
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Value of subjective performance evaluation: A theoretical perspective
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作者 ZHAO Xiao-dong YU Zeng-bia 《Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing》 2007年第4期46-52,共7页
To break through the academic research tradition of isolating subjective performance evaluation (SPE) with objective evaluation, and enhance the application and explanation power of analytical research findings, thi... To break through the academic research tradition of isolating subjective performance evaluation (SPE) with objective evaluation, and enhance the application and explanation power of analytical research findings, this paper adopts a one-period principal-agent model, and solves programming problems by internalizing validity conditions for SPE as constraints according to revelation principle. We find that both SPE and its objectivization can achieve Pareto improvement for both the principal and the agent. Our findings have a general application beyond bonus contracts; it not only explains the pervasive existence of SPE, but also helps to interpret phenomena of the objectification of SPE. 展开更多
关键词 SUBJECTIVITY performance evaluation principal-agent model managerial accounting
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Understanding the deterrence effect of punishment for marine information security policies non-compliance
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作者 Xiaolong Wang Changlin Wang +1 位作者 Tianyu Yi Wenli Li 《Journal of Ocean Engineering and Science》 SCIE 2024年第1期9-12,共4页
In the organizational setting of marine engineering,a significant number of information security incidents have been arised from the employees’failure to comply with the information security policies(ISPs).This may b... In the organizational setting of marine engineering,a significant number of information security incidents have been arised from the employees’failure to comply with the information security policies(ISPs).This may be treated as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard between the employer and the employee for the practical compliance effort of an employee is not observable without high cost-.On the other hand,according to the deterrence theory,the employer and the employee are inherently self-interested beings.It is worth examining to what extent the employee is self-interested in the marine ISPs compliance context.Moreover,it is important to clarify the proper degree of severity of punishment in terms of the deterrent effect.In this study,a marine ISPs compliance game model has been proposed to evaluate the deterrence effect of punishment on the non-compliance behavior of employee individuals.It is found that in a non-punishment contract,the employee will decline to comply with the marine ISPs;but in a punishment contract,appropriate punishment will lead her to select the marine ISPs compliance effort level expected by the employer,and cause no potential backfire effect. 展开更多
关键词 Deterrence mechanism Marine engineering Information security policies Non-compliance behavior principal-agent model with moral hazard Punishment
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Understanding how heterogeneous agents affect Principal's returns:Perspectives from short-termism and Bayesian learning
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作者 Chuan Ding Yang Li Zhenyu Cui 《Journal of Management Science and Engineering》 CSCD 2023年第3期342-368,共27页
We consider a general framework of optimal contract design under the heterogeneity and short-termism of agents.Our research shows that the optimal contract must weigh the agent's information rent,incentive cost,an... We consider a general framework of optimal contract design under the heterogeneity and short-termism of agents.Our research shows that the optimal contract must weigh the agent's information rent,incentive cost,and benefit to overcome the contract's adverse selection and moral hazards.Agents with higher moral levels were more likely to choose higher effort and lower manipulation.Simultaneously,the principal offers lower incentives and receives more significant payoff.We also extend our model to investigate the benefits of Bayesian learning.Furthermore,we compare the principal's returns in general and learning models and find that the learning contract can bring more profit to the principal。 展开更多
关键词 SHORT-TERMISM Bayesian learning Agent heterogeneity principal-agent model
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