Defection or Cooperation—Richard Power’s Moral Insights in Prisoner’s Dilemma

Prisoner’s Dilemma is a master trope for relaying the permanent impasse or dilemma of cooperation versus defection.In Prisoner’s Dilemma Richard Powers narrates a multiform of dilemma mainly narrating Eddie Hobson’s traumatic history,along with Eddie’s attempt to carry out a strategy—Eddie’s ideal Hobstown which is supposed to cope with the confused dilemma.Pow⁃ers’strategic moral insights are revealed by assuming that each player feels sympathy for the other and a moral cooperative instead of antagonistic solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma will be found.

Richard Power’s Philosophical Thoughts in Prisoner’s Dilemma

The“prisoner’s dilemma”illustrates that everyone is rationally thinking about maximizing their own interests and taking their own best strategies,but the end result is counterproductive.In Prisoner’s Dilemma Richard Powers describes multiformareas of dilemma;to lose balance;to make choices;and ask each other:what to do next?It is a master trope for relaying the permanent impasse or dilemma of cooperation versus defection.In most cases,the prisoner's dilemma is more about the number of defeats in the game,and even a major loss of society.Individual rationality is likely to be a collective disregard,and if everyone is acting on the principle of self-interest,it is often the result that everyone is lost.Powers expresses his philosophical insight:Until a cooperative instead of antagonistic solution is collectively agreed upon,we still remain imprisoned in an interminable and oppressive struggle and conflict decided by self-interest and rational control,which is also a moral response to historical consciousness of postmodernism.

An Adaptive Strategy via Reinforcement Learning for the Prisoner＇s Dilemma Game

The iterated prisoner's dilemma(IPD) is an ideal model for analyzing interactions between agents in complex networks. It has attracted wide interest in the development of novel strategies since the success of tit-for-tat in Axelrod's tournament. This paper studies a new adaptive strategy of IPD in different complex networks, where agents can learn and adapt their strategies through reinforcement learning method. A temporal difference learning method is applied for designing the adaptive strategy to optimize the decision making process of the agents. Previous studies indicated that mutual cooperation is hard to emerge in the IPD. Therefore, three examples which based on square lattice network and scale-free network are provided to show two features of the adaptive strategy. First, the mutual cooperation can be achieved by the group with adaptive agents under scale-free network, and once evolution has converged mutual cooperation, it is unlikely to shift. Secondly, the adaptive strategy can earn a better payoff compared with other strategies in the square network. The analytical properties are discussed for verifying evolutionary stability of the adaptive strategy.

THE OPTIMAL CONTROL FOR PROMOTING THE COOPERATION IN EVOLUTION GAME GENERATED BY PRISONER'S DILEMMA

Natural selection opposes the evolution of cooperation unless specific mechanisms are at work in Prisoner＇s Dilemma. By taking advantage of the modern control theory, the controller design is discussed and the optimal control is designed for promoting cooperation based on the recent advances in mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Two con- trol strategies are proposed： compensation control strategy for the cooperator when playing against a defector and reward control strategy for cooperator when playing against a coop- erator. The feasibility and effectiveness of these control strategies for promoting cooperation in different stages are analyzed. The reward for cooperation can＇t prevent defection from being evolutionary stable strategy （ESS）. On the other hand, compensation for the coopera- tor can＇t prevent defection from emerging and sustaining. By considering the effect and the cost, an optimal control scheme with constraint on the admissible control set is put forward. By analyzing the special nonlinear system of replicator dynamics, the exact analytic solution of the optimal control scheme is obtained based on the maximum principle. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed method is illustrated by examples.

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on highly clustered community networks

This paper studies the evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game on a highly clustered community network in which the clustering coefficient and the community size can be tuned. It finds that the clustering coefficient in such a degree-homogeneous network inhibits the emergence of cooperation for the entire range of the payoff parameter. Moreover, it finds that the community size can also have a marked influence on the evolution of cooperation, with a larger community size leading to not only a lower cooperation level but also a smaller threshold of the payoff parameter above which cooperators become extinct.

Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma on Newman-Watts social networks with an asymmetric payoff distribution mechanism

In this paper, we introduce an asymmetric payoff distribution mechanism into the evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game （PDG） on Newman Watts social networks, and study its effects on the evolution of cooperation. The asymmetric payoff distribution mechanism can be adjusted by the parameter α： if α〉 0, the rich will exploit the poor to get richer; if α 〈 0, the rich are forced to offer part of their income to the poor. Numerical results show that the cooperator frequency monotonously increases with c~ and is remarkably promoted when c~ 〉 0. The effects of updating order and self-interaction are also investigated. The co-action of random updating and self-interaction can induce the highest cooperation level. Moreover, we employ the Gini coefficient to investigate the effect of asymmetric payoff distribution on the the system＇s wealth distribution. This work may be helpful for understanding cooperative behaviour and wealth inequality in society.

Payoff-based accumulative effect promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma

We study the effect of accumulative payoff on the evolution of cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma on a square lattice. We introduce a decaying factor for the accumulative payoff, which characterizes the extent that the historical payoff is accumulated. It is shown that for fixed values of the temptation to defect, the density of cooperators increases with the value of the decaying factor. This indicates that the more the historical payoff is involved, the more favourable cooperators become. In the critical region where the cooperator density converges to zero, cooperators vanish according to a power-law-like behaviour. The associated exponents agree approximately with the two-dimensional directed percolation and depend weakly on the value of the decaying factor.

Adaptive co-evolution of strategies and network leading to optimal cooperation level in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

We study evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game on adaptive networks where a population of players co-evolves with their interaction networks. During the co-evolution process, interacted players with opposite strategies either rewire the link between them with probability p or update their strategies with probability 1 - p depending on their payoffs. Numerical simulation shows that the final network is either split into some disconnected communities whose players share the same strategy within each community or forms a single connected network in which all nodes are in the same strategy. Interestingly, the density of cooperators in the final state can be maximised in an intermediate range of p via the competition between time scale of the network dynamics and that of the node dynamics. Finally, the mean-field analysis helps to understand the results of numerical simulation. Our results may provide some insight into understanding the emergence of cooperation in the real situation where the individuals＇ behaviour and their relationship adaptively co-evolve.

PREFERENCE AND EVOLUTION IN THE ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA

Game theory is extensively used to study strategy-making and actions of play- ers. The authors proposed an analysis method for study the evolutionary outcome and behaviors of players with preference in iterated prisoner＇s dilemma. In this article, a preference parameter k was introduced in the payoff matrix, wherein the value of k denotes the player＇s degree of egoism and altruism （preference）. Then, a game-theoretic dynamical model was formulated using Birth-and-Death process. The authors studied how preference influences the evolutionary equilibrium and behaviors of players. The authors get the general results： egoism leads to defection, and altruism can make players build trust and maintain cooperation, and so, the hope of the Pareto optimal solution. In the end, the simulation experiments proved the efficiency of the method.

A 2-stage strategy updating rule promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

In this study,we propose a spatial prisoner＇s dilemma game model with a 2-stage strategy updating rule,and focus on the cooperation behavior of the system.In the first stage,i.e.,the pre-learning stage,a focal player decides whether to update his strategy according to the pre-learning factor β and the payoff difference between himself and the average of his neighbors.If the player makes up his mind to update,he enters into the second stage,i.e.,the learning stage,and adopts a strategy of a randomly selected neighbor according to the standard Fermi updating rule.The simulation results show that the cooperation level has a non-trivial dependence on the pre-learning factor.Generally,the cooperation frequency decreases as the pre-learning factor increases;but a high cooperation level can be obtained in the intermediate region of- 3〈 β 〈-1.We then give some explanations via studying the co-action of pre-learning and learning.Our results may sharpen the understanding of the influence of the strategy updating rule on evolutionary games.

