Adaptive interaction driven by the learning effect in the spatial prisoner's dilemma

We propose a computing model in which individuals can automatically adjust their interaction intensity with their mentor according to the learning effect.This model is designed to investigate the cooperative dynamics of the spatial prisoner's dilemma.More specifically,when the cumulative payoff of a learner is more than his reference earning,he will strengthen his interaction with his mentor;otherwise,he will reduce it.The experimental results indicate that this mechanism can improve the emergence of cooperation in a networked population and that the driving coefficient of interaction intensity plays an important role in promoting cooperation.Interestingly,under a certain social dilemma condition,there exists a minimal driving coefficient that leads to optimal cooperation.This occurs due to a positive feedback effect between the individual's satisfaction frequency and the number of effective neighbors.Moreover,we find that the experimental results are in accord with theoretical predictions obtained from an extension of the classical pair-approximation method.Our conclusions obtained by considering relationships with mentors can provide a new perspective for future investigations into the dynamics of evolutionary games within structured populations.

THE OPTIMAL CONTROL FOR PROMOTING THE COOPERATION IN EVOLUTION GAME GENERATED BY PRISONER'S DILEMMA

Natural selection opposes the evolution of cooperation unless specific mechanisms are at work in Prisoner＇s Dilemma. By taking advantage of the modern control theory, the controller design is discussed and the optimal control is designed for promoting cooperation based on the recent advances in mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Two con- trol strategies are proposed： compensation control strategy for the cooperator when playing against a defector and reward control strategy for cooperator when playing against a coop- erator. The feasibility and effectiveness of these control strategies for promoting cooperation in different stages are analyzed. The reward for cooperation can＇t prevent defection from being evolutionary stable strategy （ESS）. On the other hand, compensation for the coopera- tor can＇t prevent defection from emerging and sustaining. By considering the effect and the cost, an optimal control scheme with constraint on the admissible control set is put forward. By analyzing the special nonlinear system of replicator dynamics, the exact analytic solution of the optimal control scheme is obtained based on the maximum principle. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed method is illustrated by examples.

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on highly clustered community networks

This paper studies the evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game on a highly clustered community network in which the clustering coefficient and the community size can be tuned. It finds that the clustering coefficient in such a degree-homogeneous network inhibits the emergence of cooperation for the entire range of the payoff parameter. Moreover, it finds that the community size can also have a marked influence on the evolution of cooperation, with a larger community size leading to not only a lower cooperation level but also a smaller threshold of the payoff parameter above which cooperators become extinct.

Adaptive co-evolution of strategies and network leading to optimal cooperation level in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

We study evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game on adaptive networks where a population of players co-evolves with their interaction networks. During the co-evolution process, interacted players with opposite strategies either rewire the link between them with probability p or update their strategies with probability 1 - p depending on their payoffs. Numerical simulation shows that the final network is either split into some disconnected communities whose players share the same strategy within each community or forms a single connected network in which all nodes are in the same strategy. Interestingly, the density of cooperators in the final state can be maximised in an intermediate range of p via the competition between time scale of the network dynamics and that of the node dynamics. Finally, the mean-field analysis helps to understand the results of numerical simulation. Our results may provide some insight into understanding the emergence of cooperation in the real situation where the individuals＇ behaviour and their relationship adaptively co-evolve.

PREFERENCE AND EVOLUTION IN THE ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA

Game theory is extensively used to study strategy-making and actions of play- ers. The authors proposed an analysis method for study the evolutionary outcome and behaviors of players with preference in iterated prisoner＇s dilemma. In this article, a preference parameter k was introduced in the payoff matrix, wherein the value of k denotes the player＇s degree of egoism and altruism （preference）. Then, a game-theoretic dynamical model was formulated using Birth-and-Death process. The authors studied how preference influences the evolutionary equilibrium and behaviors of players. The authors get the general results： egoism leads to defection, and altruism can make players build trust and maintain cooperation, and so, the hope of the Pareto optimal solution. In the end, the simulation experiments proved the efficiency of the method.

