It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incen...It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incentive compatible in classic auction theory. In the beginning of this letter, the faults of the most representative auction-based mechanisms are discussed. And then a new method called Uniform-Price Auction (UPA), which has the simplest auction rule is proposed and its incentive compatibility in the network environment is also proved. Finally, the basic mode is extended to support applications which require minimum bandwidth guarantees for a given time period by introducing derivative market, and a market mechanism for network resource allocation which is predictable, riskless, and simple for end-users is completed.展开更多
Offloading Mobile Devices(MDs)computation tasks to Edge Nodes(ENs)is a promising solution to overcome computation and energy resources limitations of MDs.However,there exists an unreasonable profit allocation problem ...Offloading Mobile Devices(MDs)computation tasks to Edge Nodes(ENs)is a promising solution to overcome computation and energy resources limitations of MDs.However,there exists an unreasonable profit allocation problem between MDs and ENs caused by the excessive concern on MD profit.In this paper,we propose an auction-based computation offloading algorithm,inspiring ENs to provide high-quality service by maximizing the profit of ENs.Firstly,a novel cooperation auction framework is designed to avoid overall profit damage of ENs,which is derived from the high computation delay at the overloaded ENs.Thereafter,the bidding willingness of each MD in every round of auction is determined to ensure MD rationality.Furthermore,we put forward a payment rule for the pre-selected winner to effectively guarantee auction truthfulness.Finally,the auction-based profit maximization offloading algorithm is proposed,and the MD is allowed to occupy the computation and spectrum resources of the EN for offloading if it wins the auction.Numerical results verify the performance of the proposed algorithm.Compared with the VA algorithm,the ENs profit is increased by 23.8%,and the task discard ratio is decreased by 7.5%.展开更多
With manufacturing slowly recovering amid improving economic conditions, cotton demand has increased prompting more orders among mills. However, with a deficient supply of cotton in the market, prices extend gains sin...With manufacturing slowly recovering amid improving economic conditions, cotton demand has increased prompting more orders among mills. However, with a deficient supply of cotton in the market, prices extend gains since Oct. 2009.展开更多
The land price in big cities draws much attention and discussion for its skyrocketing appreciation.Most researches are from the macro perspective due to data restriction.This paper aims to investigate the critical fac...The land price in big cities draws much attention and discussion for its skyrocketing appreciation.Most researches are from the macro perspective due to data restriction.This paper aims to investigate the critical factors in the price formation process of a land auction,using the listing auction micro bidding-level data in Beijing from 2013 to 2018.We construct a model for the relationship between quitting price and land,bidder's characteristics,housing market conditions and competitive intensity(including private and public signals),then we use OLS for identification.We find that competitive intensity increases the quitting price by causing competition and interaction between bidders.More importantly,we find evidence of cheating behavior in the land market.Results show that bidders have higher quitting prices when they are in a joint venture,and when a central SOE developer or a top 10 developer exist in the joint venture.We also find different behavior of developers in the short run and long run.Our research contributes to the literature of land auctions by analyzing the price formation process and developers'behavior.We also provide supporting evidence for the government to make adjustments of the auction system and identify the cheating developers.展开更多
This paper aims to assess the Initial Investment Valuation Methodology of the local regulator, facing the results of auctions, due to the high occurrence of low clearing prices observed from 2003 to 2008 and the high ...This paper aims to assess the Initial Investment Valuation Methodology of the local regulator, facing the results of auctions, due to the high occurrence of low clearing prices observed from 2003 to 2008 and the high percentage of auctions without any bidder recently. The regulator investment forecasted defines the maximum value of Yearly Allowed Revenue and the bidder that offers the lowest YAR value wins the auction. The first type of analysis considers project cost, location, execution deadline, transmission line extension and type of all actions from 1999 to 2015, totalling about 3.361 billion USD. It was not found any correlation of those variables and the result of the actions. The second analysis compared the equipment and the additional costs breakdown of the regulator investment forecast with the real investment in projects from 2009 to 2013 and it rarely surpasses 5%. Suggestions are proposed based on the analysis.展开更多
