Characteristics of the Ownership Structure of Chinese Listed Companies and Its Effect on Financial Reports Quality

Ownership structure is brand-new to the reform of Chinese state-owned enterprises, and also a problem that urgently need to study. Because the reform wasn＇t entire, the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies looks freakish. That is to say, the ownership is highly concentrated in the state, who has just no tangible rights to control the business, which results in ＂insider control＂, ＂owner absence＂, ＂duality of manager and chairman＂, and so on. At the same time, such an ownership structure is unavoidable to supply inducement to the people who has relative benefits in it, and it eventually affects the quality of their financial reports. This paper empirically studies the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies and their characteristics in the actual situation, and finally puts forward some suggestions on how to improve the quality of the financial reports from the ownership structure approach.

Comparative Analysis of Managerial Ownership and Its Effect on Corporate Performance in Selected Asian and European Transition Economies

This paper analyzes determinants and consequences of managerial ownership within ownership structures of the selected European and Asian transition countries. Focus of the analysis is the influence of the specific unification of ownership and control on corporate performance. Findings in the paper are based on research that produced empirical data for Croatia which is subsequently compared with evidence from other Asian and European transition countries facing the same issues. Consequently, transitional ownership structures, influenced by actual privatization process, like emergent corporate governance mechanisms, highly concentrated ownership and undeveloped markets for corporate control are also described. Research findings show that direct or indirect managerial ownership are important phenomena in transition countries, research has also shown that stable and concentrated managerial ownership have positive effects on firms＇ profitability in the observed transitional environments.

Investor Protection,Ownership Structure and Corporate Valuation

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between investor protection, ownership structure and corporate valuation. La Porta showed that there existed a simple linear relationship between corporate valuation and the holding percentage of controlling shareholders. But recent empirical evidence does not support it. A nonlinear relationship is proved between ownership structure and corporate valuaton by relaxing the assumption of La Porta＇s model in this paper. There exists a positive relation between investor protection and corporate valuation. Our empirical research shows that this relation is significantly positive indeed.

Audit Quality, Legal Systems, Investment Opportunity Set and Ownership Structure： Evidence From United States, France and Germany

This paper investigates the determinants of audit quality of three countries especially the United States, France and Germany belonging to three different legal systems. These determinants concern the legal system of country, investment opportunity set and ownership structure which have influence of audit quality.Empirical results show, initially, that specificities of legal system are positively associated with audit quality appreciated by size of audit firm. Then, the results reveal that investment opportunity set influences partially size of audit firm. Finally, ownership structure influences negatively the search for a high audit quality

Ownership Structure in Electricity Regulation

Electricity is subject to government regulation in every country. Regulation failure and multiple objectives imposed by government run the risk facing by the investor. In order to balance the interests of investors, consumers and governments, there are historically three types of ownership structure： investor-owned, public-owned and mixed system. Ownership reform and structural change are the most exciting development in the electricity. Restructuring and creating market competition make political influence more expensive and could mitigate the hold-up problem and ratchet effect. Finally, the effects of different ownership structure on economic performance in electricity are explored.

The CPC’s Century-Long Exploration of a Socialist Ownership System

Throughout its century-long history,the Communist Party of China(CPC)has been striving to explore and implement an ownership system of the means of production.Upon its founding in 1921,the Party envisioned to create a sole ownership system after the victory of the National Revolution.In war times,land issues dominated the agenda of the Party’s work on the ownership structure since most of its bases and liberated areas were in the countryside.After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949,China established a basic socialist economic system through“one industrialization and three transformations,”i.e.socialist industrialization and the transformations of agriculture,artisanal production,and capitalist industry and commerce.This nascent socialist economic system was characterized by the sole public ownership of the means of production and a highly centralized planned economy.Since the reform and opening up in 1978,the Party took bold steps to explore and reform the socialist ownership system under the principle to keep public ownership as the mainstay and allow diverse forms of ownership to develop side by side.In the new era,the Party has redefined China’s basic socialist economic system by creating a mixed ownership structure at two levels with public ownership as the mainstay.China’s increasing economic vitality and dynamism have witnessed the exploration and growth of this mixed ownership system.

Board independence, ownership structure, audit quality and income smoothing activities： A study on Malaysian market

The 1997 economic crisis faced by many East Asian economies has generated a substantial amount of debate largely focused on issues such as the roles and functions of good corporate governance （CG）. Lack of transparency has been singled out as the major culprit of the crisis and it has been alleged to cause management to indulge themselves in unhealthy activities such as income smoothing （IS） act. The paper extends Nasuhiyah, Hian, Sob and WEI （1994） by incorporating contextual variables that proxy for CG, ownership structure and audit quality. The empirical analysis is conducted on a sample of Bursa Malaysia listed companies for a period between 1991 and 2000. The main intention of taking this time span is to observe to what extend has previous business operations inculcated the feature of CG in the running of their companies＇ activities despite not being obligatory for them to uphold. The results showed that the existence of non-executive directors and the presence of brand name auditors to be significant in hindering the management from indulging in IS. The study opens the way for a richer understanding of the links among CG, ownership structure, audit quality and IS in Malaysia.