A 2-stage strategy updating rule promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

In this study,we propose a spatial prisoner＇s dilemma game model with a 2-stage strategy updating rule,and focus on the cooperation behavior of the system.In the first stage,i.e.,the pre-learning stage,a focal player decides whether to update his strategy according to the pre-learning factor β and the payoff difference between himself and the average of his neighbors.If the player makes up his mind to update,he enters into the second stage,i.e.,the learning stage,and adopts a strategy of a randomly selected neighbor according to the standard Fermi updating rule.The simulation results show that the cooperation level has a non-trivial dependence on the pre-learning factor.Generally,the cooperation frequency decreases as the pre-learning factor increases;but a high cooperation level can be obtained in the intermediate region of- 3〈 β 〈-1.We then give some explanations via studying the co-action of pre-learning and learning.Our results may sharpen the understanding of the influence of the strategy updating rule on evolutionary games.

Effects of Dimers on Cooperation in the Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game

We investigate the evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game in structured populations by introducing dimers, which are defined as that two players in each dimer always hold a same strategy. We find that influences of dimets on cooperation depend on the type of dimers and the population structure. For those dimers in which players interact with each other, the cooperation level increases with the number of dimers though the cooperation improvement level depends on the type of network structures. On the other hand, the dimers, in which there are not mutual interactions, will not do any good to the cooperation level in a single community, but interestingly, will improve the cooperation level in a population with two communities. We explore the relationship between dimers and self-interactions and find that the effects of dimers are similar to that of self-interactions. Also, we find that the dimers, which are established over two communities in a multi-community network, act as one type of interaction through which information between communities is communicated by the requirement that two players in a dimer hold a same strategy.

Effects of Topological Randomness on Cooperation in a Deterministic Prisoner's Dilemma Game

In this work, we consider an evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game on a homogeneous random network with the richest-following strategy adoption rule. By constructing homogeneous random networks from a regular ring graph, we investigate the effects of topologicaJ randomness on cooperation. In contrast to the ordinary view that the presence of smaJ1 amount of shortcuts in ring graphs favors cooperation, we find the cooperation inhibition by weak topological randomness. The explanations on the observations are presented.

SPECTRUM SHARING IN ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME BASED ON EVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES FOR COGNITIVE RADIOS

We study a spectrum sharing problem where multiple systems coexist and interfere with each other. First, an analysis is proposed for distributed spectrum sharing based on Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) in Cognitive Radios (CRs). In one-shot game, selfish and rational CRs greedily full spread their own spectrum space in order to maximize their own rates, which leads to Nash Equilibrium (N.E.). But with long term interaction, i.e., Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), CRs can come to cooperate and acquire the social optimal point by using different evolutionary strategies such as Tit For Tat (TFT), Generous TFT (GTFT), etc. Also we compare the performances of the different evolutionary strategies in noise-free and noisy environments for two-player games. Finally, N-player IPD (N-IPD) is simulated to verify our conclusions that TFT is a good strategy for spectrum sharing in CRs.

Dilemmas and Optimization of Third-Party Assessment System in Chinese Fair Competition Review

The current predominant self-review mechanism by policy-making bodies suffers from deficiencies such as insufficient motivations, limited review capabilities, and weak external supervision. Third-party assessment, characterized by independence and specialization, is designed to mitigate these shortcomings. However, the implementation of third-party assessment faces challenges too. This paper intends to improve the third-party assessment system and to realize the legislative purpose of the system. Based on social research, discussions and exchanges with relevant parties, and the existing research results, this paper analyzes the challenges and possible optimization measures for the third-party assessment. The challenges include repulsion from policy-making bodies, insufficient independence of assessment bodies, disparity of assessment quality, and limited application of assessment outcomes. Possible optimization measures include promoting fair competition culture, increasing the acceptance of third-party assessment from policy-making bodies, enhancing the quality of third-party assessment, clarifying the relationship between policy-making bodies and assessment bodies, ensuring the independence of third-party assessments, and promoting the application of assessment results.

The “Panchatantra” Narrative Structure and the Writing of Indian Women’s Dilemma in Suraj Ka Satvan Ghoda

Dharamvir Bharati’s Suraj Ka Satvan Ghoda connects the text with the social reality,through the multiple narrative perspectives of the“Panchatantra”Narrative Structure and the love stories,and narrates the survival and spiritual dilemma of Indian women in the transformation of India’s modernization.The novel depicts in both content and form the plight of Indian women’s physical and spiritual dependence under the traditional concepts of arranged marriages,caste marriages,dowry system and patriarchal will,and shows the process of women’s body and self-consciousness gradually moving from vitality to extinction.

