Effect of distribution of fines on evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game

In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers incur expenses in imposing sanctions,while defectors face fines.Unfortunately,these monetary elements seemingly vanish into thin air,representing a loss to the system itself.However,by virtue of the redistribution of fines to cooperators and punishers,not only can we mitigate this loss,but the rewards for these cooperative individuals can be enhanced.Based upon this premise,this paper introduces a fine distribution mechanism to the traditional pool punishment model.Under identical parameter settings,by conducting a comparative experiment with the conventional punishment model,the paper aims to investigate the impact of fine distribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game.The experimental results clearly demonstrate that,in instances where the punishment cost is prohibitively high,the cooperative strategies of the traditional pool punishment model may completely collapse.However,the model enriched with fine distribution manages to sustain a considerable number of cooperative strategies,thus highlighting its effectiveness in promoting and preserving cooperation,even in the face of substantial punishment cost.

Discreet investors exert greater influence on cooperation in the public goods game

This paper studies the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a public goods game model with heterogeneous investment strategies in square lattices.In the proposed model,players are divided into defectors,cooperators and discreet investors.Among these,defectors do not participate in investing,discreet investors make heterogeneous investments based on the investment behavior and cooperation value of their neighbors,and cooperators invest equally in each neighbor.In real life,heterogeneous investment is often accompanied by time or economic costs.The discreet investors in this paper pay a certain price to obtain their neighbors'investment behavior and cooperation value,which quantifies the time and economic costs of the heterogeneous investment process.The results of Monte Carlo simulation experiments in this study show that discreet investors can effectively resist the invasion of the defectors,form a stable cooperative group and expand the cooperative advantage in evolution.However,when discreet investors pay too high a price,they lose their strategic advantage.The results in this paper help us understand the role of heterogeneous investment in promoting and maintaining human social cooperation.

Changes in the Supply of Public Intermediate Goods,Fixed Wage,and the Relative Price in the Harris-Todaro Model

Since the Harris-Todaro model was proposed in 1970,it has played a crucial role in analyzing various environmental and trade issues in developing countries.This paper analyzes the effects of the amount of public intermediate goods provided by the government,the increase in the fixed wage rate in the urban sector,and the changes in the relative international prices of agricultural and manufacturing goods on labor employment,unemployment,and the economic welfare in the context of a small open economy.It also proposes relevant policies to reduce the unemployment rate while improving national welfare.

Strategy dominance mechanism of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm within the framework of public goods game

The key advantage of unmanned swarm operation is its autonomous cooperation. How to improve the proportion of cooperators is one of the key issues of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm operations. This work proposes a strategy dominance mechanism of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm within the framework of public goods game. It starts with the requirement analysis of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm;and an aspiration-driven multiplayer evolutionary game model is established based on the requirement. Then the average abundance function and strategy dominance condition of the model are constructed by theoretical derivation. Furthermore, the evolutionary mechanism of parameter adjustment in swarm cooperation is revealed via simulation,and the influences of the multiplication factor r, aspiration levelα, threshold m and other parameters on the strategy dominance conditions were simulated for both linear and threshold public goods games(PGGs) to determine the strategy dominance characteristics;Finally, deliberate proposals are suggested to provide a meaningful exploration in the actual control of unmanned swarm cooperation.

Discussion on the Supply of Child-friendly City Construction Based on the Attributes of Public Goods

Child friendliness is the need for a good life in the new era.The problems related to the construction of child-friendly cities were discussed from the perspective of the supply of public goods.Through literature research and summary,the basic concepts,construction factors,sources of supply goods,structure of the main supplies,and supply behavior of public goods supply in child-friendly cities were sorted out.Some effective suggestions were proposed,such as improving the resource conversion and integration ability of the main suppliers,establishing an effective incentive system,optimizing the structure of the main suppliers,improving multi-party collaborative efficiency,ensuring benefits for all parties,raising child-friendly awareness,innovating funding sources for projects,ensuring adequate funding supply,building urban supply system in accordance with local conditions,and ensuring the supply of public goods.

Globalization Under the Spells of Breakdowns in Supply Chains, Regime Change, Regime Formation, and Alliance Restructuring: How Much Is Left for Public Goods?

