As a representative emerging machine learning technique, federated learning(FL) has gained considerable popularity for its special feature of “making data available but not visible”. However, potential problems rema...As a representative emerging machine learning technique, federated learning(FL) has gained considerable popularity for its special feature of “making data available but not visible”. However, potential problems remain, including privacy breaches, imbalances in payment, and inequitable distribution.These shortcomings let devices reluctantly contribute relevant data to, or even refuse to participate in FL. Therefore, in the application of FL, an important but also challenging issue is to motivate as many participants as possible to provide high-quality data to FL. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism for FL based on the continuous zero-determinant(CZD) strategies from the perspective of game theory. We first model the interaction between the server and the devices during the FL process as a continuous iterative game. We then apply the CZD strategies for two players and then multiple players to optimize the social welfare of FL, for which we prove that the server can keep social welfare at a high and stable level. Subsequently, we design an incentive mechanism based on the CZD strategies to attract devices to contribute all of their high-accuracy data to FL.Finally, we perform simulations to demonstrate that our proposed CZD-based incentive mechanism can indeed generate high and stable social welfare in FL.展开更多
Evidences indicate that,due to the limited caching capacity or inaccurate estimation on users’preferences,the requested files may not be fully cached in the network edge.The transmissions of the un-cached files will ...Evidences indicate that,due to the limited caching capacity or inaccurate estimation on users’preferences,the requested files may not be fully cached in the network edge.The transmissions of the un-cached files will also lead to duplicated transmissions on backhaul channels.Buffer-aided relay has been proposed to improve the transmission performance of the un-cached files.Because of the limited buffer capacity and the information asymmetric environment,how to allocate the limited buffer capacity and how to incentivize users in participating buffer-aided relay have become critical issues.In this work,an incentive scheme based on the contract theory is proposed.Specifically,the backlog violation probability,i.e.,the buffer overflow probability,is provided based on the martingale theory.Next,based on the backlog violation probability,the utility functions of the relay node and users are constructed.With the purpose to maximize the utility of the relay node,the optimal contract problem is formulated.Then,the feasibility of the contract is also demonstrated,and the optimal solution can be obtained by the interior point method.Finally,numerical results are presented to demonstrate effectiveness of the proposed contract theory scheme.展开更多
In recent years,the modem medical system has achieved deepening reforms,and the management systems of domestic hospitals have changed accordingly,which has improved the level of modem management to a certain extent.Ho...In recent years,the modem medical system has achieved deepening reforms,and the management systems of domestic hospitals have changed accordingly,which has improved the level of modem management to a certain extent.However,the development of hospitals is easily affected by many factors,which gradually highlights the problems of internal human resource management.This is not conducive for improvement in terms of the enthusiasm and initiative of internal employees in addition to restricting the quality of medical services.Based on this,in hope to provide assistance,this article uses incentive theory as the main research object and focuses on its specific application in hospitals*human resource management.展开更多
The ubiquity of mobile devices have promoted the prosperity of mobile crowd systems, which recruit crowds to contribute their resources for performing tasks. Yet, due to the various resource consumption, the crowds ma...The ubiquity of mobile devices have promoted the prosperity of mobile crowd systems, which recruit crowds to contribute their resources for performing tasks. Yet, due to the various resource consumption, the crowds may be reluctant to join and contribute information. Thus, the low participation level of crowds will be a hurdle that prevents the adoption of crowdsourcing. A critical challenge for these systems is how to design a proper mechanism such that the crowds spontaneously act as suppliers to contribute accurate information. Most of existing mechanisms ignore either the honesty of crowds or requesters respectively. In this paper, considering the honesty of both, we propose a game-based incentive mechanism, namely RTRC, to stimulate the crowds to contribute accurate information and to motivate the requesters to return accurate feedbacks. In addition, an evolutionary game is designed to model the dynamic of user-strategy selection. Specially, the replicator dynamic is applied to model the adaptation of strategy interactions taking into account the dynamic nature in time dependence and we also derive the evolutionarily stable strategies(ESSs) for users. Finally, empirical results over the simulations show that all the requesters and suppliers will select honest strategy to maximize their profit.展开更多
Key to energize State-Owned-Enterprises (hereinafter SOEs) is to set up effective incentive and discipline mechanisms. First of all, the paper analyses the problems existing in the current incentive and discipline mec...Key to energize State-Owned-Enterprises (hereinafter SOEs) is to set up effective incentive and discipline mechanisms. First of all, the paper analyses the problems existing in the current incentive and discipline mechanism system in SOEs, including low transparency income and considerable covert income, insider control,corporate governance nominalization and so on; next,the paper explores the causes behind these problems,such as incomplete corporate governance and imperfect market mechanism; finally, the paper proposes a series of solutions from the aspects of incentive mechanism and discipline mechanism.展开更多
＂Knowledge workers＂ is the carrier of enterprise knowledge and technology and is undoubtedly the most important resource and core competence. How to effectively motivate such people create greater wealth for the ent...＂Knowledge workers＂ is the carrier of enterprise knowledge and technology and is undoubtedly the most important resource and core competence. How to effectively motivate such people create greater wealth for the enterprise has become the key problem of the era of knowledge economy. Based on the concept and characteristics of knowledge workers, this paper uses classical analysis framework of incentive theory; through quantitative and qualitative analysis, it points out the existing problems and puts forward solutions on the basis of full analysis of the present incentive situation.展开更多
基金partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (62173308)the Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang Province of China (LR20F030001)the Jinhua Science and Technology Project (2022-1-042)。
文摘As a representative emerging machine learning technique, federated learning(FL) has gained considerable popularity for its special feature of “making data available but not visible”. However, potential problems remain, including privacy breaches, imbalances in payment, and inequitable distribution.These shortcomings let devices reluctantly contribute relevant data to, or even refuse to participate in FL. Therefore, in the application of FL, an important but also challenging issue is to motivate as many participants as possible to provide high-quality data to FL. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism for FL based on the continuous zero-determinant(CZD) strategies from the perspective of game theory. We first model the interaction between the server and the devices during the FL process as a continuous iterative game. We then apply the CZD strategies for two players and then multiple players to optimize the social welfare of FL, for which we prove that the server can keep social welfare at a high and stable level. Subsequently, we design an incentive mechanism based on the CZD strategies to attract devices to contribute all of their high-accuracy data to FL.Finally, we perform simulations to demonstrate that our proposed CZD-based incentive mechanism can indeed generate high and stable social welfare in FL.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.61702258)the Key Projects of Natural Science Research in Colleges and Universities of Jiangsu Province(No.19KJA410001)the Foundation of Jiangsu Advanced Numerical Control Technology Key Laboratory(No.SYKJ201901).
