This paper analyses the game model between the individual and the group that has the characteristics of Stackelberg model in traditional game theory and replicator dynamic model in evolutionary game theory. In the fir...This paper analyses the game model between the individual and the group that has the characteristics of Stackelberg model in traditional game theory and replicator dynamic model in evolutionary game theory. In the first phase of game, the bounded rationality group players adopt the replicator dynamic behavior. Secondly, the full rationality individual player decides the own response function by the strategies distribution of group players. The shortsighted individual player will take the risk-dominant strategy. This model has some unique characteristics.展开更多
基金The paper was supported by ＇Excellent Innovative Research Group Funds Project from National Science Foundation （Ratifying No. 7012001）＇ and the National Nature Science Foundation （Ratifying No. 70371038） .
文摘This paper analyses the game model between the individual and the group that has the characteristics of Stackelberg model in traditional game theory and replicator dynamic model in evolutionary game theory. In the first phase of game, the bounded rationality group players adopt the replicator dynamic behavior. Secondly, the full rationality individual player decides the own response function by the strategies distribution of group players. The shortsighted individual player will take the risk-dominant strategy. This model has some unique characteristics.