In a paper conceived about five years ago(“Globalization and Public Goods:Too Big to Tackle?”)roughly a dozen factors were linked to explain important causal paths from globalization to the potential output of public goods.The Russian invasion of Ukraine,the corona epidemic,and the increased hegemonic rivalry between China and the U.S.interrupted or even destroyed many of the linkages between globalization and potential public good production.About five important detrimental paths involved in the meantime.In the present article we aim at linking what is left from the previous level of globalization or emerging to form a new and simplified causal model for likely linkages between truncated or(re-)emerging globalization,and the deadly needed output of public goods.These linkages refer to rules of climate control,go to trade linkages and arbitrary tariffs and trade interventions.Regime change,regime formation,and alliance restructuring address aspects of domestic rule and international stability.Selectorate theory,regime type,and exit options for political elites provide key explanatory factors in explaining globalization and public goods productions,or their decay.Where possible we use some data and transformation experiences corroborating our arguments.In other instances need for further empirical macro research will become clear.

Application of the Industry-University-Research Education Model of“Works,Products,and Public Goods”in Design Majors Practical Courses in Colleges and Universities

One of the goals and requirements of China’s educational modernization includes prioritizing,guiding,and promoting the social service capabilities of universities.The teaching of practical courses in design majors in colleges and universities has long been plagued by problems such as being“out of touch with the market and social needs”and“ignoring the cultivation of creativity.”It fails to meet the goals and requirements of educational modernization.This article takes the“Fundamentals of Styling and Comprehensive Expression”course offered by the School of Design of Guangxi Normal University as an entry point to study the industry-university-research education method that combines“social service”with the teaching of design professional practical courses.It also attempts to improve“works,products,and public goods”through the establishment of the theoretical model of“product”and the analysis of practical application paths is carried out to solve the problems existing in the traditional teaching of the design major,enhance the social service capabilities of the design major,promote talent employment and industry and social development,and carry out teaching reform attempts.

Maintenance of cooperation induced by punishment in public goods games

In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters are fixed. One is the punishment mechanism which can avoid the dilemma of lacking investment, and the other is the degree of rationality. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that the existence of punishment mechanism and distribution of rationality are the keys to the enhancement of cooperation level. We also testify that they can heavily influence the payoffs of system as well. The findings in this paper may provide a deeper understanding of some social dilemmas.

Punishment in optional public goods games

In this work, the optional public goods games with punishment are studied. By adopting the approximate best response dynamics, a micro model is given to explain the evolutionary process. Simultaneously, the magnitude of rationality is also considered. Under the condition of bounded rationality which provides a light to interpret phenomena in human society, the model leads to two types of equilibriums. One is the equilibrium without punishers and the other is the equilibrium including only punishers and cooperators. In addition, the effects of rationality on equilibriums are briefly investigated.

Stochastic evolutionary public goods game with first and second order costly punishments in finite populations

We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.

The Supply-Demand Analysis and Mechanism Innovation of Chinese Rural Public Goods

The connotation of rural public goods is expounded.The rural public goods refer to the products and labors that satisfy the production and living of rural residents,economic growth and social progress.The rural public goods is characterized by non-excludability,non-competitiveness and indispensability of other general public goods.The supply situation of Chinese government to rural public goods is analyzed,as well as the demand situation of rural public goods,which includes farmers' demand on training,the assistance demand of rural weak groups,farmers' demand on comfortable living conditions and farmers' demand on "soft" public goods.The paths for innovating the supply mechanism of rural public goods are put forward,which cover perfecting the decision mechanism of public goods supply;scientifically distributing the supply responsibility of rural public goods;facilitating the reform of each supporting equipment and exploring the multiple capital collecting channels of rural public goods.

The Theoretical Foundation and its Mode Transformation of Rural Public Goods Supply in the Perspective of Organizational Competition

Theoretical expositions of public goods supply by the liberalism,new institutionalism and the school of public choice are conducted in the perspective of organizational competition.And the theoretical foundation of rural public goods is put forward.Then,the changes of the supply mode of rural public goods are discussed before and after the tax reform,that is,the "Community Cooperation" supply mode of rural public goods before the tax reform and the "Organization Cooperation" supply mode of rural public goods after the tax reform.Finally,the diversification of rural public goods supply in China in future is forecasted.

Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games

We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies： cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered. By adopting approximate best response dynamics, we show that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in [Nature （London） 425 （2003） 390], but also it will heavily influence the evolution of cooperation. Compared with previous results of infinite populations, which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium cooperation. In addition, we characterize that loner＇s and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner＇s payoff. It thus indicates the effects of rationality and loner＇s payoff will influence the cooperation. Finally, we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly.

