This study is designed to solve supply chain inefficiencies caused by some members’financial problems,such as capital shortages and financing restrictions in a stochastic environment.To this end,we have established a...This study is designed to solve supply chain inefficiencies caused by some members’financial problems,such as capital shortages and financing restrictions in a stochastic environment.To this end,we have established a supply chain finance framework by designing two novel coordinating contracts based on trade credit financing for different problem settings.These contracts are modeled in the form of multi-leader Stackelberg games that address horizontal and vertical competition in a supply chain consisting of multiple suppliers and a financially constrained manufacturer.However,previous studies in the trade credit literature have addressed only simple vertical competition,that is,seller-buyer competition.To solve the proposed models,two algorithms were developed by combining population-based metaheuristics,the Nash-domination concept,and the Nikaido-Isoda function.The results demonstrate that the proposed supply chain finance framework can eliminate supply chain inefficiencies and make a large profit for suppliers,as well as the financially constrained manufacturer.Furthermore,the results of the contracts’analysis showed that if the manufacturer is required to settle its payments to suppliers before the end of the period,the trade credit contract cannot coordinate the supply chain because of a lack of incentive for suppliers.However,if the manufacturer is allowed to extend its payments to the end of the period,the proposed trade credit financing contract can coordinate the supply chain.Finally,the sensitivity analysis results indicate that the worse the financial status of the manufacturer,the more bargaining power suppliers have in determining the contract parameters for more profit.展开更多
To improve the performance of the supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand, an optimal strategy is proposed based on knowledge discovery. First the dece...To improve the performance of the supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand, an optimal strategy is proposed based on knowledge discovery. First the decentralized system in which the supplier and the retailers are independent, profit-maximizing participants with the supplier acting as a Stackelberg game leader is studied. Numerical examples illustrate the importance of the coordination. The conventional quantity discount mechanism needs to be modified to coordinate the supply chain, so a revenue-sharing contract is proposed to coordinate such supply chain. Lastly, a special decision under certain demand rates is studied. The pricing and replenishment policies can be decided sequentially, which yields much less loss comparing with optimal decision when the demand rates are sufficiently large.展开更多
In order to construct a resource-saving and environment- friendly society, the advantages of radio frequency identification (RFID) were considered. And it put forward the idea of introducing RFID in the recycling ac...In order to construct a resource-saving and environment- friendly society, the advantages of radio frequency identification (RFID) were considered. And it put forward the idea of introducing RFID in the recycling activities of waste products. Taking into account such elements as the technical level of RFID, cost saving from remanufacturing and the cost of RFID tags, both centralized and decentralized supply chain models with different participants in waste product collection were created, in order to determine the optimal pricing strategy and RFID technical level. In the end, sensitivity analyses were conducted to analyze the impacts of scaling parameter for additional increased recovery rate with RFED on pricing and RFID technology level, and impacts of cost saving on the profits of participants in different remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain models.展开更多
Focusing on negative-spillover from environmental effort,this paper explores the issues of competition and optimal decision-making based on two competing two-stage manufacturer-dominated supply chains:centralized and ...Focusing on negative-spillover from environmental effort,this paper explores the issues of competition and optimal decision-making based on two competing two-stage manufacturer-dominated supply chains:centralized and decentralized.We develop the Stackelberg competition models according to four identified competition scenarios(pure centralized structure-CC,mixed structure-DC,mixed structure-CD,and pure decentralized structure-DD).By comparing the results of the four scenarios,we find that negative-spillover from environmental effort negatively impacts environmental-effort providers and reduces the optimal profit of the manufacturer who provide the environmental effort,which in turn reduces the profit of the entire supply chain.The inter-supply-chain competition also produces a negative incentive for environmental-effort providers but provides a free riding effect on the non-provider,and this effect increases as competition increases.In terms of network externality,the structural change of a supply chain from centralized to decentralized is altruistic,which generates a double-marginalization(i.e.,the network externality enhances competitor performance).Furthermore,the leader supply chain with a centralized structure is more willing to provide greater environmental effort,whereas when the leader supply chain structure remains unchanged,its environmental effort depends on the negative-spillover effect and the follower supply chain structure.Therefore,excessive supply chain competition should be avoided,and the negative-spillover effect of environmental effort should be reduced to motivate environmental-effort providers to increase their environmental efforts and promote the development of sustainable green supply chains.Future research should examine retailer-dominated supply chain competition and compare the results with the conclusions of this study.展开更多
