Evolutionary analysis of green credit and automobile enterprises under the mechanism of dynamic reward and punishment based on government regulation

To explore the green development of automobile enterprises and promote the achievement of the“dual carbon”target,based on the bounded rationality assumptions,this study constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model of gov-ernment,commercial banks,and automobile enterprises;introduced a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism;and analyzed the development process of the three parties’strategic behavior under the static and dynamic reward and punish-ment mechanism.Vensim PLE was used for numerical simulation analysis.Our results indicate that the system could not reach a stable state under the static reward and punishment mechanism.A dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can effectively improve the system stability and better fit real situations.Under the dynamic reward and punishment mechan-ism,an increase in the initial probabilities of the three parties can promote the system stability,and the government can im-plement effective supervision by adjusting the upper limit of the reward and punishment intensity.Finally,the implementa-tion of green credit by commercial banks plays a significant role in promoting the green development of automobile enter-prises.

Behaviours of Multi-Stakeholders under China’s Renewable Portfolio Standards:A Game Theory-Based Analysis

China has implemented both quantitative and policy incentives for renewable energy development since 2019 and is currently in the policy transition stage.The implementation of renewable portfolio standards(RPSs)is difficult due to the interests of multiple stakeholders,including power generation enterprises,power grid companies,power users,local governments,and the central government.Based on China’s RPS policy and power system reform documents,this research sorted out the core game decision problems of China’s renewable energy industry and established a conceptual game decision model of the renewable energy industry from the perspective of local governments,power generation enterprises and power grid companies.The results reveal that for local governments,the probability of meeting the earnings quota or punishments for not reaching quota completion are the major determinants for active participation in quota supervision.For power grid firms,the willingness to accept renewable electricity quotas depends on the additional cost of receiving renewable electricity and governmental incentives.It is reasonable,from the theoretical perspective,to implement the RPS policy on the power generation side.Electricity reform will help clarify the electricity price system and increase the transparency of the quota implementation process.Policy implications are suggested to achieve sustainable development of the renewable energy industry from price incentives and quantity delivery.

Spread of Commercial Bribery and Private Sector Responsibilities in China

After years of governance, the momentum of the spread of commercial bribery in China has yet to be effectively curbed. Commercial bribery has become a major form ofcorruption in China, but there are very jew studies on this topic. This paper discusses commercial briber）, in terms of economics on transactions between the supplier （the bribegiver） and the demander （the bribe-taker）, analyzing reasons for the spread of commercial briberyin China from an economic perspective. The authors find that China＇s commercial bribery governance focuses on punishing the public sector and bribe-takers while it lacks sufficient governance measures on the private sector to address bribe-givers. This form of governance is dramatically different from that utilized in countries with mature market economies as well as some international organizations, which have different measures fortackling commercial bribery. Does governance have a causal effect on the spread of commercial bribery in China？The authors use penalty severity to indicate the private sector ＇srole and use a commercial bribery game under perfect rationality and evolutionary game theory models under bounded rationality to reveal the conditions and mechanism of the origin and spread of commercial bribery. The authors also analyze the role of the private sector （the potential bribe-giver） and the role of the punishment mechanism in commercial bribery governance. Results show that the penalties for bribe-giving are less severe than penaltiesfor bribe-taking. There is an especially clear asymmetric relationship between economic penalties for the bribe-giverand economic benefits gained from bribing, and the authors propose that this disparity is the institutional cause of the spread of commercial bribery in China. Froma local equilibrium and static perspective, asymmetric punishment is important for breaking down the alliance between the bribe-giver and the bribe-taken But from the general equilibrium and dynamic perspective, asymmetric punishment raises the potential bribe-giver＇s expected benefits, attracting the potential bribe-giver and encouraging the potential bribe-giver to extend the bribe offer. In this＇ regard, asymmetric punishment is an institutional defect of China＇s commercial bribery governance. Symmetric punishment mechanisms, with an emphasis on prevention and control, makes＇ the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker subject to the same level of criminal punishmentandalso raises a bribe-giver＇s .financial penaltiesto a level higher than the expected benefits. This in turn has the power tolimit the bribe-giver＇s bribery motivation and ability, leading the bribe-giver togive up bribery voluntarily through rational choice, and eventually curbing the spread of commercial bribery.