Does ownership structure matter when CPA deciding types of audit opinions

Ownership structure is one of the most important and basic corporate governance characteristics. Thus, does the ownership structure of a firm have an effect on the type of audit opinion it receives from CPA？ This paper uses a sample including 1246 non-financial listed companies from China A-share market in 2003. Empirical results show： for listed firms, external auditor＇s propensity to qualify is lower with lower proportion of public shares, or with higher concentration of shares at a marginal significant level. However, the proportions of state-owned shares and institutional shares have no significant effects on audit opinions. A possible explanation is that the ownership structure influences risk awareness and negotiation power of audit firms, influences negotiation power of clients, and then ultimately influences auditors＇ reporting decision and audit opinions. The potential policy implication is： a more dispersed ownership structure and/or a higher proportion of public shares are preferable for higher audit reporting conservatism and audit quality in China.

A Comparative Study of Land Economy under Different Ownerships in China

This paper creates a land economy model under the framework of the consistent growth theory to investigate the impacts of different forms of ownership on longterm economic equilibrium.As demonstrated under the model,in an economy of private ownership that allows the free transfer of land,land gradually becomes concentrated in the hands of a few;income growth deriving from technological progress merely contributes to the wealth and consumption of landowners;landless workers will struggle at the level of subsistence.An economy of public or collective ownership that forbids the transfer of land can ensure basic social equity.However,in a collective economy without a contract system,population is likely to grow excessively and thus requires external restraint.The conclusions of our model suggest that the long-term welfare and growth effect under collective ownership with a contract system is superior to those under private ownership and pure public ownership.

Available Agricultural Area by Utilization Categories and Ownership Structure of Holdings in the Republic of Serbia

The subject of research in this paper is the analysis and presentation of data on agricultural holdings, the structure of available and utilized area. The data and calculated indicators represent a comprehensive overview of the structural characteristics of national agriculture, but they are also an internationally comparable database, based on key features of agriculture. The main goal of this paper is to determine and explain more comprehensively and in detail by using appropriate methods, and based on available data, the condition of utilized agricultural area (hereinafter: UAA) and its quantitative and qualitative characteristics by utilization categories and manner of its use;types of agricultural holdings and statistical regions and lower statistical units of data grouping. Implementation of such a defined basic research goal indicates necessity of more detailed and continuous study of the causes that led to the reduction of available agricultural area and especially its better and more important production categories of utilization and measures and activities to be taken to eliminate or reduce the causes of inadequate management of agricultural area in the coming period. The importance of this research arises from the fact that the results on utilized agricultural area can be used to adopt appropriate measures and undertake certain activities in land and overall agricultural and rural policy related to sustainable utilization, arrangement and protection of agricultural land and more balanced integrated development of rural areas, as well as to find better solutions in the field of utilization, ownership sector and conditions of agricultural area management.

Ownership Concentration, Insider Shareholding and Firm Performance in Chinese Privately-run Enterprises

A typical privately-run enterprise has a mixed ownership structure with. four predominant groups of shareholders the state, legal persons, domestic individuals, and foreign investors. This paper gives an empirical analysis on the relationship among ownership concentration, insider shareholding and firm performance in nearly one thousand Chinese privately-run enterprises. The results show： the ownership concentration ratio and the percentage of insider shareholding are ＇inverse U--shaped＇ related to finn performance, respectively, the debt-to-asset ratio is negative related to finn performance, the firm size is positive related to firm performance.

Effect of Issuing Convertible Bonds from the Perspective of Ownership Structure:Evidence from Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen

Due to the rapid expansion of enterprise scale,traditional financing methods can no longer meet the needs of enterprises.As a financing method with both equity and debt,convertible bonds,with its flexibility,is favored by enterprises.Especially in 2017,China’s supervision on the financing method of private placement of shares has become stricter,and some companies have chosen convertible bonds for financing.This paper takes the ownership structure as the starting point and the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen as the research subjects,as well as uses regression analysis to determine the relationship between convertible bonds,ownership structure,and enterprise performance.It is found that convertible bonds reduce the performance of enterprises,while ownership concentration strengthens the negative relationship.

Corporate governance mechanisms and firm valuation in Malaysian listed firms： A panel data analysis

Corporate governance mechanisms emerge to tackle agency problems in ensuring that shareholders＇ funds are not expropriated or wasted on unprofitable activities. The issue arises as to whether these improvements have been effective in reducing agency costs, and therefore enhancing firm value. The objectives of this paper is to examine the effects of governance mechanisms of dividend, types of ownership structure, and board governance on firm value. This paper utilises a panel data analysis of 403 firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia over a four-year period from years 2002 to 2005. A hierarchical regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses and the data is analysed using the generalized least square （GLS） estimation technique. Overall, the results highlight the importance of moderating role played by board governance variables with types of ownership structure to influence firm value. However, the benefits of better corporate governance through enhanced board governance are not the same across all firms since their incentives vary with respect to dividend and different types of ownership structure mechanisms.

