After the outbreak of the Enron incident in the United States, China’s attention to internal control information disclosure has gradually increased. As a pillar industry of the national economy, real estate industry ...After the outbreak of the Enron incident in the United States, China’s attention to internal control information disclosure has gradually increased. As a pillar industry of the national economy, real estate industry internal control system is sound, which has an important impact on social stability and healthy economic development. Therefore, this paper selects a company in the real estate industry, through the analysis of its internal control information disclosure, finds out its existing problems, and puts forward practical and feasible suggestions.展开更多
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the board of directors,namely board size,board independence,and CEO duality,as well as audit quality on the disclosure of internal control information.The sample c...The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the board of directors,namely board size,board independence,and CEO duality,as well as audit quality on the disclosure of internal control information.The sample consists of 164 European companies listed in the STOXX Europe 600.Based on positive agency theory,the authors posit that board of directors and audit quality influence corporate internal control disclosure practice.The content analysis and the design of the evaluation criterion were used to calculate the disclosure index of internal control.Thus,multiple regression analysis is utilized to analyze the results of this paper.The average internal control information disclosure index was 0.285,indicating that most of the companies in our sample do not disclose enough information about the internal control.This low level of forward-looking information disclosure makes it very difficult for corporate stakeholders to determine the future performance of the company.Multivariate results indicate that internal control disclosure is positively and significantly associated with board independence,CEO duality,and audit quality.This study contributes to the literature on the various governance characteristics and disclosure by showing that the disclosure of internal control information in European countries is positively and significantly associated with board independence,separation of duties,and audit quality.Our study was based on a sample of European companies including countries regulating IC disclosure as well as unregulated settings.As noted by Bedard and Graham(2014),regulatory differences in countries can contribute insights on the costs and benefits of disclosure.Findings also have policy implications for investors,managers,and regulators.展开更多
When there is high information asymmetry between directors and managers,independent directors do not have enough information to perform their functions. Only when faced with a good internal information environment can...When there is high information asymmetry between directors and managers,independent directors do not have enough information to perform their functions. Only when faced with a good internal information environment can such directors acquire enough information to provide advice and monitor managers,and only under these conditions can increasing their proportion on the board effectively reduce agency problems, such as driving managers to disclose information to investors. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms that voluntarily disclose their auditors' reports on internal controls from 2007 to 2009, this study explores how the information acquisition costs of independent directors affect their monitoring effectiveness by investigating the disclosure decisions of their internal control audits. We find that when the information asymmetry between insiders and outside directors is low and the proportion of independent directors on a board is high, a firm is more likely to voluntarily disclose its internal control audit report.展开更多
文摘After the outbreak of the Enron incident in the United States, China’s attention to internal control information disclosure has gradually increased. As a pillar industry of the national economy, real estate industry internal control system is sound, which has an important impact on social stability and healthy economic development. Therefore, this paper selects a company in the real estate industry, through the analysis of its internal control information disclosure, finds out its existing problems, and puts forward practical and feasible suggestions.
文摘The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the board of directors,namely board size,board independence,and CEO duality,as well as audit quality on the disclosure of internal control information.The sample consists of 164 European companies listed in the STOXX Europe 600.Based on positive agency theory,the authors posit that board of directors and audit quality influence corporate internal control disclosure practice.The content analysis and the design of the evaluation criterion were used to calculate the disclosure index of internal control.Thus,multiple regression analysis is utilized to analyze the results of this paper.The average internal control information disclosure index was 0.285,indicating that most of the companies in our sample do not disclose enough information about the internal control.This low level of forward-looking information disclosure makes it very difficult for corporate stakeholders to determine the future performance of the company.Multivariate results indicate that internal control disclosure is positively and significantly associated with board independence,CEO duality,and audit quality.This study contributes to the literature on the various governance characteristics and disclosure by showing that the disclosure of internal control information in European countries is positively and significantly associated with board independence,separation of duties,and audit quality.Our study was based on a sample of European companies including countries regulating IC disclosure as well as unregulated settings.As noted by Bedard and Graham(2014),regulatory differences in countries can contribute insights on the costs and benefits of disclosure.Findings also have policy implications for investors,managers,and regulators.
基金the China National Natural Science Foundation "Internal Control of Listed Companies and Investors Protection" (Project No. 70972076)Humanities Social Science Foundation of the Ministry of Education "Internal Control, Overinvestmentand Financial Crisis" (Project No. 09YJA790199)+2 种基金The Key Research Institutions of Humanities and Social Science Foundation of Guangdong Province "Internal Control and Value Creation–An Empirical Study Based on China’s Capital Market"(Project No. 11JDXM79004)National Social Science Foundation Youth Project (Project No.10CGL041)Academic New Distinguished Scholar Prize 2011 for PhD candidates offered by the Ministry of Education (14000-3191033)
文摘When there is high information asymmetry between directors and managers,independent directors do not have enough information to perform their functions. Only when faced with a good internal information environment can such directors acquire enough information to provide advice and monitor managers,and only under these conditions can increasing their proportion on the board effectively reduce agency problems, such as driving managers to disclose information to investors. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms that voluntarily disclose their auditors' reports on internal controls from 2007 to 2009, this study explores how the information acquisition costs of independent directors affect their monitoring effectiveness by investigating the disclosure decisions of their internal control audits. We find that when the information asymmetry between insiders and outside directors is low and the proportion of independent directors on a board is high, a firm is more likely to voluntarily disclose its internal control audit report.
