MULTI-OBJECTIVE SHAPE DESIGN IN AERODYNAMICS USING GAME STRATEGY

Multi-objective optimization for the optimum shape design is introduced in aerodynamics using the Game theory. Based on the control theory, the employed optimizer and the negative feedback are used to implement the constraints. All the constraints are satisfied implicitly and automatically in the design. Furthermore,the above methodology is combined with a formulation derived from the Game theory to treat multi-point airfoil optimization. Airfoil shapes are optimized according to various aerodynamics criteria. In the symmetric Nash game, each “player” is responsible for one criterion, and the Nash equilibrium provides a solution to the multipoint optimization. Design results confirm the efficiency of the method.

Multi-objective optimization strategies using adjoint method and game theory in aerodynamics

There are currently three different game strategies originated in economics： （1） Cooperative games （Pareto front）, （2） Competitive games （Nash game） and （3） Hierarchical games （Stackelberg game）. Each game achieves different equilibria with different performance, and their players play different roles in the games. Here, we introduced game concept into aerodynamic design, and combined it with adjoint method to solve multi- criteria aerodynamic optimization problems. The performance distinction of the equilibria of these three game strategies was investigated by numerical experiments. We computed Pareto front, Nash and Stackelberg equilibria of the same optimization problem with two conflicting and hierarchical targets under different parameterizations by using the deterministic optimization method. The numerical results show clearly that all the equilibria solutions are inferior to the Pareto front. Non-dominated Pareto front solutions are obtained, however the CPU cost to capture a set of solutions makes the Pareto front an expensive tool to the designer.

Bargaining Game Theoretic Power Control in Selfish Cooperative Relay Networks

Wireless cooperative communications require appropriate power allocation （PA） between the source and relay nodes. In selfish cooperative communication networks, two partner user nodes could help relaying information for each other, but each user node has the incentive to consume his power solely to decrease its own symbol error rate （SER） at the receiver. In this paper, we propose a fair and efficient PA scheme for the decode-and-forward cooperation protocol in selfish cooperative relay networks. We formulate this PA problem as a two-user cooperative bargaining game, and use Nash bargaining solution （NBS） to achieve a win-win strategy for both partner users. Simulation results indicate that the NBS is fair in that the degree of cooperation of a user only depends on how much contribution its partner can make to decrease its SER at the receiver, and efficient in the sense that the SER performance of both users could be improved through the game.

Modelling the Iranian Petroleum Contract fiscal regime using bargaining game theory to guide contract negotiators

Based on Iran's sixth development plan,the country's oil and gas industry requires an investment of about$200 bn in the next five years to increase production.The Iranian government,to attract and motivate international oil company investment in their oil and gas fields,has presented a new type of risk service contract:the Iranian Petroleum Contract(IPC).This paper summarizes the features of the IPC and presents mathematical models of its fiscal regime for the benefit and guidance of both the National Iranian Oil Company(NIOC)and the contractors.Next,adopting bargaining game theory provides a mathematical model for reaching a win-win situation between the NIOC and the contractor.Finally,a numerical example is given and a sensitivity analysis performed to illustrate the implementation of the proposed models.The contractor and the NIOC may use these models when preparing their proposal and in the course of actual negotiations to calculate their internal rate of return,remuneration fee,and net present value for developing the fields at different conditions of their bargaining power,and derive a logical bargain to protect their best possible interests.

Unlicensed Band Sharing Based on Bargaining Game for Heterogeneous Networks

Currently,limited licensed frequency bands cannot meet the increasing demands for various wireless communication applications any more.It is necessary to extend wireless communication networks to unlicensed spectrum.In this paper,we propose a new bargaining framework for unlicensed band access to achieve high spectrum efficiency,where one radio access technology(RAT)(such as macro cellular network)“competes”the unlicensed bands with multiple other RATs(such as small cellular networks or Wi-Fi)virtually.Considering that macro cell can share unlicensed frequencies with multiple small cells which are in the same coverage area for more freedom,we use bargaining game theory to fairly and effectively share the unlicensed spectrum between macro and multiple heterogeneous small cell networks,where bargaining loss and time dissipation loss for virtual“price”of unlicensed bands are mainly considered.In the oneto-many bargaining process,we also develop a multiple RAT alliance game strategy to reduce transmission loss in a joint manner.Simulation results show that the proposed unlicensed band sharing algorithm significantly improves the spectrum efficiency performance compared with the other practical schemes for heterogeneous networks.

