In this paper,we propose an iterative algorithm to find the optimal incentive mechanism for the principal-agent problem under moral hazard where the number of agent action profiles is infinite,and where there are an i...In this paper,we propose an iterative algorithm to find the optimal incentive mechanism for the principal-agent problem under moral hazard where the number of agent action profiles is infinite,and where there are an infinite number of results that can be observed by the principal.This principal-agent problem has an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints,and we transform it into an optimization problem with an infinite number of constraints called a semi-infinite programming problem.We then propose an exterior penalty function method to find the optimal solution to this semi-infinite programming and illustrate the convergence of this algorithm.By analyzing the optimal solution obtained by the proposed penalty function method,we can obtain the optimal incentive mechanism for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard.展开更多
The optimization investment policy decision of SCM-Supply Chain Management-implementation has been analysed under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions. For both conditions, SCM implementation options’ deci...The optimization investment policy decision of SCM-Supply Chain Management-implementation has been analysed under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions. For both conditions, SCM implementation options’ decision optimizing models have been developed. In these models, both clients and vendors try to pursue their own benefits. Based upon the principal-agent theory, the models show to what extent a principal (a client) needs to pay more to an agent (a vendor) in a context of asymmetric information. For the client, it is important to understand the extra costs to be able to adopt effective strategies to stimulate a vendor to perform an optimal implementation of a SCM system. The results of a simulation experiment regarding SCM implementation options illustrate and verify the theoretical findings and confirm the general notion that the less informed party is obliged to pay information rent to the better-informed party.展开更多
研究了多通道分布式主动噪声控制(Distributed Active Noise Control,ANC)系统的空间平滑问题.传统的分布式ANC算法通过本地控制器之间的通信,可以大大提高系统稳定性.但由于每组控制器和误差麦克风分布位置不同,引入的估计偏差影响系...研究了多通道分布式主动噪声控制(Distributed Active Noise Control,ANC)系统的空间平滑问题.传统的分布式ANC算法通过本地控制器之间的通信,可以大大提高系统稳定性.但由于每组控制器和误差麦克风分布位置不同,引入的估计偏差影响系统整体降噪性能.因此,旨在开发一种新型扩散滤波最小均方算法(Diffusion Filtered-x Least Mean Squares,Diff-FxLMS),该算法平衡了空间平滑度和信息交换强度之间的矛盾,从而减少估计偏差.通过对Diff-FxLMS算法性能进行的理论分析,揭示了扩散控制机制,为ANC算法设计提供了理论依据,并在此基础上发展出一种新型的可变平滑度的Diff-FxLMS(Varible Spatial Regularized Diff-FxLMS,VSR-Diff-FxLMS)算法.仿真结果验证了新算法的性能及理论分析的可靠性.展开更多
This paper extends the single-task n-Vehicle Exploration Problem to Multitask n-Vehicle Exploration Problem （MTNVEP）, by combining n-Vehicle Exploration Problem with Job Scheduling Problem. At first, the authors pro...This paper extends the single-task n-Vehicle Exploration Problem to Multitask n-Vehicle Exploration Problem （MTNVEP）, by combining n-Vehicle Exploration Problem with Job Scheduling Problem. At first, the authors prove that MTNVEP is NP-hard for fixed number of tasks, and it is strongly NP-hard for general number of tasks. Then they propose an improved accurate algorithm with computing time O（n3n）, which is better than O（n!） as n becomes sufficiently large. Moreover, four heuristic algorithms are proposed. Effectiveness of the heuristic algorithms is illustrated by experiments at last.展开更多
Traditional Chinese medicine(TCM)has been improving human health for millennia.And for that,it has gradually gained the attention of the global scientific community.TCM clinical research progresses,but slowly.I see it...Traditional Chinese medicine(TCM)has been improving human health for millennia.And for that,it has gradually gained the attention of the global scientific community.TCM clinical research progresses,but slowly.I see it as being held back by perverse incentive structures in science and regulatory politics.展开更多
This paper studies the problem of principal-agent with moral hazard in continuous time.The firm’s cash flow is described by geometric Brownian motion(hereafter GBM).The agent affects the drift of the firm’s cash flo...This paper studies the problem of principal-agent with moral hazard in continuous time.The firm’s cash flow is described by geometric Brownian motion(hereafter GBM).The agent affects the drift of the firm’s cash flow by her hidden effort.Meanwhile,the firm rewards the agent with corresponding compensation and equity which depend on the output.The model extends dynamic optimal contract theory to an inflation environment.Firstly,the authors obtain the dynamic equation of the firm’s real cash flow under inflation by using the It?formula.Then,the authors use the martingale representation theorem to obtain agent’s continuation value process.Moreover,the authors derive the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman(HJB)equation of investor’s value process,from which the authors derive the investors’scaled value function by solving the second-order ordinary differential equation.Comparing with He;,the authors find that inflation risk affects the agent’s optimal compensation depending on the firm’s position in the market.展开更多
The optimization investment policy decision of SCM-supply chain management-implementation has been analysed under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions.For both conditions,SCM implementation optional decisio...The optimization investment policy decision of SCM-supply chain management-implementation has been analysed under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions.For both conditions,SCM implementation optional decision optimizing models have been developed.In these models,both clients and vendors try to pursue their own benefits.Based upon the principal-agent theory,the models show to what extent a principal(a client)needs to pay more to an agent(a vendor)in a context of asymmetric information.For the client it is important to understand the extra costs to be able to adopt effective strategies to stimulate a vendor to perform an optimal implementation of a SCM system.The results of a simulation experiment regarding SCM implementation options illustrate and verify the theoretical findings and confirm the general notion that the less informed party is obliged to pay information rent to the better-informed party.展开更多
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(72031009 and 71871171)the National Social Science Foundation of China(20&ZD058).
