Game theoretic analysis for pricing-based incentive mechanism in non-dedicated cooperative relay networks

In non-dedicated cooperative relay networks, each node is autonomous and selfish in nature, and thus spontaneous cooperation among nodes is challenged. To stimulate the selfish node to participate in cooperation, a pricing-based cooperation engine using game theory was designed. Firstly, the feasible regions of the charge price and reimbursement price were deduced. Then, the non-cooperative and cooperative games were adopted to analyze the amount of bandwidth that initiating cooperation node(ICN) forwards data through participating cooperation node(PCN) and the amount of bandwidth that PCN helps ICN to relay data. Meanwhile, the Nash equilibrium solutions of cooperation bandwidth allocations(CBAs) were obtained through geometrical interpretation. Secondly, a pricing-based cooperation engine was proposed and a cooperative communication system model with cooperation engines was depicted. Finally, an algorithm based on game theory was proposed to realize the cooperation engine. The simulation results demonstrate that, compared with the system without pricing-based incentive, the proposed system can significantly improve the ICN's metric measured by bit-per-Joule and increase the PCN's revenue.

QoS awared power and admission controls based on non-cooperative game theory in wireless networks

In order to better accommodate heterogeneous quality of service (QoS) in wireless networks, an algorithm called QoS-aware power and admission controls (QAPAC) is proposed. The system is modeled as a non-cooperative game where the users adjust their transmit powers to maximize the utility, thus restraining the interferences. By using adaptive utility functions and tunable pricing parameters according to QoS levels, this algorithm can well meet different QoS requirements and improve system capacity compared with those that ignore the QoS differences.

Non-cooperative game for network access selection in heterogeneous integrated networks

The integration of different heterogeneous access networks is one of the remarkable characteristics of the next generation network,in which users with multi-network interface terminals can independently select access network to obtain the most desired service.A kind of unified quantification model of non-monotone quality of service(QoS) and a model of non-cooperative game between users and networks are proposed for heterogeneous network access selection.An optimal network pricing mechanism could be formulated by using a novel strategy which is used in this non-cooperative game model to balance the interests of both the users and the networks.This access network selection mechanism could select the most suitable network for users,and it also could provide the basis when formulating QoS standards in heterogeneous integrated networks.The simulation results show that this network selection decision-making algorithm can meet the users' demand for different levels service in different scenes and it can also avoid network congestion caused by unbalanced load.

No-cooperative games for multiple emergency locations in resource scheduling

When an emergency happens, the scheduling of relief resources to multiple emergency locations is a realistic and intricate problem, especially when the available resources are limited. A non-cooperative games model and an algorithm for scheduling of relief resources are presented. In the model, the players correspond to the multiple emergency locations, strategies correspond to all resources scheduling and the payoff of each emergency location corresponds to the reciprocal of its scheduling cost. Thus, the optimal results are determined by the Nash equilibrium point of this game. Then the iterative algorithm is introduced to seek the Nash equilibrium point. Simulation and analysis are given to demonstrate the feasibility and availability of the model.

博弈视角下电-气互联综合能源系统多目标协同优化

考虑到现有综合能源系统多目标优化存在主观性,文中提出一种基于非合作博弈理论的单主体多目标协同优化方法。首先,建立耦合配电网络、配气网络和能源站的电-气互联综合能源系统模型。为使优化调度结果更贴近现实,在配气网模型中采用可变压缩比的压缩机模型,并考虑其非线性耗量特性。其次,基于非合作博弈理论,将能源站单一利益主体的经济性目标和环保性目标视为完全平等且理性的虚拟博弈者,其策略空间由系统内各设备约束组成。再次,为确保博弈模型存在纳什均衡解,在新增辅助变量和约束作用下将收益函数(目标函数)转为拟凸的可微函数。采用凸松弛方法处理模型中非凸非线性约束,并提出非线性迭代策略加速松弛收紧。为便于求解出纳什均衡,使用Nikaido-Isoda函数重构收益函数,将原模型转变为全局最优问题。最后,通过算例验证了所提方法的有效性。

Multicriteria Partial Cooperative Games

In this paper, we study an approach to environmental topics, through multicriteria partial cooperative games. In general, not all players wish to cooperate to solve a common problem, so we consider a model where only some decision-makers cooperate. Starting from the transformation of a coalition game into a strategic one, we give a new concept of solution for partial cooperative models proving an existence theorem.

基于α-CIS值的非合作-合作双型博弈的求解

本文研究了非合作-合作双型博弈模型求解的问题.首先利用于α-CIS值,求解非合作-合作双型博弈中的合作博弈阶段,再对非合作博弈阶段求其纯策略纳什均衡,获得了基于α-CIS值的双型博弈的一种新的求解方法.推广了原始双型博弈模型的求解方法并证明其可行性.

