The Official Promotion Incentive： A New Re-Estimation and Re-Examination

Based on three major theories, the Chinese local officials＇ promotion incentive could be influenced by economic performances, political relationships, and financial performances. However, there were some researchers focusing on these promotion mechanisms and then they got different outcomes. This paper achieves the goal for exploring the influence factors of officials＇ promotion by using OLS empirical test. From collecting the data of Chinese local officials and cities＇ economic conditions, we find that economic performances and political relationships can have a significant effect on officials＇ promotion, but financial performances cannot have this effect. And the experiences and lesson of this research have some reference for exploration of Chinese local officials＇ promotion incentive.

Knowledge Graph of China's Executive Compensation Gap:Visual Analysis Based on CiteSpace

This study selected 473 local research articles on executive compensation from core journals in the China Academic Journals(CNKI)full-text database and the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index(CSSCI)from 2003 to 2020.Then,the bibliometric analysis method was adopted and conducted in regard to the number of articles published,authors,research institutions,high-frequency keywords,etc.In view of the increasing studies of this field,this study showed that a few scholars and institutions with high academic influence have been involved in the research on executive compensation gap in China.The results from this study revealed that the research on the relationship between executive compensation gap and firm performance as well as the moderating variables between them were topics of interests.In the context of the increasing compensation gap which had become a global interest,the research on management power and promotion incentives have established their significance as important research frontiers.

Does Chinese Environmental Policy Affect Income Inequality? Evidence from the Central Environmental Protection Inspection

This paper investigates the effect of environmental policy on income inequality.It focuses on the central environmental protection inspection led by the central government in China.Using a diference-in-diferences approach,it finds evidence that environmental regulation decreased the per capita income and enlarged the gap between urban and rural income while showing an insignificant effect on employment.Although the policy can reduce pollution levels and bring environmental benefits in aggregate,the findings of this study suggest that the regulations appear to have reduced the proportion of manufacturing industry and hindered general innovation and investment from entrepreneurs,which resulted in greater inequality.Rural residents suffered more from environmental regulation due to relatively high migration costs and their disadvantaged human resources on the aspects of health,education level,and skills.The local government's execution incentive can also play a key role in the effectiveness of environmental policy.Regions with lower GDP growth targets and younger government leaders were affected significantly with regard to the income growth of local residents and the urban-rural income gap.

Turnover of Local Government Officials and Local Air Quality

This paper constructs a fixed effect model to study the impact of turnover of local government officials on local air quality,and the mechanism through which this effect takes place,using data from 282 prefecture-level cities in China from 2015 to 2019.This research shows that turnover of local government officials led to a decline in local air quality,mainly due to a“responsibility gap period.”It also found that the heterogeneity of officials and the difference in the implementation of political initiatives by cities affected the length of the“responsibility gap period”-the shorter it was,the lower the air pollution was during official turnover.Air pollution in China is still severe and the Chinese central government should therefore further reform the turnover system to improve local air quality during the turnover of key local officials by shortening the“responsibility gap period.”

Financial Pressure,Economic Stimulus and Land Transfer with the Aim of Attracting Investment-Empirical Evidence Based on Micro Data of Industrial Land

Although China’s local governments are facing greater financial pressure,they often sell industrial land at low prices to attract investment.Local government land transfer strategies refl ect driving mechanisms of officials’behavior.Based on the micro data of about 340000 industrial land sales in 289 prefecture-level cities in China from 2006 to 2015,this paper divides industrial land transfer into two categories,namely land transfer with the aim of attracting investment and normal transfer,according to whether the transfer price is lower than the minimum price stipulated by central government.The paper explores the strategies of industrial land transfer under financial pressure and the motivation differences of officials with the help of changes in local land transfers after the introduction of economic stimulus policies.It is found that financial pressure will signifi cantly reduce local industrial land transfer with the aim of investment attraction.However,after the introduction of economic stimulus policies,although financial pressure has increased,the infl uence of financial pressure on local governments’investment-induced land transfer behavior significantly weakened due to the increase of out-of-system financing channels,thus industrial land transfer with the aim of attracting investment has increased signifi cantly.From the perspective of promotion incentives of officials,officials with longer term were more inclined to sell industrial land to attract investment.Therefore,it is necessary to rationally arrange the financial resources and powers of central and local governments,to adapt reasonable macro control method and strategy,and to build an offi cial evaluation system that meets the needs of high-quality development.