文摘Evidences indicate that,due to the limited caching capacity or inaccurate estimation on users’preferences,the requested files may not be fully cached in the network edge.The transmissions of the un-cached files will also lead to duplicated transmissions on backhaul channels.Buffer-aided relay has been proposed to improve the transmission performance of the un-cached files.Because of the limited buffer capacity and the information asymmetric environment,how to allocate the limited buffer capacity and how to incentivize users in participating buffer-aided relay have become critical issues.In this work,an incentive scheme based on the contract theory is proposed.Specifically,the backlog violation probability,i.e.,the buffer overflow probability,is provided based on the martingale theory.Next,based on the backlog violation probability,the utility functions of the relay node and users are constructed.With the purpose to maximize the utility of the relay node,the optimal contract problem is formulated.Then,the feasibility of the contract is also demonstrated,and the optimal solution can be obtained by the interior point method.Finally,numerical results are presented to demonstrate effectiveness of the proposed contract theory scheme.
文摘In recent years,the modem medical system has achieved deepening reforms,and the management systems of domestic hospitals have changed accordingly,which has improved the level of modem management to a certain extent.However,the development of hospitals is easily affected by many factors,which gradually highlights the problems of internal human resource management.This is not conducive for improvement in terms of the enthusiasm and initiative of internal employees in addition to restricting the quality of medical services.Based on this,in hope to provide assistance,this article uses incentive theory as the main research object and focuses on its specific application in hospitals*human resource management.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61672408, U1405255, 61502368, 61602537, 61602357, 61672413, U1509214, U1135002)National High Technology Research and Development Program (863 Program) (Grant Nos. 2015AA016007, 2015AA017203)+5 种基金China Postdoctoral Science Foundation Funded Project (Grant No.2016M592762)Shaanxi Science & Technology Coordination & Innovation Project (Grant No.2016TZC-G-6-3)Shaanxi Provincial Natural Science Foundation (Grant Nos. 2015JQ6227, 2016JM6005)China 111 Project (Grant No. B16037)Beijing Municipal Social Science Foundation(Grant No. 16XCC023)Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Grant Nos. JB150308, JB150309, JB161501, JBG161511)
文摘The ubiquity of mobile devices have promoted the prosperity of mobile crowd systems, which recruit crowds to contribute their resources for performing tasks. Yet, due to the various resource consumption, the crowds may be reluctant to join and contribute information. Thus, the low participation level of crowds will be a hurdle that prevents the adoption of crowdsourcing. A critical challenge for these systems is how to design a proper mechanism such that the crowds spontaneously act as suppliers to contribute accurate information. Most of existing mechanisms ignore either the honesty of crowds or requesters respectively. In this paper, considering the honesty of both, we propose a game-based incentive mechanism, namely RTRC, to stimulate the crowds to contribute accurate information and to motivate the requesters to return accurate feedbacks. In addition, an evolutionary game is designed to model the dynamic of user-strategy selection. Specially, the replicator dynamic is applied to model the adaptation of strategy interactions taking into account the dynamic nature in time dependence and we also derive the evolutionarily stable strategies(ESSs) for users. Finally, empirical results over the simulations show that all the requesters and suppliers will select honest strategy to maximize their profit.
文摘Key to energize State-Owned-Enterprises (hereinafter SOEs) is to set up effective incentive and discipline mechanisms. First of all, the paper analyses the problems existing in the current incentive and discipline mechanism system in SOEs, including low transparency income and considerable covert income, insider control,corporate governance nominalization and so on; next,the paper explores the causes behind these problems,such as incomplete corporate governance and imperfect market mechanism; finally, the paper proposes a series of solutions from the aspects of incentive mechanism and discipline mechanism.
文摘＂Knowledge workers＂ is the carrier of enterprise knowledge and technology and is undoubtedly the most important resource and core competence. How to effectively motivate such people create greater wealth for the enterprise has become the key problem of the era of knowledge economy. Based on the concept and characteristics of knowledge workers, this paper uses classical analysis framework of incentive theory; through quantitative and qualitative analysis, it points out the existing problems and puts forward solutions on the basis of full analysis of the present incentive situation.