Coordination game model of co-opetition relationship on cluster supply chains

The research of cluster supply chains is a new direction and a hotspot of the industrial cluster theory. On the condition of the coordination game, the enterprises may be stuck on the non-efficient equilibrium status, which becomes an important problem that must be considered on cluster supply chains. A symmetrical coordination game model is constituted to describe the competition and cooperation relationship of the same-quality manufacturers on cluster supply chains. The methods of the non-cooperation game theory and the evolutionary game theory are respectively used to analyze the model, whose parameters＇ influences under each method are then compared. It can be concluded that the analysis of the evolutionary game theory is more realistic and practical. Finally, three approaches are considered to break away from being path-dependence locked-in non-efficient status during this coordination game evolutionary process, which provide the development of cluster supply chains with an effective forecasting and Pareto optimizing method.

基于博弈论的孤岛型风-光-氢微网容量规划

为了解决多经济主体参与的微电网容量规划问题,针对构建的孤岛型风-光-氢微电网进行容量规划研究。系统以风电场、光伏电站和制氢-储氢-发电系统三个投资商各自的经济成本最小为优化目标,首先考虑各博弈方的投资成本、运行维护成本、负荷中断惩罚成本与弃风弃光惩罚成本,提出五种非合作/合作博弈的规划模型,采用粒子群算法对各博弈模式下的纳什均衡点进行求解,然后基于Shapley值对合作博弈模式中最小的总经济成本进行成本分摊。最后应用西北某地区风速和光照强度的历史数据进行算例分析,验证了所提模型可以满足各方的经济性和系统的可靠性。

Modeling and game strategy analysis of suppressing IADS for multiple fighters' cooperation

This paper addresses the problem of suppression of the integrated air defense system(IADS) by multiple fighters’ cooperation. Considering the dynamic changing of the number of the nodes in the operational process, a profit model for the influence of the mission’s cost for the whole system is developed for both offense and defensive sides. The scenario analysis is given for the process of suppressing the IADS by multiple fighters. Based on this scenario analysis, the modeling method and the specific expression for the payoff function are proposed in four cases for each node. Moreover, a distributed virtual learning algorithm is designed for the n-person and n-strategy game, and the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium(MSNE) of this game can be solved from the n × m × 3-dimensional profit space. Finally, the simulation examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model and the game algorithm.

考虑居民用户可调节潜力的负荷聚合商日前投标决策优化模型研究

负荷聚合商能够充分挖掘居民用户资源参与需求响应,深化居民用电可调节潜力量化分析对负荷精准调控与负荷聚合商模式智能推广具有重要作用。首先,基于居民用电负荷调控差异性,考虑居民典型用电电器综合满意度计量,构建居民柔性负荷可调节潜力分析模型;然后,考虑负荷聚合商参与市场交易的运营模式,构建基于非合作博弈理论的日前投标决策优化模型;最后,通过算例仿真验证模型的有效性及适用性。结果表明该模型能够兼顾调控潜力,有效支撑负荷聚合商最优投标决策,为负荷聚合商推广下统筹资源优化调控提供借鉴与参考。

基于解雇威胁的股东与经理人非合作微分博弈模型研究

本文针对存在解雇威胁时公司股东与项目经理人之间的非合作问题,构建了两阶段连续时间下双方进行非合作博弈的微分对策模型。通过求解HJB方程得到了该博弈的均衡结果,运用“逆向归纳法”推导出经理人最优投资决策的表达形式,最后从理论推导和数值模拟两个方面分析了“解雇机制”对于经理人最优投资决策和最优努力的影响。研究表明:(1)当企业实物资本所占比例超过某一阈值时,初始资本的增加以及解雇概率的降低会提高经理人的投资积极性;当该比例低于阈值时,初始资本的增加会对经理人最优投资比例的选择产生负向影响,但随着解雇风险的上升,经理人会提高投资比例。(2)经理人所选择的再投资比例,会随着一定范围内企业实物资本所占比重的增加而逐渐降低。(3)解雇机制在参数设置满足约束条件的企业中能够有效激励经理人努力工作。

非合作博弈背景下基于BSA的配电网优化重构

为缓解分布式电源大规模接入对配电网安全稳定运行的影响,提出一种考虑分布式电源输出功率的不确定性的有源配电网优化重构方法.首先,采用非合作博弈理论研究电网调度人员与“大自然”之间的博弈关系,将配电网系统中光伏单元的不确定性视为“大自然”博弈方;其次,以有功网损、负荷均衡度、电压偏差最小为目标函数,建立有源配电网优化重构模型,通过回溯搜索算法(backtracking search algorithm,BSA)进行迭代求解,得到最优重构方案;最后,在IEEE33节点系统进行仿真分析,验证模型的正确性及求解算法的有效性.研究结果表明,相较传统重构方法,本文方法更充分考虑了分布式电源输出功率的不确定性,并且在最恶劣的情况发生时,得到的重构策略能够使配电网系统的有功网损、负荷均衡度、电压偏差指标分别降低0.31%、0.59%、0.48%.