The Coalition Cooperative Game Method and Its Application in Multi-objective Optimization Design

This paper proposes a multi-objective optimization design method based on the coalition cooperative game theory where the three design goals have been seen as three game players. By calculating the affecting factors and fuzzy clustering, the design variables are divided into different strategic spaces which belong to each player, then it constructs a payoff function based on the coalition mechanism. Each game player takes its own revenue function as a target and obtains the best strategy versus other players. The best strategies of all players consist of the strategy permutation of a round game and it obtains the final game solutions through multi-round games according to the convergence criterion. A multi-objective optimization example of the luff mechanism of compensative sheave block shows the effectiveness of the coalition cooperative game method.

基础设施BOT(build-operate-transter)项目特许权期决策的Bargaining博弈模型

特许权期是基础设施BOT项目融资建设中的一个重要决策变量,但目前缺乏计算特许权期的理论方法.SHEN等建立了特许权期的决策模型(BOTCc M),得出了特许权期的可行区间,但BOTCc M模型未能提供在该区间内选择具体的特许权期时间点的方法.这是该模型在应用中的一个重要缺陷,需要进一步改进和完善.应用博弈论原理,建立了特许权期决策的Bargaining博弈模型,克服了BOTCc M模型的缺陷,求出了特许权期决策的具体时间.最后,通过算例演示了特许权期决策的Bargaining博弈模型.研究结果表明,Bargaining博弈模型能为政府和企业进行特许权期决策提供有效的计算方法.

Multi-objective optimization for voltage and frequency control of smart grids based on controllable loads

The output uncertainty of high-proportion distributed power generation severely affects the system voltage and frequency.Simultaneously,controllable loads have also annually increased,which markedly improve the capability for nodal-power control.To maintain the system frequency and voltage magnitude around rated values,a new multi-objective optimization model for both voltage and frequency control is proposed.Moreover,a great similarity between the multiobjective optimization and game problems appears.To reduce the strong subjectivity of the traditional methods,the idea and method of the game theory are introduced into the solution.According to the present situational data and analysis of the voltage and frequency sensitivities to nodal-power variations,the design variables involved in the voltage and frequency control are classified into two strategy spaces for players using hierarchical clustering.Finally,the effectiveness and rationality of the proposed control are verified in MATLAB.

Some Kinds of Bargaining Equilibria of Multi-objective Games

To solve the choice of multi-objective game's equilibria,we construct general bargaining games called self-bargaining games,and define their individual welfare functions with three appropriate axioms.According to the individual welfare functions,we transform the multi–objective game into a single-objective game and define its bargaining equilibrium,which is a Nash equilibrium of the single-objective game.And then,based on certain continuity and concavity of the multi-objective game's payoff function,we proof the bargaining equilibrium still exists and is also a weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium.Moreover,we analyze several special bargaining equilibria,and compare them in a few examples.

基于Bargain经济模型的网格资源交易管理算法

该文针对计算网格的特点,提出了一种基于Bargain经济模型的网格资源交易管理算法:首先描述了分层的网格协议体系;接着,给出了计算网格资源管理的Bargain经济模型;然后依据对策论,提出了交易管理算法,它包括3个成分:局中人,策略集和赢得函数;最后,定义了经济模型的平衡局势,并给出了求解最优纯策略的算法。

Equilibrium solution of two enterprises cooperative game

Based on the actual experience of cooperation in the supply chain, the Nash solution of two enterprises cooperative games is given. Not only is the solution unique, but it is also stable, and neither side has the capability to deviate the allocation of interests from the equilibrium point. If some firm tries to withdraw from cooperation or threaten to use other particular strategy, the negotiations are likely to achieve the distribution by the threat game; The calculating method of the choice of the optimal bargaining base point and the corresponding optimal pay-off vector are given.

