Exploration of OPEC and oil world market

In this article, the author will analyze the phenomena of soaring oil price today, how it happened, and find the reasons for the creation of OPEC, how it conducted its affairs in the market, and the economic factors that influenced Dr. Yamani in managing the organization effectively for a fairly long period of time to attain by the goals set out by him. I will apply the economic theories of market models, substitutability of products, the concept of price leadership etc. to explain the situation in the oil market and OPEC＇s function, which also illustrates current market behavior in the business world.

CAPACITY COMMITMENT AND PRICING FOR SUBSTITUTABLE PRODUCTS UNDER COMPETITION

Capacity acquisition and pricing decisions are a company＇s long-term strategic decisions. However, demand uncertainty and substitutability of multiple products cause the difficulty to solve capacity and pricing decision problems. In this paper, we address a multiple product pricing and multiple resource capacity acquisition problem with demand.uncertainties and competition. The company needs to determine capacity commitment for each resource and product prices before demands are realized so that the total profit is maximized. If the demand exceeds the committed capacity, extra amounts can be purchased from the spot market. Variable unit production costs, capacity acquisition and maintenance costs are considered. We first analyze a single company basic problem and find the optimal solutions on prices and capacity. Based on the single company model, we address the two-product, two-firm capacity commitment and pricing problem considering across product and across company price competition factors. The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium on price and capacity commitment are proved, and then we extended the results to the multiple product, multiple company case.

Game-theoretical Models of a Two-echelon Supply Chain Involving Two Substitutable Products

This paper considers tripartite pricing issues in a two-echelon supply chain involving duopolistic manufacturers and a single retailer.Firstly,a tripartite competitive model is conducted,in which both a Stackelberg game and a Bertrand game occur simultaneously.It is shown that the manufacturer who possesses a higher sales quantity gains more profits than the other one.Secondly,a definition of optimal vertical pricing alliance is proposed when cooperation exists between the retailer and some manufacturer.We conduct two-player games when partial cooperation exists among the three participants.It is demonstrated that the total profit of the alliance is higher than the sum profit of the corresponding two participants in the tripartite competition model,and meanwhile the profit of the manufacturer who is not in the alliance suffers a loss.Further,a criterion is given to judge which manufacturer the retailer will choose to cooperate in order to maximize the total increased profits.From the perspective of game theory,we examine the stability of the vertical alliance with considering the dominance of the retailer.Finally,a numerical illustration is designed to examine the judging criteria of which manufacturer is the member of the optimal alliance under different potential market demands.