Political Connection, the Nature of Property Rights, and Enterprise M＆A Performance——Empirical Study based on the Panel Data of Listed Companies

Mergers and acquisitions （M＆A） are the important methods to quickly acquire external resources, achieve the economies of scale and the economies of scope, improve market share, and expand the scale of enterprise, while M＆A performance is an important index to measure if enterprise M＆A is successful. In this paper, the influence of entrepreneurs＇ political connection on the M＆A driving factors and M＆A efficiency of the enterprises with different property rights are analyzed using 357 mergers and acquisitions of China＇ s 189 listed companies in 2005-2011 as samples based on the distinction between political connection and the nature of enterprise property rights. The results show that the political connection plays a very significant positive influence on the M＆A performances of the central state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, but exerts a very significant negative influence on the local state-owned enterprises; the intensity of entrepreneurs＇ political connection also plays a certain influence on enterprise merger and acquisition, and the central political connection and the local political connection are significantly different in the influence on the enterprise M＆A performance.

The Relationship between Government Subsidies and Research & Development Investment of Chinese Agricultural Listed Companies

Based on the background of China's emerging and transitional market,government subsidies to enterprises are regarded as a " helping hand" of promoting economic structural adjustment. In this paper,using China's A-share agricultural listed companies from 2010 to 2015 as research samples,we discuss the influence of government subsidies on research and development( hereinafter referred to as R & D) investment,and the difference in the relationships between the two from the perspective of different nature of property rights. The results show that,on the whole,the increase in government subsidies does not promote the intensity of R & D investment of agricultural listed companies. And after distinguishing the nature of property rights,the results show that state-owned enterprises can get more government subsidies than private enterprises,and the increase in government subsidies boosts the increase in R & D investment in private enterprises,but there is a negative correlation between government subsidies and R & D investment of state-owned enterprises. This conclusion can broaden the research perspective of the influence factors of corporate R & D investment,and it is of practical significance to further clarify the role of government subsidies in R & D investment decisions of enterprises with different nature of property rights.

Customer Concentration and Corporate Social Responsibility——An Empirical Study Based on Chinese Agricultural Listed Companies

Taking the agricultural companies listed in the A-share markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen as samples,the relationship between customer concentration and corporate social responsibility was studied. In addition,the regulatory role of property rights and regional factors was examined. The results showed that the degree of customer concentration is negatively related to the degree of fulfillment of corporate social responsibility; for companies with different property rights and regions,there are significant differences in the influence of customer concentration on corporate social responsibility. In non-state-owned enterprises and mid-western areas,customer concentration has a greater impact on corporate social responsibility.

Top Executive Turnover and Finn Performance Evidence From China

By using the data of the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market---a share market as a sample from 2003 to 2007 to analyze the relationship between corporation performance and top executive alteration, different succession modes get different efficiency. The result shows that： The decline of company performance will cause the top executive turnover, and that the possibility of top executive turnover in non-state-owned listed companies is higher than that of the state-owned companies. In the routine turnover sample, the performance level of the internal succession is better than that of the external succession. In the non-routine turnover sample, the results are reversed. For further analysis, the main sources of the improvement for performance are items of below-the-line and non-recurring profit and loss, rather than the company＇s operating revenue.

An Empirical Study on CEO’s Academic Experience and Financing Constraints-Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-Share Listed Companies as Samples

Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2018 as samples,this paper analyzes the influence of CEO’s academic experience on corporate financing constraints.The empirical results show that there is a negative correlation between CEO’s academic experience and enterprise financing constraint level.Compared with state-owned enterprises,the academic experience of CEO in private enterprises is significantly negatively correlated with the level of corporate financing constraints.It also suggests that CEO’s academic experience can significantly reduce the level of financing constraints in the company samples audited by accounting firms(not Big 4).The conclusion of this paper is helpful to enrich the research of manager characteristics and corporate governance.At the same time,the research in this paper has reference significance for enterprises to ease the level of financing constraints.

Monetary policy,government control and capital investment:Evidence from China

This study examines how the relationships between local governments and local enterprises moderate the effect of targeted monetary policies through different action-propagating mechanisms. First, we investigate the impact of monetary policies on enterprise investment in areas with different institutional environments. Second, we investigate the impact of monetary policies on stateowned enterprises(SOEs) with different property rights structures. Third, we examine how political connections can influence the action-propagating mechanism of monetary policies. We conclude that in China monetary policies have different effects on SOEs and on private enterprises with or without political connections. Specifically, local government interventions can significantly weaken and distort the effects of monetary policies, such that the intended reduction in investment is noticeably alleviated for SOEs and private enterprises with close links to local governments.