In this paper, a game model composed of three subjects — government, manufacturer and consumer has been built by using Evolutionary Game Theory on the basis of analyzing the trilateral game strategy of waste mobile r...In this paper, a game model composed of three subjects — government, manufacturer and consumer has been built by using Evolutionary Game Theory on the basis of analyzing the trilateral game strategy of waste mobile reverse supply chain based on ECP; an evolutionary equilibrium model is to be sought for by utilizing the replication dynamic differential equation method; and the trilateral game strategy’s revolutionary trend and consistency have been analyzed by means of SD simulation method when government implements the static or dynamic reward and punishment strategy. The finding results reveal that, under the static reward and punishment strategy, the revolutionary process of trilateral game strategy is always unstable whether the initial behavior strategy is unitary or mixed.Therefore, it is more reasonable for the government to adopt the strategy of dynamic reward and punishment, and it is also stable and reciprocal for all the stakeholders when implementing this strategy.展开更多
文摘In this paper, a game model composed of three subjects — government, manufacturer and consumer has been built by using Evolutionary Game Theory on the basis of analyzing the trilateral game strategy of waste mobile reverse supply chain based on ECP; an evolutionary equilibrium model is to be sought for by utilizing the replication dynamic differential equation method; and the trilateral game strategy’s revolutionary trend and consistency have been analyzed by means of SD simulation method when government implements the static or dynamic reward and punishment strategy. The finding results reveal that, under the static reward and punishment strategy, the revolutionary process of trilateral game strategy is always unstable whether the initial behavior strategy is unitary or mixed.Therefore, it is more reasonable for the government to adopt the strategy of dynamic reward and punishment, and it is also stable and reciprocal for all the stakeholders when implementing this strategy.
