An Improved Simple Power Attack against Camellia's Key Schedule

This paper presents an improved simple power attack against the key schedule of Camellia. While the original attack required an exact determination of the Hamming weight of intermediate data values based on power measurements, in this paper, two types of the simple power attack are presented and shown to be tolerant of errors that might occur in the Hamming weight determinations. In practical applications of the attack, such errors are likely to occur due to noise and distortion in the power measurements and their mapping to the Hamming weights of the data. To resist these attacks, the required design rationale of key schedules and several practical countermeasures are suggested.

Clustering Collision Power Attack on RSA-CRT

In this paper,we propose two new attack algorithms on RSA implementations with CRT(Chinese remainder theorem).To improve the attack efficiency considerably,a clustering collision power attack on RSA with CRT is introduced via chosen-message pairs.This attack method is that the key parameters dp and dq are segmented by byte,and the modular multiplication collisions are identified by k-means clustering.The exponents dp and dq were recovered by 12 power traces of six groups of the specific message pairs,and the exponent d was obtained.We also propose a second order clustering collision power analysis attack against RSA implementation with CRT,which applies double blinding exponentiation.To reduce noise and artificial participation,we analyze the power points of interest by preprocessing and k-means clustering with horizontal correlation collisions.Thus,we recovered approximately 91%of the secret exponents manipulated with a single power curve on RSA-CRT with countermeasures of double blinding methods.

Side-Channel Attacks & Data Exfiltration Using Wall Outlet USB Power Adapters

The number and creativity of side channel attacks have increased dramatically in recent years. Of particular interest are attacks leveraging power line communication to 1) gather information on power consumption from the victim and 2) exfiltrate data from compromised machines. Attack strategies of this nature on the greater power grid and building infrastructure levels have been shown to be a serious threat. This project further explores this concept of a novel attack vector by creating a new type of penetration testing tool: an USB power adapter capable of remote monitoring of device power consumption and communicating through powerline communications.

Correlation power attack on a message authentication code based on SM3

Hash-based message authentication code(HMAC)is widely used in authentication and message integrity.As a Chinese hash algorithm,the SM3 algorithm is gradually winning domestic market value in China.The side channel security of HMAC based on SM3(HMAC-SM3)is still to be evaluated,especially in hardware implementation,where only intermediate values stored in registers have apparent Hamming distance leakage.In addition,the algorithm structure of SM3 determines the difficulty in HMAC-SM3 side channel analysis.In this paper,a skillful bit-wise chosen-plaintext correlation power attack procedure is proposed for HMAC-SM3 hardware implementation.Real attack experiments on a field programmable gate array(FPGA)board have been performed.Experimental results show that we can recover the key from the hypothesis space of 2256 based on the proposed procedure.

Erratum to: An Improved Simple Power Attack against Camellia's Key Schedule

Retraction： LIU Shuanggen, NI Haiying, HU Yupu, LIAO Yunyan. An Improved Simple Power Attack against Camellia＇s Key Schedule. Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences, 2008, 13（5）： 591-594. DOI： 10.1007/s 11859-008-0516-3

Invariant of Enhanced AES Algorithm Implementations Against Power Analysis Attacks

The security of Internet of Things(IoT)is a challenging task for researchers due to plethora of IoT networks.Side Channel Attacks(SCA)are one of the major concerns.The prime objective of SCA is to acquire the information by observing the power consumption,electromagnetic(EM)field,timing analysis,and acoustics of the device.Later,the attackers perform statistical functions to recover the key.Advanced Encryption Standard(AES)algorithm has proved to be a good security solution for constrained IoT devices.This paper implements a simulation model which is used to modify theAES algorithm using logicalmasking properties.This invariant of the AES algorithm hides the array of bits during substitution byte transformation of AES.This model is used against SCAand particularly Power Analysis Attacks(PAAs).Simulation model is designed on MATLAB simulator.Results will give better solution by hiding power profiles of the IoT devices against PAAs.In future,the lightweight AES algorithm with false key mechanisms and power reduction techniques such as wave dynamic differential logic(WDDL)will be used to safeguard IoT devices against side channel attacks by using Arduino and field programmable gate array(FPGA).