Knowledge of Female Prisoners in a City of Ceará, Brazil, about Sexually Transmitted Diseases

Exploratory study was conducted in the Crato Public Prison, State of Ceará, Brazil, aiming to understand the knowledge and experiences related to the preventive aspects of Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs) in the prison context. The target population of the study consisted of 14 female inmates, 10 of whom agreed to participate. Data collection occurred in June 2012 through recorded semi-structured individual interviews. We investigated quantitative, socio-demographic and sexual variables. In qualitative data analysis, we applied the Meaning Interpretation Method. The female vulnerability was aggravated by the early onset of sexual activity, lack of knowledge about STDs, non-adoption of preventive measures and history of prostitution. The following categories emerged from the qualitative assessment: Knowledge about STD/AIDS versus Personal Experience;Use of contraception as STD/AIDS prevention within the Public Jail;Habits of inmates: alcohol and tobacco;and Characterization of the conjugal visit area.

Effect of Strategy-Homogeneity on the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in a Square Lattice

We investigate the effect of strategy-homogeneity on the prisoner’s dilemma game in a square lattice. Strategy-homogeneity means that the population contains at least one connected group in which individuals maintain the same strategy at each iteration and may update according to updating rule at next iteration. The simulation results show that the introduction of strategy-homogeneity increases the cooperation in the evolutionary stable state. For any value of temptation to defect, the density of cooperators in equilibrium state increases firstly and then decreases as the level of strategy-homogeneity increases constantly, and there exists an appropriate level of strategy-homogeneity, maximizing the density of cooperators. The results may be favorable for comprehending cooperative behaviors in societies composed of connected groups with coherent strategy.

Multilateral Investment Agreement Negotiations and China's Policies

Of late,Chins’s joining in the WTO has again claimed the focus of attention at home and abroad.What is most talked about at home is

Cooperation influenced by the correlation degree of two-layered complex networks in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games

An evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game is investigated on two-layered complex networks respectively representing interaction and learning networks in one and two dimensions. A parameter q is introduced to denote the correlation degree between the two-layered networks. Using Monte Carlo simulations we studied the effects of the correlation degree on cooperative behaviour and found that the cooperator density nontrivially changes with q for different payoff parameter values depending on the detailed strategy updating and network dimension. An explanation for the obtained results is provided.

China's First Seminar On Prisoners' Human Rights

Anational seminar on honoring prisoners’ human rights was held in Nanjing from September 10 to 12 by China Society for Human Rights Studies (CSHRS) and China Penology Society (CPS), which, the first of its kind in China, drew over 60 law and human rights experts and officials from jails and judicial administrations across the country.

A Prisoner's Wedding

It was May 22, 2002. A special wedding was held at the Henan Provincial No. 2 Prison. The bridegroom was Liu Jingli, who used to be sentenced to life imprisonment and was serving his term, and the bride was Guo Runhong, who was released from prison a year earlier. Everything went in the traditional way. More than 100 prison inmates crowded the auditorium and 1,000 others standing outside. When the wedding reached the climax, the whole auditorium rose

Time Pressure Influence in Negotiation

With the development of economic globalization,international trade has taken a great part in business.While every negotiation is a trade,people doing business have to pay great attention to negotiation,if they want to be successful in the trading market.In short,negotiation is a bargaining process to achieve coincidence on a problem about every aspect of negotiation for assuring everyone's needs.This essay's topic is that time pressure's influence in negotiation.Since the general introduction of negotiation has been discussed before,now the following will introduce time power in negotiation in detail.

Inmates’Rights Protection in China’s Prisons

Prisons are the State＇s organ for carrying out criminal punishment. Chinese laws require that criminals sentenced to a fixed-term sentence, a life sentence, or to the death penalty with a two-year reprieve should serve their terms in prisons. China＇s high- est judicial administrative organ is the Ministry of Justice whose Bureau of Prison Administration manages the country＇s prisons. According to the levels of prison administration, prisons are divided into three cat- egories. Currently, there is only one prison in category I,

Call of True Passion and Conscience——A visit to a women's prison

The Shanghai Women’s Prison was built in October 1996. Walking into the confinement, we felt that it is a special kingdom of women. The prison warden is a middle-aged woman, looking very agile and capable. Guards coming with her were all young girls, elegant and beautiful. If not for their police uni forms, they should have been taken as college students. As soon as we sat down, we were shown a film strip that recorded the moving scenes of women inmates and guards spending the 2001 Spring Festival together. One scene presented representatives of women’s federation of the Putuo District of Shanghai, who visited the