Incentive mechanism analysis of information security outsourcing based on principal-agent model

In order to solve principal-agent problems caused by interest inconformity and information asymmetry during information security outsourcing, it is necessary to design a reasonable incentive mechanism to promote client enterprises to complete outsourcing service actively. The incentive mechanism model of information security outsourcing is designed based on the principal-agent theory. Through analyzing the factors such as enterprise information assets value, invasion probability, information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree how to impact on the incentive mechanism, conclusions show that an enterprise information assets value and invasion probability have a positive influence on the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient; while information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree have a negative influence on the compensation coefficient. Therefore, the principal enterprises should reasonably design the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient to encourage information security outsourcing agency enterprises to the full extent.

Optimization of Structure of Agricultural Insurance Subsidies:A Multi-task Principal Agent Model

Optimizing the structure of agricultural insurance subsidies is of great significance to increasing the supply of agricultural insurance and strengthening the effects of agricultural insurance policies.This paper optimized the structure of agricultural insurance subsidies.It decomposed insurance activities into three parts:underwriting,claim settlement,and agricultural services.Next,it incorporated adverse selection risks,moral hazards,agricultural production and operation risks,insurance company's behavioral decisions and its risk attitudes into the multi-task principal agent analysis framework.Finally,it discussed how the government designs a subsidy mechanism and adjusts the subsidy structure to increase the insurance supply.

Study on Pollution Cost Control Model under Asymmetric Information Based on Principal Agent

Pollution cost control is key to solve pollution problem.The paper takes pollution control cost of pollution control contract between management authority and pollutant discharge enterprise as research object,considers pollution control quality level,pollution control quality inspection and pollution control cost model,and establishes pollution control cost model of management authority and pollutant discharge enterprise,including rational constraints of pollutant discharge enterprise.And it analyzes principal-agent relationship between the two under condition of asymmetric information,and un-observability of pollution control level is shown as hiding information of sewage enterprises.In essence,it is problem of adverse selection in principal-agent.Pollution control cost of management is objective function.The first order condition of pollution control cost of sewage enterprise is transformed into state space equation,and optimal control of problem is solved by using maximum principle.In particular,management authority,as principal,uses pollution control provisions to reward,punish and encourage pollutant discharge enterprises as agents.

Uncertain State of nature and Contract in the Principal-Agent Relationship

This paper points out that the principal and agent may have different prior probability to the uncertain state of the world, and the influence of the state to the agent′s effort cost should be considered in the analysis of a principal\|agent relationship. Taking this opinion into a simple principal\|agent model, we get some conclusion with new meaning.

Certainty,Justice and the Law of Agency in the Chinese Civil Code:A View from England

The new Chinese rules on agency do not impose broad“fiduciary”duties on agents—instead,there are a number of specific provisions designed to protect the principal against particular abuses to which it is peculiarly vulnerable in the principal/agent relationship.Chinese law,thus,deliberately refuses to follow the lead of English law,which imposes very strict and wide-ranging fiduciary duties on agents.This paper argues that this is probably wise.English law has to be seen against a matrix of a system of commercial law which was forged on the anvil of international trade and commodity supply contracts,leading to a set of rules that prefer certainty of outcomes(and the avoidance of litigation)overachieving particular justice in individual cases(such as might have been achieved by subjecting English law to an overarching“good faith”principle).English commercial law is adversarial,not cooperative.This explains why,in a relationship that is characterized by cooperation,such as the principal/agent relationship,the general rules of English commercial law are replaced by wide,justice-oriented rules.A system that is already based on cooperation,for which Chinese law is almost paradigmatic,is likely much more adept at applying the general rules to the agency relationship than English law would be.

Collection Cost Screening Mechanism in a Closedloop Supply Chain

Recently, the product remanufacturing has been a hot topic in the field of operational management, and more manufacturers are beginning to recover the value in their end of life （EOI.） products hy remanufacturing. This paper focuses on the closed loop supply chain where the retailer takes charge of not only retail, but also col- lection. There are two possible types of the retailer＇s collection cost as an assumption, i.e. high cost or low cost, and the retailer knows his type, whereas the manufacturer only has a prior prohability over the two possible cost types. This paper deploys the contracts with which the manufacturer can screen the type of the retailer to improve her profit under incomplete information. As a result, the pooling contract can perfectly coordinate the decentral- ized system under incomplete information, but the manufacturer obtains the lower profit; nevertheless, with the separating contracts the manufacturer obtains the larger profits though the system profit is lower.

Game for Information Disclosure and the Auditing Institution

This paper takes Principal-agent Theory as the basic analysis flame to analyze the modern corporate principal and agent in a state of the two sides in asymmetric information on the basis of self-interest maximization, and the game strategy which revolves the information disclosure and hideaway to launch, and therefore can get the game way which causes the auditing institution. The equilibrium in game of the information disclosure causes the auditing institution, the expense and cost which the audit profession consumes is the company governs reduces the information not asymmetrical diligently center essential agency costs.

契约显性激励与声誉隐性激励的比较研究——以建筑承包商为例

工程质量体现着建筑承包商对业主和社会的信誉与责任,由于承包商掌握更多在建工程项目的相关信息,而业主和公众处于信息弱势的状态,信息的不对称可能导致承包商为追求自身利益而做出不利于业主的行为。因此,建立有效的激励机制是保障投资者经济利益和工程项目用户财产与生命安全的关键。基于委托-代理理论和博弈论,建立相关数学模型,分析比较了建筑承包商作为代理人,在与委托人签订契约的显性激励与市场声誉的隐性激励下的效用函数,得到有效激励实现的条件和提高激励效应的途径,指出声誉的隐性激励与契约的显性激励机制相结合作用的合理性与优越性,对如何有效地建立委托-代理关系下建筑承包商的激励机制提出对策建议。

Tax credit rating and corporate innovation decisions

The tax credit rating mechanism was formally implemented in 2014.As an important tax collection and management innovation,it has attracted the attention of regulatory authorities and scholars.Different from the literature that directly examines corporate tax compliance,we focus on the impact of tax credit rating implementation on corporate research and development(R&D)investment decisions.Using listed companies’data from 2014 to 2019,we find that companies with higher tax credit ratings invest more in innovation,because the system helps managers identify R&D opportunities,alleviates corporate financing constraints and reduces agency costs.We confirm that tax credit ratings have manifold impacts on corporate information environments and business decisions,with better ratings positively affecting firms’business decisions.This discovery can inform tax policy reform,encourage corporate innovation and construct social credit systems.