An Improved Empirical Mode Decomposition for Power Analysis Attack

Correlation power analysis(CPA) has become a successful attack method about crypto-graphic hardware to recover the secret keys. However, the noise influence caused by the random process interrupts(RPIs) becomes an important factor of the power analysis attack efficiency, which will cost more traces or attack time. To address the issue, an improved method about empirical mode decomposition(EMD) was proposed. Instead of restructuring the decomposed signals of intrinsic mode functions(IMFs), we extract a certain intrinsic mode function(IMF) as new feature signal for CPA attack. Meantime, a new attack assessment is proposed to compare the attack effectiveness of different methods. The experiment shows that our method has more excellent performance on CPA than others. The first and the second IMF can be chosen as two optimal feature signals in CPA. In the new method, the signals of the first IMF increase peak visibility by 64% than those of the tradition EMD method in the situation of non-noise. On the condition of different noise interference, the orders of attack efficiencies are also same. With external noise interference, the attack effect of the first IMF based on noise with 15dB is the best.

Analysis of Causes and Actual Events on Electric Power Infrastructure Impacted by Cyber Attack

With the development of electric power technology, information technology and military technology, the impact of cyber attack on electric power infrastructure has increasingly become a hot spot issue which calls both domestic and foreign attention. First, main reasons of the impact on power infrastructure caused by cyber attack are analyzed from the following two aspects: 1) The dependence of electric power infrastructure on information infrastructure makes cyber attack issues in information field likely to affect electric power field. 2) As regards to the potential threat sources, it will be considerably profitable to launch cyber attacks on electric power infrastructure. On this basis, this paper gives a classified elaboration on the characteristics and the possibilities of cyber attacks on electrical infrastructures. Finally, the recently published actual events of cyber attacks in respect of threat sources, vulnerabilities and assaulting modes are analyzed and summarized.

Secure and efficient elliptic curve cryptography resists side-channel attacks

An embedded cryptosystem needs higher reconfiguration capability and security. After analyzing the newly emerging side-channel attacks on elliptic curve cryptosystem （ECC）, an efficient fractional width-w NAF （FWNAF） algorithm is proposed to secure ECC scalar multiplication from these attacks. This algorithm adopts the fractional window method and probabilistic SPA scheme to reconfigure the pre-computed table, and it allows designers to make a dynamic configuration on pre-computed table. And then, it is enhanced to resist SPA, DPA, RPA and ZPA attacks by using the random masking method. Compared with the WBRIP and EBRIP methods, our proposals has the lowest total computation cost and reduce the shake phenomenon due to sharp fluctuation on computation performance.

基于双掩码技术的抗功耗攻击CMOS电路设计

为增强现有差分传输管预充电逻辑(differential pass-transistor pre-charge logic,DP^(2)L)电路结构的抗功耗攻击性能,设计并开发了一种改进型DP^(2)L电路。与改进前电路相比,改进型DP^(2)L电路在不同输入信号下晶体管的导通数目保持相同,从而表现出更好的功耗恒定性能。在此基础上,进一步设计了双轨双掩码差分传输管预充电逻辑(double masked differential pass-transistor pre-charge logic,DMDP^(2)L)电路。该电路不仅改善了原有电路的功耗恒定特性,而且引入的双掩码具有随机性,加大了攻击者获取电路运算结果的难度。模拟结果表明,设计的双轨DMDP^(2)L电路较其他3种同类型逻辑电路的标准化能量偏差(normalized energy deviation,NED)分别减小了11.33%,5.19%和3.06%,表明其具有更好的功耗恒定特性和抗功耗攻击能力。

针对风机变桨距控制系统隐蔽攻击的防御方法研究

伴随信息化程度不断提高,隐蔽攻击将对风机变桨距控制系统构成威胁。为此,设计了一种防御结构。将攻击信号对被控对象的影响反馈给控制器,由控制器实时调节控制输出信号,进而防御隐蔽攻击。分别在有攻击和无攻击场景下分析了采用防御结构后系统的稳定性。仿真结果显示,在隐蔽攻击时间段内,采用防御结构后,风机输出功率与设定值的平均误差为0.004 MW;在无攻击时间段内,风机输出功率与原系统保持一致。该结果说明,防御结构有效。