Game Theory Based Network Security

The interactions between attackers and network administrator are modeled as a non-cooperative non-zero-sum dynamic game with incomplete information, which considers the uncertainty and the special properties of multi-stage attacks. The model is a Fictitious Play approach along a special game tree when the attacker is the leader and the administrator is the follower. Multi-objective optimization methodology is used to predict the attacker’s best actions at each decision node. The administrator also keeps tracking the attacker’s actions and updates his knowledge on the attacker’s behavior and objectives after each detected attack, and uses it to update the prediction of the attacker’s future actions. Instead of searching the entire game tree, appropriate time horizons are dynamically determined to reduce the size of the game tree, leading to a new, fast, adaptive learning algorithm. Numerical experiments show that our algorithm has a significant reduction in the damage of the network and it is also more efficient than other existing algorithms.

The Win-Win-Win Papakonstantinidis Model in the Ultimatum Game

In this article it is investigated the case of a three-part ultimatum game,where the proposer makes repeated sharing suggestions to the responder and a"third".This"third"is the regulatory factor of recurring bids,at a rate-at each time of the immediately preceding.This article answers to question like"what share would the proposer be willing to give to the responder in the case of three taking part in the ultimatum game?"Which would be moral and which fair?At which point of distribution would it be accepted by the responder?A Chi Square(x^(2))test is used.For this reason,after investigating the social integration factors through the literature,two small surveys trying to identify the distribution rate are conducted.We conclude that a share 0.40 could be accepted by the responder and the"third".

考虑多重不确定性与电碳耦合交易的多微网合作博弈优化调度

双碳背景下,构建低碳运行的能源系统是实现“双碳”目标的重要方向与实施路径。为了促进多微网系统内部能源的本地消纳以及低碳经济运行,该文对不确定性环境下多微网系统的合作运行及电碳耦合交易展开研究。首先,对于每个微网,构建了电转气碳捕集系统相耦合的热电联产运行模式,基于地方碳交易市场和阶梯碳交易机制,提出了多能源微网的低碳运行模型;其次,考虑到新能源发电和电力市场电价都存在不确定性的实际情况,采用机会约束和鲁棒优化的方法,以降低不确定性影响;再次,基于纳什谈判理论,建立了多个微网电碳耦合的合作博弈模型,各微网主体可同时参与到上级能源市场和地方能源市场中进行电能和碳排放配额的交易;最后,将非凸的合作博弈问题分解为两个线性可求解的子问题,进一步采用交替方向乘子法对问题进行求解。通过算例验证,该文所提方法可以有效提升各微网经济效益并减少碳排放。

Excess Benefit Allocation in Shared Savings Based on Non-cooperative Game Theory

Energy saving income distribution mode is of great significance to the energy industry.With the continuous application of new technologies,the problem of excess energy saving income distribution has become one of the obstacles to the appreciation of energy performance.At present,the distribution of risk and income is mainly based on the contribution of risk and income,which has some limitations.The benefit distribution of energy saving negotiation between energy saving service companies and clients can be regarded as a bargaining process where an effective range satisfying both parties can be obtained.This provides a new perspective in solving the problem of excess energy saving income distribution in energy management contract projects.

考虑碳排放分摊的综合能源服务商交易策略

为寻求在满足用户用能需求的同时降低系统碳排放的有效途径,提出了一种考虑碳排放分摊的多综合能源服务商能源交易策略。基于网络流模型实现碳流追踪并联合Shapley理论建立了综合能源服务商碳排放成本计算模型。应用Nash议价理论构建了多综合能源服务商合作博弈运行模型,将综合能源服务商碳排放成本引入优化目标函数,并利用分布式算法求解最优能源交易量和交易费用。基于由修改的IEEE 39节点电网和12节点气网构成的多综合能源服务商系统进行仿真分析,验证了所提模型和方法的有效性。