Silent Large Shareholders and Entrenched Bank Management： Evidence from the Banking Crisis in Japan

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Japanese banks have become saddled with huge amounts of non-performing loans and a significant number of them have failed. We investigate the cause of this banking crisis that has jeopardized the stability of the financial and economic system. Following Hanazaki （2001）, we argue that the deficiency of effective corporate governance of banks in Japan has caused inefficient management. Our focus here is the role of large shareholders who happen to be banks and insurers. We argue that these large shareholders appear to collude or conspire with management instead of being tough monitors. Consequently, the management became entrenched. Our empirical results show that during the 1980s these ＂entrenched banks＂ extended more lending. Even after the collapse of the bubble in the 1990s, they did not dramatically undertake restructuring to cope with the accumulated bad loans.

Raising capital amid economic policy uncertainty:an empirical investigation

This paper investigates how economic policy uncertainty affects firms’frequency and their choice of financial instruments to raise capital.By applying a three-step sequential framework over a sample of 6834 publicly listed US non-financial firms,we find that during periods of high economic uncertainty,firms raise capital more frequently with a preference toward debt financing.The empirical findings suggest that firms prefer debt financing over equity financing to avoid ownership dilution and high equity premia.The rise in leverage during periods of high economic uncertainty highlights the importance of scrutinizing policy tools used to stabilize the economy during such times.

SOE Dominance of Financial Capita Takes a Toil on Chinese Economy

From the perspective of financial distortoin and using the statistics China＇s industrial enterprises between 1999 and 2007,this paper examines the relationship between corporate ownership and ROIC （return on invested capital）.Our empirical results suggest that SOEs have a for lower ROIC average compared to enterprises of the forms of ownership,and that private enterprises have the highest ROIC.In addition,this paper＇s numerical simulation results indicate that if financial distortion is eliminated,so that more financial resources can be redirected to private enterprises with a higher ROIC,China＇s GDP growth could be increased by 2 to 8 per cent over the current level.

The role of cross-listing,foreign ownership and state ownership in dividend policy in an emerging market

In this paper, we investigate if dividend policy is influenced by ownership type.Within the dividend literature, dividends have a signaling role regarding agency costs, such that dividends may diminish insider conflicts(reduce free cash flow) or may be used to extract cash from firms(tunneling effect)- which could be predominant in emerging markets. We expect firms with foreign ownership and those that are listed in overseas markets to have different dividend policies and practices than those that are not, and firms with more state ownership and less individual ownership to be more likely to pay cash dividends and less likely to pay stock dividends. Using firms from an emerging economy(China), we examine whether these effects exist in corporate dividend policy and practice. We find that both foreign ownership and cross-listing have significant negative effects on cash dividends, consistent with the signaling effect and the notion of reduced tunneling activities for firms with the ability to raise capital from outside of China. Consistent with the tunneling effect, we find that firms with higher state ownership tend to pay higher cash dividends and lower stock dividends, while the opposite is true for public(individual) ownership.Further analysis shows that foreign ownership mediates the effect of state ownership on dividend policy. Our results have significant implications for researchers, investors, policy makers and regulators in emerging markets.

Founder Control,Ownership Structure and Firm Value:Evidence from Entrepreneurial Listed Firms in China

In emerging markets, the deviation between the ultimate controlling shareholders' voting rights and their cash flow rights(hereafter "DVC") in the listed firms is quite prevalent. DVC could be introduced due to the ultimate controlling shareholders' opportunistic incentives, as well as by their incentives to improve firm efficiency. This study uses 229 listed firms ultimately controlled by individuals or families(hereafter "entrepreneurial firms") for 2004 in China, to investigate the effect of DVC on firm value and to determine whether it is different between founder and non-founder controlled firms. We find that DVC has a positive effect on firm value for founder controlled firms. This result implies that investors believe that their interests are better protected by founder controlled firms than by non-founder controlled firms.

Some thoughts on deepening the reform of ownership structure

The fundamental criterion of the ＂three favorables＂ put forward by Deng Xiaoping is the basic theoretical foundation on which China＇s current ownership structure is established and improved, one where public ownership is dominant and diverse forms of ownership coexist. What is critical for properly handling the relationship between the public and non-public economies and coordinating them within the great practice of constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics is adherence to the dominance of public ownership together with ceaseless exploration and active adoption of effective forms to realize public ownership. ＂Public assets dominate the total assets in society.＂ Their dominance in terms of quantity should mean mainly that net public operating assets account for a dominant proportion of society＇s overall net operating assets, while their dominance in terms of quality should be seen in the ability of the socialist economy linked with net public operating assets to yield much higher labor productivity than the capitalist economy. In order to consolidate and develop the public economy in China, and further bring into play the dominant role of the state-owned economy, it is imperative for us to correctly understand and grasp the unique features of China in the distribution of the state sector of the economy in the conditions of the socialist market economy, rationally map out and continuously optimize its distribution and structure, and endeavor to nurture a group of intemationally competitive large-scale state-owned or state-controlled enterprises or enterprise groups.