基于自适应生成对抗网络的智能电网状态重构的虚假数据攻击检测

考虑到电力系统与能源互联网的深度耦合,虚假数据注入攻击对电力系统的威胁不断提升。文章针对虚假数据注入攻击(false data injection attack,FDIA)设计自适应生成对抗网络(adaptive generative adversarial networks,AGAN)状态重构的虚假数据注入攻击检测方法。该方法在生成对抗网络(generative adversarial networks,GAN)基础上融入卷积神经网络(convolutional neural network,CNN)以及自适应约束下的自注意力机制(self-attention,SA),实现节点间全局参考性,从而实现状态的有效重构和异常状态的准确预测;根据AGAN的异常数据预测结果设计结合网络判别值的检测逻辑。最后,在IEEE14节点的电力系统上验证所提方法的有效性,且对比GAN、CNN,AGAN重构的平均绝对百分比误差为0.0001%,检测准确率可达到98%。

基于SOS-LSTM的核电站隐蔽攻击方法研究

针对实现隐蔽攻击需要获取攻击目标高精度估计模型的问题,提出一种基于共生生物搜索算法优化长短期记忆神经网络(SOS-LSTM)的隐蔽攻击方法。首先,将攻击目标的反馈控制器输出和输入信号作为长短期记忆神经网络的数据集,通过训练得到受攻击区域的估计模型,再利用估计模型设计隐蔽攻击器向受攻击对象施加攻击信号。此外,使用SOS算法优化LSTM的网络参数来提升隐蔽攻击器的性能。对核电站一回路控制系统进行隐蔽攻击的仿真实验结果表明,该攻击方法在对目标控制系统输出信号实现预先设定攻击行为的同时具有较高隐蔽性。

面向智算融合网络的自主防御范式研究

随着数字经济时代算力供给模式的变革,以算力为核心的新型网络基础设施已成为实现算力资源共享、支撑数字经济转型的重要动力.在算力网络中,多元异构用户终端通过多种方式高频接入网络以随时随地获取算力服务,网络的开放性和动态性增大,算力网络将面临更严峻的安全挑战.然而,基于传统网络的安全防御模式通常针对具体安全问题静态式增补安全防护组件,无法主动适配用户需求灵活调整防御策略,难以应对算力网络中的安全风险.因此,本文面向新型算力网络安全需求,将安全功能作为网络内部属性,基于智算融合网络提出一种多维协同自主防御范式.结合智算融合网络“三层”“三域”的设计思想,在“三层”中,以广义服务层定义安全固有服务,以映射适配层智慧适配安全功能,以融合组件层执行安全策略;在“三域”中,以实体域先导资源适配,以知识域驱动安全服务流程,以感控域实施具体安全技术,构建“检测”“溯源”“防御”三维一体的完整基础管控流程,其中安全策略与技术可根据场景扩展性与业务安全性进行灵活调整.最终,通过仿真实验对所提范式有效性进行了验证,为未来智算融合安全的进一步研究和应用提供参考.

电力高级量测体系网络攻击致损路径图构建及风险评估

高级量测体系(AMI)是新型电力系统的重要组成部分,随着大量智能终端和异构通信链路广泛接入,网络攻击的风险与日俱增。因此,提出电力AMI网络攻击致损路径图构建及风险量化评估方法,量化分析网络攻击对系统的影响。首先,考虑AMI中的3种网络攻击场景,构建了各场景攻击致损路径图及贝叶斯攻击图。其次,考虑到漏洞利用的难度和攻击者的技术水平,建立了漏洞平均攻破时间(MTTC)模型,计算各攻击目标的攻破概率。然后,建立了针对AMI虚假数据注入的负荷损失评估模型,求解出负荷削减问题,并结合攻击概率提出了安全风险综合定量评估模型。最后,基于IEEE 39节点系统,对比分析了不同级别攻击者在AMI不同攻击致损路径下的MTTC,计算了网络攻击下系统的安全风险值,验证了所提方法的有效性。