针对出行即服务(Mobility as a Service,MaaS)提供定制化的出行服务以满足游客差异化的交通需求,构建了由传统旅游供应商和MaaS平台组成的双渠道旅游出行服务链,探讨不同主导权下的集中式决策和分散式决策策略及其效益,并开展以供应商...针对出行即服务(Mobility as a Service,MaaS)提供定制化的出行服务以满足游客差异化的交通需求,构建了由传统旅游供应商和MaaS平台组成的双渠道旅游出行服务链,探讨不同主导权下的集中式决策和分散式决策策略及其效益,并开展以供应商为主导的供应链收益共享契约设计和数值分析。研究结果发现:基于MaaS的旅游供应链集中式决策下的效益大于分散式决策,且集中式决策效益是以供应商为主导的分散式决策效益的3/4。在收益共享契约协调下,供应商利润和MaaS平台利润分别为0.68和0.58,均有所提高,旅游供应链整体效益最大,实现旅游供应链完美协调。展开更多
文摘This study is designed to solve supply chain inefficiencies caused by some members’financial problems,such as capital shortages and financing restrictions in a stochastic environment.To this end,we have established a supply chain finance framework by designing two novel coordinating contracts based on trade credit financing for different problem settings.These contracts are modeled in the form of multi-leader Stackelberg games that address horizontal and vertical competition in a supply chain consisting of multiple suppliers and a financially constrained manufacturer.However,previous studies in the trade credit literature have addressed only simple vertical competition,that is,seller-buyer competition.To solve the proposed models,two algorithms were developed by combining population-based metaheuristics,the Nash-domination concept,and the Nikaido-Isoda function.The results demonstrate that the proposed supply chain finance framework can eliminate supply chain inefficiencies and make a large profit for suppliers,as well as the financially constrained manufacturer.Furthermore,the results of the contracts’analysis showed that if the manufacturer is required to settle its payments to suppliers before the end of the period,the trade credit contract cannot coordinate the supply chain because of a lack of incentive for suppliers.However,if the manufacturer is allowed to extend its payments to the end of the period,the proposed trade credit financing contract can coordinate the supply chain.Finally,the sensitivity analysis results indicate that the worse the financial status of the manufacturer,the more bargaining power suppliers have in determining the contract parameters for more profit.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China (70471034)the Talent Foundation of Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (s0670-082).
文摘To improve the performance of the supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand, an optimal strategy is proposed based on knowledge discovery. First the decentralized system in which the supplier and the retailers are independent, profit-maximizing participants with the supplier acting as a Stackelberg game leader is studied. Numerical examples illustrate the importance of the coordination. The conventional quantity discount mechanism needs to be modified to coordinate the supply chain, so a revenue-sharing contract is proposed to coordinate such supply chain. Lastly, a special decision under certain demand rates is studied. The pricing and replenishment policies can be decided sequentially, which yields much less loss comparing with optimal decision when the demand rates are sufficiently large.
基金National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71301038)
文摘In order to construct a resource-saving and environment- friendly society, the advantages of radio frequency identification (RFID) were considered. And it put forward the idea of introducing RFID in the recycling activities of waste products. Taking into account such elements as the technical level of RFID, cost saving from remanufacturing and the cost of RFID tags, both centralized and decentralized supply chain models with different participants in waste product collection were created, in order to determine the optimal pricing strategy and RFID technical level. In the end, sensitivity analyses were conducted to analyze the impacts of scaling parameter for additional increased recovery rate with RFED on pricing and RFID technology level, and impacts of cost saving on the profits of participants in different remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain models.
基金financially supported by the Youth Research Fund Project of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics(QN-202002)。
文摘Focusing on negative-spillover from environmental effort,this paper explores the issues of competition and optimal decision-making based on two competing two-stage manufacturer-dominated supply chains:centralized and decentralized.We develop the Stackelberg competition models according to four identified competition scenarios(pure centralized structure-CC,mixed structure-DC,mixed structure-CD,and pure decentralized structure-DD).By comparing the results of the four scenarios,we find that negative-spillover from environmental effort negatively impacts environmental-effort providers and reduces the optimal profit of the manufacturer who provide the environmental effort,which in turn reduces the profit of the entire supply chain.The inter-supply-chain competition also produces a negative incentive for environmental-effort providers but provides a free riding effect on the non-provider,and this effect increases as competition increases.In terms of network externality,the structural change of a supply chain from centralized to decentralized is altruistic,which generates a double-marginalization(i.e.,the network externality enhances competitor performance).Furthermore,the leader supply chain with a centralized structure is more willing to provide greater environmental effort,whereas when the leader supply chain structure remains unchanged,its environmental effort depends on the negative-spillover effect and the follower supply chain structure.Therefore,excessive supply chain competition should be avoided,and the negative-spillover effect of environmental effort should be reduced to motivate environmental-effort providers to increase their environmental efforts and promote the development of sustainable green supply chains.Future research should examine retailer-dominated supply chain competition and compare the results with the conclusions of this study.
文摘针对出行即服务(Mobility as a Service,MaaS)提供定制化的出行服务以满足游客差异化的交通需求,构建了由传统旅游供应商和MaaS平台组成的双渠道旅游出行服务链,探讨不同主导权下的集中式决策和分散式决策策略及其效益,并开展以供应商为主导的供应链收益共享契约设计和数值分析。研究结果发现:基于MaaS的旅游供应链集中式决策下的效益大于分散式决策,且集中式决策效益是以供应商为主导的分散式决策效益的3/4。在收益共享契约协调下,供应商利润和MaaS平台利润分别为0.68和0.58,均有所提高,旅游供应链整体效益最大,实现旅游供应链完美协调。