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Incentive Mechanism Design for Public Goods Provision:Price Cap Regulation and Optimal Regulation
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作者 ZHENG Jun-jun YIN Hong WANG Xian-jia 《Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences》 EI CAS 2005年第5期817-822,共6页
This paper studies the mechanism design that induces firms to provide public goods under two regulatory means: price cap regulation and optimal regulation, respectively. We first outline two models of monopoly regula... This paper studies the mechanism design that induces firms to provide public goods under two regulatory means: price cap regulation and optimal regulation, respectively. We first outline two models of monopoly regulation with unobservable marginal costs and effort, which can be regard as an optimal problem with dual restrictions. By solving this problem, we get the two optimal regulatory mechanisms to induce the provision of public goods. Further, by comparative statics, the conclusion is drawn that the welfare loss as sociated with price cap regulation, with respective to optimal regulation, increases more with increase of the expense of public goods. 展开更多
关键词 price cap regulation optimal regulation public goods incentive mechanism
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