生态服务价值与社会经济因素交互影响下的流域生态补偿标准研究

流域生态补偿是实现流域环境改善与区域经济均衡发展的一种政策工具,对消除上下游地区间的经济差异影响,实现区域社会发展的公平性具有重要意义。为定量寻求多元信息扰动下的流域生态补偿标准最优解,亟需开展基于多维关系协调及经济利益分配多目标优化求解的动态均衡博弈研究。以实现生态补偿标准讨价还价贝叶斯纳什均衡为目标,借助完全信息博弈的混合均衡策略实施过程探讨流域生态补偿标准均衡解存在条件,并基于流域上下游间的动态转移支付进行生态补偿标准均衡解求解,依托激励相容机制开展讨价还价的动态博弈贝叶斯均衡的合理性分析。本文结合弥河流域经济社会取用水费用标准及水资源使用价值的变化规律,在流域生态保护和社会经济发展基本均衡的情况下,下游的寿光市、中游的青州市对上游临朐县的水量-水质生态补偿额度分别为3194万元、859万元。本文给出的研究方法可用于处理博弈过程中的冗余信息以便于进行讨价还价,形成合理的流域生态补偿标准。

考虑新能源发电商租赁共享储能的电力市场博弈分析

针对实际中储能资源利用率不高等问题,提出一种新能源发电商和储能运营商之间的储能租赁共享模式,其中储能运营商除了租赁部分储能给新能源发电商外,还可利用剩余储能独立参与市场竞争,因而该模式有助于提高储能资源利用率。为了研究该共享模式对电力市场运行的影响,建立了考虑该共享模式的日前电力市场双层博弈模型,其中,上层为储能运营商与多个新能源发电商基于讨价还价博弈理论来确定储能租赁价格的优化模型,下层为新能源发电商、储能运营商与传统发电商作为价格影响者参与日前电力市场竞争的多时段非合作博弈模型。然后采用非线性互补方法将双层博弈模型转化为单层优化问题求解。最后通过算例仿真验证所提出租赁模式的合理性和有效性。

计及需求响应和季节性氢储的多微网合作运行策略

为促进可再生能源的消纳,解决综合能源系统中源荷季节性不平衡的问题,提出一种计及需求响应和季节性氢储的多微网合作运行策略.首先对综合能源系统中的季节性氢储系统和用户的需求响应行为进行建模,随后通过电力通道将多个微网连接成多微网系统.由于各个微网属于不同的利益主体,微网与用户之间也存在利益交互,因此引入合作-主从博弈框架对本文多利益主体博弈进行描述,其中主从博弈中多微网系统为领导者,能源用户为跟随者.在对主从博弈求解完成后,最后提出一种议价能力对各微网联盟的贡献进行描述,利用纳什议价对各微网的合作利益进行合理分配.算例表明,本文策略可有效促进可再生能源的消纳,降低用户购能成本和促进各微网能源传输.

考虑灵活性资源和多能共享的低碳区域综合能源系统联盟-配电网博弈优化调度

随着全国碳交易市场政策落地,为充分挖掘区域综合能源系统(regional integrated energy system,RIES)低碳减排能力,提高多区域综合能源系统接入主动配电网(active distribution network,ADN)的经济交互效益,提出了考虑灵活性资源与低碳交互结构的区域综合能源系统联盟参与配电网调峰调度的优化调度策略。建立了以主动配电网为主体,区域综合能源系统联盟为从体的主从博弈模型。主体以最大化交互效益目标制定分时电价策略,从体成员间通过联络线实现多能共享,考虑碳交易制度以供能与碳交易成本之和最小为目标,响应主体电价策略,建立了下层多区域综合能源系统联盟合作博弈优化模型。引入包含需求响应、储能和电动汽车在内的灵活性资源,配合碳捕集-电转气耦合机组优化联盟内部各系统的低碳供能策略,满足联盟负荷需求。基于纳什议价理论完成联盟成员合作收益的分配。通过算例验证所提策略能够有效减少各区域综合能源系统碳排放,并保障主从交互经济效益。