Nowadays manufacturers are facing fierce challenge.Apart from the products,providing customers with multiple maintenance options in the service contract becomes more popular,since it can help to improve customer satis...Nowadays manufacturers are facing fierce challenge.Apart from the products,providing customers with multiple maintenance options in the service contract becomes more popular,since it can help to improve customer satisfaction,and ultimately promote sales and maximize profit for the manufacturer.By considering the combinations of corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance,totally three types of maintenance service contracts are designed.Moreover,attractive incentive and penalty mechanisms are adopted in the contracts.On this basis,Nash non-cooperative game is applied to analyze the revenue for both the manufacturer and customers,and so as to optimize the pricing mechanism of maintenance service contract and achieve a win-win situation.Numerical experiments are conducted.The results show that by taking into account the incentive and penalty mechanisms,the revenue can be improved for both the customers and manufacturer.Moreover,with the increase of repair rate and improvement factor in the preventive maintenance,the revenue will increase gradually for both the parties.展开更多
Farmers’contract breach behavior is cited as one of the major stumbling blocks in the sustainable expansion of contract farming in many developing countries.This paper examines farmers’contract breach decisions from...Farmers’contract breach behavior is cited as one of the major stumbling blocks in the sustainable expansion of contract farming in many developing countries.This paper examines farmers’contract breach decisions from the perspective of time preferences.The empirical analysis is based on a household survey and economic field experiments of poultry households participating in contract farming conducted in Jiangsu Province,China.A discounted utility model and a maximum likelihood technique are applied to estimate farmers’time preferences and the effect of time preferences on contract breach in the production and sales phases are explored with a bivariate probit model.The results show that,on average,the poultry farmers in the sample are generally present biased and impatient regarding future utility.The regression results show that farmers with a higher preference for the present and a higher discount rate are more likely to breach contracts,and time preferences play a greater role in the production phase than in the sales phase.When considering heterogeneity,specific investments and transaction costs promote contract stability only for farmers with a low degree of impatience.Moreover,compared with large-scale farmers,small-scale farmers’contract breach decisions are more significantly affected by their time preferences.These results have implications for contract stability policies and other issues that are impacted by the linking of behavioral preferences to agricultural decisions.展开更多
From the perspective of psychological contract,this paper discusses mechanism of consumers' network cluster behavior in the context of brand crisis. On the basis of Simmel's conflict theory,it presented new fi...From the perspective of psychological contract,this paper discusses mechanism of consumers' network cluster behavior in the context of brand crisis. On the basis of Simmel's conflict theory,it presented new findings of network cluster behavior. It is concluded that brand crisis exerts significant influence on breach of psychological contract. Particularly,functional brand crisis more easily leads to breach of transactional psychological contract,while value brand crisis more easily leads to breach of relational psychological contract. Breach of transactional psychological contract more easily leads to realistic network cluster behavior,while breach of relational psychological contract does not necessarily lead to non-realistic network cluster behavior.展开更多
足球合同违约不仅导致赔偿,还可能引发体育制裁。将此类由体育制裁引发的争议提交至国际体育仲裁院(Court of Arbitration for Sport,CAS),须将足球主管机构作为被诉方。在审查此类案件中,仲裁庭首先确认合同违约是否发生在保护期内;对...足球合同违约不仅导致赔偿,还可能引发体育制裁。将此类由体育制裁引发的争议提交至国际体育仲裁院(Court of Arbitration for Sport,CAS),须将足球主管机构作为被诉方。在审查此类案件中,仲裁庭首先确认合同违约是否发生在保护期内;对违约球员、违约俱乐部和诱导球员违约俱乐部施加的体育制裁不同,仲裁庭的审查要件和裁判标准也存在区别。在处理此类案件的过程中,CAS尊重足球主管机构在体育制裁方面的裁量权,同时确保这一裁量权的行使正当及在合理范围之内。展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71671035)。
文摘Nowadays manufacturers are facing fierce challenge.Apart from the products,providing customers with multiple maintenance options in the service contract becomes more popular,since it can help to improve customer satisfaction,and ultimately promote sales and maximize profit for the manufacturer.By considering the combinations of corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance,totally three types of maintenance service contracts are designed.Moreover,attractive incentive and penalty mechanisms are adopted in the contracts.On this basis,Nash non-cooperative game is applied to analyze the revenue for both the manufacturer and customers,and so as to optimize the pricing mechanism of maintenance service contract and achieve a win-win situation.Numerical experiments are conducted.The results show that by taking into account the incentive and penalty mechanisms,the revenue can be improved for both the customers and manufacturer.Moreover,with the increase of repair rate and improvement factor in the preventive maintenance,the revenue will increase gradually for both the parties.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(72003082 and 71573130)the Project of Philosophy and Social Science Research in Colleges and Universities in Jiangsu Province of China(2020SJA1015)+1 种基金the Priority Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions,China(PAPD)the China Center for Food Security Studies,Nanjing Agricultural University,China。
文摘Farmers’contract breach behavior is cited as one of the major stumbling blocks in the sustainable expansion of contract farming in many developing countries.This paper examines farmers’contract breach decisions from the perspective of time preferences.The empirical analysis is based on a household survey and economic field experiments of poultry households participating in contract farming conducted in Jiangsu Province,China.A discounted utility model and a maximum likelihood technique are applied to estimate farmers’time preferences and the effect of time preferences on contract breach in the production and sales phases are explored with a bivariate probit model.The results show that,on average,the poultry farmers in the sample are generally present biased and impatient regarding future utility.The regression results show that farmers with a higher preference for the present and a higher discount rate are more likely to breach contracts,and time preferences play a greater role in the production phase than in the sales phase.When considering heterogeneity,specific investments and transaction costs promote contract stability only for farmers with a low degree of impatience.Moreover,compared with large-scale farmers,small-scale farmers’contract breach decisions are more significantly affected by their time preferences.These results have implications for contract stability policies and other issues that are impacted by the linking of behavioral preferences to agricultural decisions.
文摘From the perspective of psychological contract,this paper discusses mechanism of consumers' network cluster behavior in the context of brand crisis. On the basis of Simmel's conflict theory,it presented new findings of network cluster behavior. It is concluded that brand crisis exerts significant influence on breach of psychological contract. Particularly,functional brand crisis more easily leads to breach of transactional psychological contract,while value brand crisis more easily leads to breach of relational psychological contract. Breach of transactional psychological contract more easily leads to realistic network cluster behavior,while breach of relational psychological contract does not necessarily lead to non-realistic network cluster behavior.
文摘足球合同违约不仅导致赔偿,还可能引发体育制裁。将此类由体育制裁引发的争议提交至国际体育仲裁院(Court of Arbitration for Sport,CAS),须将足球主管机构作为被诉方。在审查此类案件中,仲裁庭首先确认合同违约是否发生在保护期内;对违约球员、违约俱乐部和诱导球员违约俱乐部施加的体育制裁不同,仲裁庭的审查要件和裁判标准也存在区别。在处理此类案件的过程中,CAS尊重足球主管机构在体育制裁方面的裁量权,同时确保这一裁量权的行使正当及在合理范围之内。