EFIS 数据源防御部署优化的非合作博弈模型

电子飞行仪表系统(Electronic Flight Instrument System,EFIS)具有高安全性要求,其运行环境极端,可供分配的防御策略资源严重受限,缺乏合理性的防御策略部署会影响系统整体安全。文章从攻防决策视角转换和非合作博弈理论出发,在融合安全视角下提出一种伴随EFIS周期性检修的有限防御策略部署优化模型。首先通过建立双属性的攻击防御树(Attack Defense Tree,ADT)构建攻防策略空间;然后运用决策视角转换思想,从攻击者的角度进行非合作博弈分析,揭示攻击者意图降低系统安全性的攻击策略分配;最后基于攻击者博弈结果对防御策略进行博弈分析,并通过验证提高防御者策略安全属性的可行性,为安全资源分配提供可靠的理论基础。该模型基于蒙特卡洛模拟成功求解了非合作博弈下的防御策略部署问题,得到期望效用最大化时的防御策略优化部署方案,避免了防御措施的冗余添加,同时有效提高了系统整体的安全性。

基于区块链的负荷聚合商及居民用户多方共治交易模式

居民用户以负荷聚合商为中介参与需求响应,在交易中往往不具有话语权和选择权,由此产生信息不透明、第三方权力过大等信任问题;同时,居民用户因信息获取能力差以及负荷实时控制能力弱,难以在聚合响应中享受平等决策权、知情权和话语权。因此,基于区块链技术设计负荷聚合商及居民用户多方共治交易模式,针对包含3类柔性负荷的居民用户及聚合商的区块链节点,以自治共享为基本原则建立区块链节点模型和配置方法;基于负荷聚合商及居民用户节点间的聚合响应新模式,构建了基于聚合商非合作博弈、居民用户间演化博弈及聚合商与居民用户间主从博弈的激励机制,设计了激励相容的智能合约算法和区块数据结构,并提出响应标识因数和激励理性系数来评估所提交易模式的有效性;最后,经算例仿真验证表明,所提交易模式在保证各交易节点效用的基础上,可确保聚合服务高效可信,有利于唤醒海量需求侧沉睡资源。

Coverage and capacity optimization in LTE network based on non-cooperative games

expenditures and operational expenditures （OPEX） （CAPEX） for operator, the coverage and capacity optimization （CCO） is one of the key use cases in long term evolution （LTE） self-organization network （SON）. In LTE system, some factors （e.g. load, traffic type, user distribution, uplink power setting, inter-cell interference, etc.） limit the coverage and capacity performance. From the view of single cell, it always pursuits maximize performance of coverage and capacity by optimizing the uplink power setting and intra-cell resource allocation, but it may result in decreasing the performance of its neighbor cells. Therefore, the benefit of every cell conflicts each other. In order to tradeoff the benefit of every cell and maximize the performance of the whole network, this paper proposes a multi-cell uplink power allocation scheme based on non-cooperative games. The scheme aims to make the performance of coverage and capacity balanced by the negotiation of the uplink power parameters among multi-cells. So the performance of every cell can reach the Nash equilibrium, making it feasible to reduce the inter-cell interference by setting an appropriate uplink power parameter. Finally, the simulation result shows the proposed algorithm can effectively enhance the performance of coverage and capacity in LTE network.

企业-高校合作创新方式选择的非对称信息博弈研究

企业与高校的合作创新是企业获取技术的一种重要手段。本文运用博弈论基本理论对企业和高校间合作创新中的信息不对称问题进行了研究,建立了一个非对称信息动态博弈模型,讨论了企业创新能力、技术的先进性和商业化价值如何影响对合作创新方式及合作对象的选择。

企业-高校合作创新的信息不对称博弈分析

企业与高校的合作创新是企业获取技术的一种重要手段。本文运用博弈论基本理论和模型对企业和高校间的技术交易这类合作创新中的信息不对称问题进行了研究,并解释了企业高校基于技术交易这一合作创新过程中的逆向选择现象存在的原因。

Vidale-Wolfe微分对策广告模型

广告竞争是市场竞争的重要形式，亦是目前营销活动中经常选用的竞争策略。在广告策划中，广告决策的选择过程本身就是一个对策过程。作者运用博奕论将著名的Ｖｉｄａｌｅ－Ｗｏｌｆｅ广告模型推广为微分对策广告模型，旨在量化阐明广告投入的市场运作“法则”，其结论可为解释当前有关广告竞争博奕方案的比较或选择提供新的理论支持。