The Opportunities,Dilemmas,and Paths for the Development of Adult Higher Education in the New Era

This paper comprehensively analyzes the development opportunities and realistic dilemmas faced by adult higher education in China in the new era,and puts forward corresponding strategies as solutions.With the construction of a learning society,the development of digital technology,and the popularization of the concept of lifelong learning,adult higher education has unprecedented development opportunities.At the same time,these forms of education are facing a series of dilemmas due to challenges such as unsound guarantee mechanisms and traditional enrollment competition.Through the establishment of perfect legal and policy guarantees,transformation of school running mode,meeting the diversified needs of learners,and other multi-faceted measures,the development of adult higher education can be effectively promoted to meet the needs of individual and social development.

A Study of a Moral Dilemma Stories Teaching Model Focusing on the Development of Higher-Order Thinking --"Synthetic polymers" as an example

Cultivating students'higher-order thinking is one of the important goals of modern education,and innovative teaching model is an effective way to achieve this goal.Aiming at the inadequacy of the existing moral dilemma stories approach in the transformation of knowledge and behavior,this research constructs a new Project Based Learning-Ethical Dilemma Stories(PBL-EDS)Teaching Model applicable to China's secondary education stage based on the innovative features of the moral dilemma stories approach on the core competencies,taking the chemistry subject as an example to carry out practice,and puts forward suggestions for the implementation of the teaching model.Chemistry as an example to carry out the practice,and suggestions are made for the implementation of the teaching model.

Research Status,Practical Dilemmas,and Optimization Strategies of Blended Teaching in Universities

Blended teaching has emerged as a prominent subject in the recent reform and innovation of higher education.It has become imperative and guiding for colleges and universities to embrace a mixed teaching approach that aligns with the evolving needs of education and teaching in the new era.This paper aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the research status surrounding blended teaching,encompassing fundamental issues,teaching design,practical guidance,teaching effectiveness,and evaluation.By critically examining the current challenges associated with blended teaching,this study proposes optimization strategies including enhancing student participation and interaction,promoting deep learning,improving teachers’preparedness,teaching technologies,and curriculum design capabilities,strengthening top-level design,and perfecting evaluation and incentive mechanisms.These strategies provide new directions for the reform of blended teaching.

Evolution of Cooperation in Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma Games on Barabasi-Albert Networks with Degree-Dependent Guilt Mechanism

This paper studies the continuous prisoner's dilemma games (CPDG) on Barabasi-Albert (BA) networks.In the model,each agent on a vertex of the networks makes an investment and interacts with all of his neighboring agents.Making an investment is costly,but which benefits its neighboring agents,where benefit and cost depend on the level of investment made.The payoff of each agent is given by the sum of payoffs it receives in its interactions with all its neighbors.Not only payoff,individual's guilty emotion in the games has also been considered.The negative guilty emotion produced in comparing with its neighbors can reduce the utility of individuals directly.We assume that the reduction amount depends on the individual's degree and a baseline level parameter.The group's cooperative level is characterized by the average investment of the population.Each player makes his investment in the next step based on a convex combination of the investment of his best neighbors in the last step,his best history strategies in the latest steps which number is controlled by a memory length parameter,and a uniformly distributed random number.Simulation results show that this degree-dependent guilt mechanism can promote the evolution of cooperation dramatically comparing with degree-independent guilt or no guilt cases.Imitation,memory,uncertainty coefficients and network structure also play determinant roles in the cooperation level of the population.All our results may shed some new light on studying the evolution of cooperation based on network reciprocity mechanisms.

Effects of Inertia on Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Considering the inertia of individuals in real inertia of players is introduced into evolutionary prisoner＇s life, we propose a modified Fermi updating rule, where the dilemma game （PDG） on square lattices. We mainly focus on how the inertia affects the cooperative behavior of the system. Interestingly, we find that the cooperation level has a nonmonotonic dependence on the inertia： with small inertia, cooperators will soon be invaded by defectors; with large inertia, players are unwilling to change their strategies and the cooperation level remains the same as the initial state; while a moderate inertia can induce the highest cooperation level. Moreover, effects of environmental noise and individual inertia are studied. Our work may be helpful in understanding the emergence and persistence of cooperation in nature and society.