Global Development Initiative:An International Public Goods to Promote Common Development

The world today is facing turbulence and change,and global development is at a crossroads.At this critical juncture,President Xi Jinping put forth the Global Development Initiative(GDI)with the theme“implementing the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda for more robust,greener and healthier global development”at the 76th General Assembly of the United Nations,which sheds light on the direction of global development.The GDI,proposed by China,has galvanized support from the international community as an international public goods to promote common development.Following the historical trends of human development,the GDI breaks through the limitations of the hegemonic stability theory and the free-riding curse to expand and innovate the theoretical perception of international public goods with the right approach to principles and interests.With a people-oriented approach and the basic principles of green and innovative development,the GDI both addresses urgent challenges and attaches importance to enhancing development capabilities and creating supporting conditions to offer a holistic solution to global challenges.Through the implementation of multiple pathways under international cooperation,the GDI will build a consensus on global development,increase the momentum of global development,and play an important role in creating a community with a shared future for mankind.

Incentive Mechanism Design for Public Goods Provision:Price Cap Regulation and Optimal Regulation

This paper studies the mechanism design that induces firms to provide public goods under two regulatory means： price cap regulation and optimal regulation, respectively. We first outline two models of monopoly regulation with unobservable marginal costs and effort, which can be regard as an optimal problem with dual restrictions. By solving this problem, we get the two optimal regulatory mechanisms to induce the provision of public goods. Further, by comparative statics, the conclusion is drawn that the welfare loss as sociated with price cap regulation, with respective to optimal regulation, increases more with increase of the expense of public goods.

Research on Supervision of Country Public Goods Supply Based on Public Choice Theory

To increase the provision of rural public goods is a major task of Chinese new rural construction, while it can not do without the necessary supervision. This paper described the relationship between public choice theory and the provision of rural public goods and it was a basis for in-depth study of the government＇s subject behavior from the perspective of public choice, and led to the necessity of regulation of rural public goods provision in rural areas, then it presented a strengthen monitoring of the rationalization proposals.

Study on Problems and Countermeasures of Rural Public Goods Supplying System

In current China, the main problem existing in the rural public goods supplying system is the unbalanced condition of public goods supply, and the chief reason for which is unitary system of supply main body. Thus the leading countermeasure for comer of public goods supply is to reform the present unitary rural public goods supplying system, to strengthen functional transfer of rural grass-roots directive organization, to adopt diversified mode and provide public goods on the base of overall planning of urban and rural areas and to implement unitary and diversified supplying strategy. In this way, supplying efficiency of the rural public goods will be improved.

Difficulties in Implementing Supply Mechanism of Rural Public Goods in the Context of Urban-rural Integration

Through in-depth interviews and questionnaires,we take Mianyang City,Aba Prefecture,and Suining City in Sichuan Province as the study object,to analyze the relationship between the basic situation of farmers and the supply mechanism implementation of rural public goods.The research results show that the younger the farmers,the higher the educational level,the higher the annual household income,and the higher the enthusiasm in participating the discussion of the supply of rural public goods.And the correlation between farmers'annual household income and participation in the supply of public goods is the highest.Finally corresponding countermeasures and proposals are put forth based on farmers' educational level and annual household income,the two difficulties in supply mechanism implementation of rural public goods.

The Rural Elite and the Supply of Public Goods in Rural Areas

Based on the theory of collective action and social capital theory,social capital is introduced into the game analysis of the supply of public goods between the rural elite and ordinary villagers.I establish the income model of public goods utility concerning the rural elite and ordinary villagers;research the incentive of social capital for the rural elite and villagers,and impact of social capital on the rural elite and villagers.Three inferences can be drawn from the model:the precondition for the elite to prompt the collective cooperation is having " good reputation" ;" good reputation" of the elite in the supply of public goods can abate farmers' motive of " free rider" ;the role of the elite in organizing the supply of public goods can save the transaction costs in the process of collective action.Taking the case of Shunhe Village,Panyu District,Guangzhou City,I explain this model.Finally,some policy recommendations are put forth as follows:rebuilding the community credit;giving full play to the role of the rural elite in the supply of public goods in rural areas.

The Economic Value of Public Goods

This paper explores US entrepreneurial history and public budgets from President Eisenhower’s election in 1952 until the beginning of the Obama administration 2008. A mix of market forces, structural changes and a tendency toward unfettered capitalism [1] challenge diagnosis. This analysis examines these complexities with 216 business quarters of economic history. It also provides a mathematical model to characterize in broad strokes positive governance modeling for business. This work is important as economic growth ensures a nation’s ability to protect its citizens.