The advent of Industry 4.0 has compelled businesses to adopt digital approaches that combine software toenhance production efficiency. In this rapidly evolving market, software development is an ongoing process thatmu...The advent of Industry 4.0 has compelled businesses to adopt digital approaches that combine software toenhance production efficiency. In this rapidly evolving market, software development is an ongoing process thatmust be tailored to meet the dynamic needs of enterprises. However, internal research and development can beprohibitively expensive, driving many enterprises to outsource software development and upgrades to externalservice providers. This paper presents a software upgrade outsourcing model for enterprises and service providersthat accounts for the impact of market fluctuations on software adaptability. To mitigate the risk of adverseselection due to asymmetric information about the service provider’s cost and asymmetric information aboutthe enterprise’s revenues, we propose pay-per-time and revenue-sharing contracts in two distinct informationasymmetry scenarios. These two contracts specify the time and transfer payments for software upgrades. Througha comparative analysis of the optimal solutions under the two contracts and centralized decision-making withfull-information, we examine the characteristics of the solutions under two information asymmetry scenarios andanalyze the incentive effects of the two contracts on the various stakeholders. Overall, our study offers valuableinsights for firms seeking to optimize their outsourcing strategies and maximize their returns on investment insoftware upgrades.展开更多
Under the condition of asymmetric information,the Spence 's Job Market Signaling Model is generally applied to inspect the design capability of a designer and his labor and efforts to be invested; however,since th...Under the condition of asymmetric information,the Spence 's Job Market Signaling Model is generally applied to inspect the design capability of a designer and his labor and efforts to be invested; however,since the"prior probability"and "posterior probability"have great uncertainties,the practical effect of this model is poor. On the basis of analyzing reverse selection questions,this paper provides a design capability screening model,which can make a designer automatically expose his hidden information so that necessary actions can be taken as required by the owner to realize risk sharing. A calculation example is finally given to demonstrate that the new model is helpful for an owner to select a designer with high professional level and to lead the designer to work hard,so it is of significant application value.展开更多
文摘The advent of Industry 4.0 has compelled businesses to adopt digital approaches that combine software toenhance production efficiency. In this rapidly evolving market, software development is an ongoing process thatmust be tailored to meet the dynamic needs of enterprises. However, internal research and development can beprohibitively expensive, driving many enterprises to outsource software development and upgrades to externalservice providers. This paper presents a software upgrade outsourcing model for enterprises and service providersthat accounts for the impact of market fluctuations on software adaptability. To mitigate the risk of adverseselection due to asymmetric information about the service provider’s cost and asymmetric information aboutthe enterprise’s revenues, we propose pay-per-time and revenue-sharing contracts in two distinct informationasymmetry scenarios. These two contracts specify the time and transfer payments for software upgrades. Througha comparative analysis of the optimal solutions under the two contracts and centralized decision-making withfull-information, we examine the characteristics of the solutions under two information asymmetry scenarios andanalyze the incentive effects of the two contracts on the various stakeholders. Overall, our study offers valuableinsights for firms seeking to optimize their outsourcing strategies and maximize their returns on investment insoftware upgrades.
基金Sponsored by State Key Laboratory of Subtropical Building Science,Autonomous Research Topics(Grant No.x2tjc7100870)
文摘Under the condition of asymmetric information,the Spence 's Job Market Signaling Model is generally applied to inspect the design capability of a designer and his labor and efforts to be invested; however,since the"prior probability"and "posterior probability"have great uncertainties,the practical effect of this model is poor. On the basis of analyzing reverse selection questions,this paper provides a design capability screening model,which can make a designer automatically expose his hidden information so that necessary actions can be taken as required by the owner to realize risk sharing. A calculation example is finally given to demonstrate that the new model is helpful for an owner to select a designer with high professional level and to lead the designer to work hard,so it is of significant application value.