An Improved Fitness Evaluation Mechanism with Memory in Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Regular Lattices

To deeply understand the emergence of cooperation in natural,social and economical systems,we present an improved fitness evaluation mechanism with memory in spatial prisoner's dilemma game on regular lattices.In our model,the individual fitness is not only determined by the payoff in the current game round,but also by the payoffs in previous round bins.A tunable parameter,termed as the memory strength(μ),which lies between 0 and 1,is introduced into the model to regulate the ratio of payoffs of current and previous game rounds in the individual fitness calculation.When μ = 0,our model is reduced to the standard prisoner's dilemma game;while μ = 1 represents the case in which the payoff is totally determined by the initial strategies and thus it is far from the realistic ones.Extensive numerical simulations indicate that the memory effect can substantially promote the evolution of cooperation.For μ < 1,the stronger the memory effect,the higher the cooperation level,but μ = 1 leads to a pathological state of cooperation,but can partially enhance the cooperation in the very large temptation parameter.The current results are of great significance for us to account for the role of memory effect during the evolution of cooperation among selfish players.

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks with conformist mentality strategy

A prisoner's dilemma game model is studied using complex networks with a fixed strategy. The strategy of the player is updated according to not only the payoff differences between players and the neighbors, but also the majority of neighbors (noted as conformist mentality strategy). According to our results of the simulations we found that the players which select the conformist mentality strategy, the density of cooperators markedly improves. The variation trend is slower on the square lattice and small-world networks, but a different phenomenon is noted for scale-free networks. A range of conformist mentality probability is seen on BA networks which conforms to a higher density of cooperators.

Experimental Study on the Influence of Cognition and Emotion on Moral Judgment of College Students in Dilemma Situation

Objective:To study the influence of cognition and emotion on moral judgment of college students under the circumstance of whether the cognitive resources are occupied and whether the emotion is induced.Methods:This experiment uses a multi-factor mixed experiment method to divide experiments and groups.Experiment 1 uses a two-factor mixed experimental design of 2(cognitive resource occupancy group,cognitive resource non-occupied group)×3(difficult situation type).Experiment 2 uses a two-factor mixed experimental design of 2(emotion induction group,emotion induction and cognitive resource occupation group)×3(three types of dilemma situation types)is adopted.The dependent variable of this experiment(including Experiment 1 and Experiment 2)is the judgment response time and the judgment result is“Yes”(F)or“No”(J).Results:(1)The reaction time of the cognitive resource occupancy group was significantly higher than that of the cognitive resource non-occupied group,and the cognitive resource occupancy group in the three types of dilemma situations of high personal involvement,low personal involvement,and non-personal participation.There is no significant difference between the results of moral judgments and the cognitive resource non-occupied group.(2)In the three dilemmas of high personal involvement,low personal involvement,and non-personal participation,the emotion-induced group and the emotion-induced and cognitive resource occupation group have no significant differences in reaction time and moral judgment results.(3)In the three dilemmas of high personal involvement,low personal involvement,and non-personal participation,the reaction time difference between the cognitive resource occupation group and the emotionally induced and cognitive resource occupation is not significant,while in the dilemma of low personal involvement,the number of people in the cognitive resource occupation group whose moral judgment is“Yes”was significantly higher than that in the emotionally induced and cognitive resource occupation group.(4)In the three dilemmas of high personal involvement,low personal involvement,and non-personal participation,the reaction time of the emotionally induced group was significantly higher than that of the cognitive resource non-occupied group,and the moral judgment results of the two groups were both found no significant difference.Conclusion:When the occupation of cognitive resources and the induction of emotions will significantly affect the response of individual moral judgments,different types of dilemmas will significantly affect the results of individual moral judgments.

The Mission and Dilemma of College English Teachers in the New Era

The construction of world-class undergraduate education with Chinese characteristics is a major mission for all college English teachers in today’s era,and a considerable proportion of college English teachers are still in varying degrees of difficulties and bottlenecks.How to quickly achieve self-breakthrough and devote themselves to realizing the dream of serving the country and education is a higher requirement for college teachers at the national level.