This article explores bundling and pricing decisions for two complementary products in a two-layer supply chain consisting of a multi-product manufacturer and a retailer. We establish four different pricing models und...This article explores bundling and pricing decisions for two complementary products in a two-layer supply chain consisting of a multi-product manufacturer and a retailer. We establish four different pricing models under cases of decentralized decision, while considering different portfolio-bundling strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer. A game-theoretical method is used to characterize the corresponding equilibrium outcomes in each scenario. By further analyzing and comparing the maximum profits of all four possible scenarios, optimal bundling and pricing decisions for the manufacturer and the retailer are obtained, respectively. Model extensions and numerical examples are enriched to highlight the factors affecting optimal decision-making. Finally, valuable and interesting managerial insights are summarized. Results show that the upstream manufacturer always profits more when he sells complementary products separately. However, the optimal bundling decision of the downstream retailer is jointly determined by product complementarity （as a major factor） and the difference of product profitability （as a secondary factor）. Market power cannot exert an influence on both optimal bundling decisions, but it can partly affect pricing decisions.展开更多
We consider the tensor product π_α ? π_βof complementary series representations π_α and π_β of classical rank one groups SO_0(n, 1), SU(n, 1) and Sp(n, 1). We prove that there is a discrete component π_(α+β...We consider the tensor product π_α ? π_βof complementary series representations π_α and π_β of classical rank one groups SO_0(n, 1), SU(n, 1) and Sp(n, 1). We prove that there is a discrete component π_(α+β)for small parameters α and β(in our parametrization). We prove further that for SO_0(n, 1) there are finitely many complementary series of the form π_(α+β+2j,)j = 0, 1,..., k, appearing in the tensor product π_α ? π_βof two complementary series π_α and π_β, where k = k(α, β, n) depends on α, β and n.展开更多
文摘This article explores bundling and pricing decisions for two complementary products in a two-layer supply chain consisting of a multi-product manufacturer and a retailer. We establish four different pricing models under cases of decentralized decision, while considering different portfolio-bundling strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer. A game-theoretical method is used to characterize the corresponding equilibrium outcomes in each scenario. By further analyzing and comparing the maximum profits of all four possible scenarios, optimal bundling and pricing decisions for the manufacturer and the retailer are obtained, respectively. Model extensions and numerical examples are enriched to highlight the factors affecting optimal decision-making. Finally, valuable and interesting managerial insights are summarized. Results show that the upstream manufacturer always profits more when he sells complementary products separately. However, the optimal bundling decision of the downstream retailer is jointly determined by product complementarity （as a major factor） and the difference of product profitability （as a secondary factor）. Market power cannot exert an influence on both optimal bundling decisions, but it can partly affect pricing decisions.
文摘We consider the tensor product π_α ? π_βof complementary series representations π_α and π_β of classical rank one groups SO_0(n, 1), SU(n, 1) and Sp(n, 1). We prove that there is a discrete component π_(α+β)for small parameters α and β(in our parametrization). We prove further that for SO_0(n, 1) there are finitely many complementary series of the form π_(α+β+2j,)j = 0, 1,..., k, appearing in the tensor product π_α ? π_βof two complementary series π_α and π_β, where k = k(α, β, n) depends on α, β and n.