文摘In this paper,we propose an iterative algorithm to find the optimal incentive mechanism for the principal-agent problem under moral hazard where the number of agent action profiles is infinite,and where there are an infinite number of results that can be observed by the principal.This principal-agent problem has an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints,and we transform it into an optimization problem with an infinite number of constraints called a semi-infinite programming problem.We then propose an exterior penalty function method to find the optimal solution to this semi-infinite programming and illustrate the convergence of this algorithm.By analyzing the optimal solution obtained by the proposed penalty function method,we can obtain the optimal incentive mechanism for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard.
文摘The optimization investment policy decision of SCM-Supply Chain Management-implementation has been analysed under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions. For both conditions, SCM implementation options’ decision optimizing models have been developed. In these models, both clients and vendors try to pursue their own benefits. Based upon the principal-agent theory, the models show to what extent a principal (a client) needs to pay more to an agent (a vendor) in a context of asymmetric information. For the client, it is important to understand the extra costs to be able to adopt effective strategies to stimulate a vendor to perform an optimal implementation of a SCM system. The results of a simulation experiment regarding SCM implementation options illustrate and verify the theoretical findings and confirm the general notion that the less informed party is obliged to pay information rent to the better-informed party.
文摘研究了多通道分布式主动噪声控制(Distributed Active Noise Control,ANC)系统的空间平滑问题.传统的分布式ANC算法通过本地控制器之间的通信,可以大大提高系统稳定性.但由于每组控制器和误差麦克风分布位置不同,引入的估计偏差影响系统整体降噪性能.因此,旨在开发一种新型扩散滤波最小均方算法(Diffusion Filtered-x Least Mean Squares,Diff-FxLMS),该算法平衡了空间平滑度和信息交换强度之间的矛盾,从而减少估计偏差.通过对Diff-FxLMS算法性能进行的理论分析,揭示了扩散控制机制,为ANC算法设计提供了理论依据,并在此基础上发展出一种新型的可变平滑度的Diff-FxLMS(Varible Spatial Regularized Diff-FxLMS,VSR-Diff-FxLMS)算法.仿真结果验证了新算法的性能及理论分析的可靠性.
基金partly supported by Daqing Oilfield Company Project of PetroCHINA under Grant No.dqc- 2010-xdgl-ky-002Key Laboratory of Management,Decision and Information Systems,Chinese Academy of Sciences
文摘This paper extends the single-task n-Vehicle Exploration Problem to Multitask n-Vehicle Exploration Problem （MTNVEP）, by combining n-Vehicle Exploration Problem with Job Scheduling Problem. At first, the authors prove that MTNVEP is NP-hard for fixed number of tasks, and it is strongly NP-hard for general number of tasks. Then they propose an improved accurate algorithm with computing time O（n3n）, which is better than O（n!） as n becomes sufficiently large. Moreover, four heuristic algorithms are proposed. Effectiveness of the heuristic algorithms is illustrated by experiments at last.
文摘Traditional Chinese medicine(TCM)has been improving human health for millennia.And for that,it has gradually gained the attention of the global scientific community.TCM clinical research progresses,but slowly.I see it as being held back by perverse incentive structures in science and regulatory politics.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.71571001。
文摘This paper studies the problem of principal-agent with moral hazard in continuous time.The firm’s cash flow is described by geometric Brownian motion(hereafter GBM).The agent affects the drift of the firm’s cash flow by her hidden effort.Meanwhile,the firm rewards the agent with corresponding compensation and equity which depend on the output.The model extends dynamic optimal contract theory to an inflation environment.Firstly,the authors obtain the dynamic equation of the firm’s real cash flow under inflation by using the It?formula.Then,the authors use the martingale representation theorem to obtain agent’s continuation value process.Moreover,the authors derive the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman(HJB)equation of investor’s value process,from which the authors derive the investors’scaled value function by solving the second-order ordinary differential equation.Comparing with He;,the authors find that inflation risk affects the agent’s optimal compensation depending on the firm’s position in the market.
基金Supported by the Social Science Foundation of China(18BJL017)the Natural Science Foundation of Liaoning Science and Technology Bureau(20170540439)
文摘The optimization investment policy decision of SCM-supply chain management-implementation has been analysed under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions.For both conditions,SCM implementation optional decision optimizing models have been developed.In these models,both clients and vendors try to pursue their own benefits.Based upon the principal-agent theory,the models show to what extent a principal(a client)needs to pay more to an agent(a vendor)in a context of asymmetric information.For the client it is important to understand the extra costs to be able to adopt effective strategies to stimulate a vendor to perform an optimal implementation of a SCM system.The results of a simulation experiment regarding SCM implementation options illustrate and verify the theoretical findings and confirm the general notion that the less informed party is obliged to pay information rent to the better-informed party.
