Preliminary study is made to the international coordination of national monetary policy under economic globalization and informationalization. This paper uses Game Theory to analyze the operation effect of Chinese mon...Preliminary study is made to the international coordination of national monetary policy under economic globalization and informationalization. This paper uses Game Theory to analyze the operation effect of Chinese monetary policy. It suggests that the maximum effect of Chinese monetary policy can only be achieved by cooperation and coordination with international society.展开更多
We examine a capacitated system exposed to random stepwise capacity disruptions with exponentially distributed interarrival times and tmiformly distributed magnitudes. We explore two countermeasure policies for a risk...We examine a capacitated system exposed to random stepwise capacity disruptions with exponentially distributed interarrival times and tmiformly distributed magnitudes. We explore two countermeasure policies for a risk-neutral decision maker who seeks to maximize the long-nm average reward. A one-phase policy considers implementation of countermeasures throughout the entirety of a disruption cycle. The results of this analysis form a basis for a two-phase model which implements countermeasures during only a fraction of a disruption cycle. We present an extensive numerical analysis as well as a sensitivity study on the fluctuations of some system parameter values.展开更多
文摘Preliminary study is made to the international coordination of national monetary policy under economic globalization and informationalization. This paper uses Game Theory to analyze the operation effect of Chinese monetary policy. It suggests that the maximum effect of Chinese monetary policy can only be achieved by cooperation and coordination with international society.
基金supported by U.S. National Science Foundation Grant CMMI 0621030
文摘We examine a capacitated system exposed to random stepwise capacity disruptions with exponentially distributed interarrival times and tmiformly distributed magnitudes. We explore two countermeasure policies for a risk-neutral decision maker who seeks to maximize the long-nm average reward. A one-phase policy considers implementation of countermeasures throughout the entirety of a disruption cycle. The results of this analysis form a basis for a two-phase model which implements countermeasures during only a fraction of a disruption cycle. We present an extensive numerical analysis as well as a sensitivity study on the fluctuations of some system parameter values.