随机空间几何构型下物联网络攻击节点定位

物联网各节点形成的空间几何构型随机性,决定了攻击节点的空间分辨率出现较大波动,继而影响攻击节点的定位精度。针对物联网下各节点形成的空间几何构型随机性,利用节点脉冲和功率的关联属性不受空间几何构型影响的特征,设计一种攻击节点定位算法。定位算法检测节点脉冲信号,设计最优功率关联算法,关联功率与脉冲的属性。通过关联属性构建节点距离测算定位方法。实验结果表明:文中的物联网攻击节点定位方法,在低、中、高阶三种攻击特征形式下,可以实时准确定位攻击性节点位置,具备较强的实用性。

最新电压毛刺(Power Glitch)攻击与防御方法研究

电压毛刺(Power Glitch)攻击是通过快速改变输入到芯片的电压,使得芯片里的某些晶体管受到影响,引起一个或多个触发器进入错误状态,从而导致处理器会跳过或实施错误的操作,使芯片内隐藏的信息随着产生的错误而泄露出来。对电压毛刺攻击与防御技术的最新进展情况进行了综述。在攻击方面,针对攻击目的的不同,详细介绍了RSA-CRT签名运算、RSA非CRT签名运算、对非易失存储器的攻击技术。防御技术分别介绍了电压毛刺检测电路和掩码,并分析了各种防御方案的优缺点。

针对电力CPS数据驱动算法对抗攻击的防御方法

大规模电力电子设备的接入为系统引入了数量庞大的强非线性量测/控制节点,使得传统电力系统逐渐转变为电力信息物理系统(cyber-physical system,CPS),许多原本应用模型驱动方法解决的系统问题不得不因维度灾难等局限转而采取数据驱动算法进行分析。然而,数据驱动算法自身的缺陷为系统的安全稳定运行引入了新的风险,攻击者可以对其加以利用,发起可能引发系统停电甚至失稳的对抗攻击。针对电力CPS中数据驱动算法可能遭受的对抗攻击,从异常数据剔除与恢复、算法漏洞挖掘与优化、算法自身可解释性提升3个方面,提出了对应的防御方法:异常数据过滤器、基于生成式对抗网络(generative adversarial network,GAN)的漏洞挖掘与优化方法、数据-知识融合模型及其训练方法,并经算例分析验证了所提方法的有效性。

基于多模态神经网络流量特征的网络应用层DDoS攻击检测方法

农业设备、传感器和监控系统与网络的连接日益紧密,给农村配电网带来了新的网络安全挑战。其中,分布式拒绝服务(DDoS)攻击是一种常见的网络威胁,对农村配电网的安全性构成了严重威胁。针对农村配电网的特殊需求,提出一种基于多模态神经网络流量特征的网络应用层DDoS攻击检测方法。通过制定网络应用层流量数据包捕获流程并构建多模态神经网络模型,成功提取并分析了网络应用层DDoS攻击流量的特征。在加载DDoS攻击背景下的异常流量特征后,计算相关系数并设计相应的DDoS攻击检测规则,以实现对DDoS攻击的有效检测。经试验分析,所提出的方法在提取DDoS攻击相关特征上表现出色,最大提取完整度可达95%,效果明显优于对比试验中基于EEMD-LSTM的检测方法和基于条件熵与决策树的检测方法。

针对ZUC算法硬件实现的相关能量攻击与多粒度时域敏感区域检测

本文通过合理分解模加操作,优化流水线结构,构建ZUC算法硬件实现,并基于FPGA开发板搭建ZUC算法功耗采集平台.构建粗细粒度时域敏感区域的泄漏检测方法,利用移动平均算子,发掘高信噪比风险区域,采用自相关滤波器与峰值检测算子,发掘具有明显重复特征的运算区间,并对泄漏高风险区域进行标定,实现高精度的泄漏风险定位.通过分析ZUC算法的脆弱性,本文提出一种基于选择初始向量IV的CPA攻击方案,对输入的IV信息进行选择,通过固定部分明文的方法有效提高采集信号的信噪比,并采集实际3000条功耗曲线,在算法初始化首轮,成功提取8 bit密钥信息,从而证明该方案的有效性,对ZUC算法的硬件实现进行侧信道防护是必要的.总结ZUC算法侧信道防护方案,对比方案优劣.