This paper develops a game-theory model for predatory pricing via in-depth analyses of three case studies:Brooke Group Ltd.v.Brown&Williamson Tobacco Corp.,Matsushita Electric Industries Co.v.Zenith Radio Corporat...This paper develops a game-theory model for predatory pricing via in-depth analyses of three case studies:Brooke Group Ltd.v.Brown&Williamson Tobacco Corp.,Matsushita Electric Industries Co.v.Zenith Radio Corporation,and AKZO Chemie BV v.Commission of the European Communities.This model is based on subsequent action game theory models and rational economics behavior,offering a chronological outline of the“predation”stages.It presents the predator’s decisions,the prey’s potential responses,possible loops,and the two distinctive outcomes.The analysis of the model in context of the three case studies demonstrates its practicality in assessing real-life predatory pricing scenarios and players’strategies.It’s flexibility also allows applications in related fields.Overall,this paper offers a comprehensive framework that bridges the gap between law,economics,and game theory in the study of predatory pricing,informing future research in this area.展开更多
This paper revisits the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan case, using quantitative methods. We first estimate the demand system of carbonated soft drinks and juices, using the data of the 4-digit code Chinese soft drink industry. We ...This paper revisits the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan case, using quantitative methods. We first estimate the demand system of carbonated soft drinks and juices, using the data of the 4-digit code Chinese soft drink industry. We then define the relevant market by implementing the SSNIP test （a.k.a. the hypothetical monopolist test）. Finally, we evaluate the unilateral effect on the juices market with merger simulation. Our results show that carbonated soft drinks and juicess are in two separate relevant markets. More importantly, there may, be a significant unilateral effect on the juices market based on scenario analysis. 7his result confirms the MOFCOM decision itself, but highlights that competition damage comes more from unilateral efect than from the dubious portfolio effect.展开更多
The State Administration for Market Regulation has referred to the concept of"essential facilities"in two regulations,and some courts have utilized the essential facilities doctrine in their judgments to rec...The State Administration for Market Regulation has referred to the concept of"essential facilities"in two regulations,and some courts have utilized the essential facilities doctrine in their judgments to recognize a defendant's refusal to deal as an illegal act of monopolization.As a doctrine originally applicable only to tangible properties in the United States,the essential facilities doctrine has gradually evolved through case law to be applied in the context of intellectual property(IP)rights.Nevertheless,there remains significant controversy in China and other jurisdictions as to whether the essential facilities doctrine can be extended to IP rights.Given the fundamental differences between intangible and tangible properties,as well as the core mechanisms of IP laws,greater caution and limits must be exercised when applying the essential facilities doctrine to IP.Specifically,(1)compulsory licensing should only be implemented when the IP in question is deemed an essential facility;(2)Article 7 of the Provisions on the Prohibition of the Abuse of Intellectual Property to Eliminate or Restrict Competition should be interpreted as"harm the competition in the secondary market";and(3)in cases involving compulsory licensing,the court should examine whether such licensing would have an unreasonable adverse impact on the rights holder.展开更多
文摘This paper develops a game-theory model for predatory pricing via in-depth analyses of three case studies:Brooke Group Ltd.v.Brown&Williamson Tobacco Corp.,Matsushita Electric Industries Co.v.Zenith Radio Corporation,and AKZO Chemie BV v.Commission of the European Communities.This model is based on subsequent action game theory models and rational economics behavior,offering a chronological outline of the“predation”stages.It presents the predator’s decisions,the prey’s potential responses,possible loops,and the two distinctive outcomes.The analysis of the model in context of the three case studies demonstrates its practicality in assessing real-life predatory pricing scenarios and players’strategies.It’s flexibility also allows applications in related fields.Overall,this paper offers a comprehensive framework that bridges the gap between law,economics,and game theory in the study of predatory pricing,informing future research in this area.
文摘This paper revisits the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan case, using quantitative methods. We first estimate the demand system of carbonated soft drinks and juices, using the data of the 4-digit code Chinese soft drink industry. We then define the relevant market by implementing the SSNIP test （a.k.a. the hypothetical monopolist test）. Finally, we evaluate the unilateral effect on the juices market with merger simulation. Our results show that carbonated soft drinks and juicess are in two separate relevant markets. More importantly, there may, be a significant unilateral effect on the juices market based on scenario analysis. 7his result confirms the MOFCOM decision itself, but highlights that competition damage comes more from unilateral efect than from the dubious portfolio effect.
文摘The State Administration for Market Regulation has referred to the concept of"essential facilities"in two regulations,and some courts have utilized the essential facilities doctrine in their judgments to recognize a defendant's refusal to deal as an illegal act of monopolization.As a doctrine originally applicable only to tangible properties in the United States,the essential facilities doctrine has gradually evolved through case law to be applied in the context of intellectual property(IP)rights.Nevertheless,there remains significant controversy in China and other jurisdictions as to whether the essential facilities doctrine can be extended to IP rights.Given the fundamental differences between intangible and tangible properties,as well as the core mechanisms of IP laws,greater caution and limits must be exercised when applying the essential facilities doctrine to IP.Specifically,(1)compulsory licensing should only be implemented when the IP in question is deemed an essential facility;(2)Article 7 of the Provisions on the Prohibition of the Abuse of Intellectual Property to Eliminate or Restrict Competition should be interpreted as"harm the competition in the secondary market";and(3)in cases involving compulsory licensing,the court should examine whether such licensing would have an unreasonable adverse impact on the rights holder.
