With respect to different risk preference of an agent in a supply chain, linear-contract models are designed according to the principal-agent theory. The study shows that the risk preference of an agent directly corre...With respect to different risk preference of an agent in a supply chain, linear-contract models are designed according to the principal-agent theory. The study shows that the risk preference of an agent directly correlates with the incentive compensation coefficient of principal, order quantity of principal and production capability level of the agent. The principal should offer an appropriate incentive contract according to the risk preference of the agent, or choose an agent holding a different risk preference to establish the supply chain.展开更多
Recently, the product remanufacturing has been a hot topic in the field of operational management, and more manufacturers are beginning to recover the value in their end of life （EOI.） products hy remanufacturing. T...Recently, the product remanufacturing has been a hot topic in the field of operational management, and more manufacturers are beginning to recover the value in their end of life （EOI.） products hy remanufacturing. This paper focuses on the closed loop supply chain where the retailer takes charge of not only retail, but also col- lection. There are two possible types of the retailer＇s collection cost as an assumption, i.e. high cost or low cost, and the retailer knows his type, whereas the manufacturer only has a prior prohability over the two possible cost types. This paper deploys the contracts with which the manufacturer can screen the type of the retailer to improve her profit under incomplete information. As a result, the pooling contract can perfectly coordinate the decentral- ized system under incomplete information, but the manufacturer obtains the lower profit; nevertheless, with the separating contracts the manufacturer obtains the larger profits though the system profit is lower.展开更多
基金The paper is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No60372085,60404011the Youth Foundation of Northwestern Polytechnical University
文摘With respect to different risk preference of an agent in a supply chain, linear-contract models are designed according to the principal-agent theory. The study shows that the risk preference of an agent directly correlates with the incentive compensation coefficient of principal, order quantity of principal and production capability level of the agent. The principal should offer an appropriate incentive contract according to the risk preference of the agent, or choose an agent holding a different risk preference to establish the supply chain.
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China (No 70372056)
文摘Recently, the product remanufacturing has been a hot topic in the field of operational management, and more manufacturers are beginning to recover the value in their end of life （EOI.） products hy remanufacturing. This paper focuses on the closed loop supply chain where the retailer takes charge of not only retail, but also col- lection. There are two possible types of the retailer＇s collection cost as an assumption, i.e. high cost or low cost, and the retailer knows his type, whereas the manufacturer only has a prior prohability over the two possible cost types. This paper deploys the contracts with which the manufacturer can screen the type of the retailer to improve her profit under incomplete information. As a result, the pooling contract can perfectly coordinate the decentral- ized system under incomplete information, but the manufacturer obtains the lower profit; nevertheless, with the separating contracts the manufacturer obtains the larger profits though the system profit is lower.