Demand uncertainty is a key factor for the seller's decision making, especially in the e-business environment, for the website to sell products through the online auction. In this paper, two kinds of demand uncert...Demand uncertainty is a key factor for the seller's decision making, especially in the e-business environment, for the website to sell products through the online auction. In this paper, two kinds of demand uncertainties are considered: the consumer regime uncertainty and the inherent randomness of the market environment. Then, how to use a novel business model and group-buying auction (GBA) is analyzed in such a market environment. Based on the comparison of the GBA and the posted price mechanism, some conditions that favor the GBA are provided.展开更多
In the era of big data,there is an urgent need to establish data trading markets for effectively releasing the tremendous value of the drastically explosive data.Data security and data pricing,however,are still widely...In the era of big data,there is an urgent need to establish data trading markets for effectively releasing the tremendous value of the drastically explosive data.Data security and data pricing,however,are still widely regarded as major challenges in this respect,which motivate this research on the novel multi-blockchain based framework for data trading markets and their associated pricing mechanisms.In this context,data recording and trading are conducted separately within two separate blockchains:the data blockchain(DChain) and the value blockchain(VChain).This enables the establishment of two-layer data trading markets to manage initial data trading in the primary market and subsequent data resales in the secondary market.Moreover,pricing mechanisms are then proposed to protect these markets against strategic trading behaviors and balance the payoffs of both suppliers and users.Specifically,in regular data trading on VChain-S2D,two auction models are employed according to the demand scale,for dealing with users’ strategic bidding.The incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)model is deployed to the low-demand trading scenario,while the nearly incentive-compatible monopolistic price(MP) model is utilized for the high-demand trading scenario.With temporary data trading on VChain-D2S,a reverse auction mechanism namely two-stage obscure selection(TSOS) is designed to regulate both suppliers’ quoting and users’ valuation strategies.Furthermore,experiments are carried out to demonstrate the strength of this research in enhancing data security and trading efficiency.展开更多
基金Supported by Hubei Provincial Foundation for Natural Science under Contract 99J041 and 2001ABB104
文摘It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incentive compatible in classic auction theory. In the beginning of this letter, the faults of the most representative auction-based mechanisms are discussed. And then a new method called Uniform-Price Auction (UPA), which has the simplest auction rule is proposed and its incentive compatibility in the network environment is also proved. Finally, the basic mode is extended to support applications which require minimum bandwidth guarantees for a given time period by introducing derivative market, and a market mechanism for network resource allocation which is predictable, riskless, and simple for end-users is completed.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under grants 61901070,61801065,61771082,61871062,U20A20157in part by the Science and Technology Research Program of Chongqing Municipal Education Commission under grants KJQN202000603,KJQN201900611+1 种基金in part by the Natural Science Foundation of Chongqing under grant cstc2020jcyjzdxmX0024part by University Innovation Research Group of Chongqing under grant CXQT20017.
文摘Offloading Mobile Devices(MDs)computation tasks to Edge Nodes(ENs)is a promising solution to overcome computation and energy resources limitations of MDs.However,there exists an unreasonable profit allocation problem between MDs and ENs caused by the excessive concern on MD profit.In this paper,we propose an auction-based computation offloading algorithm,inspiring ENs to provide high-quality service by maximizing the profit of ENs.Firstly,a novel cooperation auction framework is designed to avoid overall profit damage of ENs,which is derived from the high computation delay at the overloaded ENs.Thereafter,the bidding willingness of each MD in every round of auction is determined to ensure MD rationality.Furthermore,we put forward a payment rule for the pre-selected winner to effectively guarantee auction truthfulness.Finally,the auction-based profit maximization offloading algorithm is proposed,and the MD is allowed to occupy the computation and spectrum resources of the EN for offloading if it wins the auction.Numerical results verify the performance of the proposed algorithm.Compared with the VA algorithm,the ENs profit is increased by 23.8%,and the task discard ratio is decreased by 7.5%.
文摘With manufacturing slowly recovering amid improving economic conditions, cotton demand has increased prompting more orders among mills. However, with a deficient supply of cotton in the market, prices extend gains since Oct. 2009.
基金Supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(72274102)。
文摘The land price in big cities draws much attention and discussion for its skyrocketing appreciation.Most researches are from the macro perspective due to data restriction.This paper aims to investigate the critical factors in the price formation process of a land auction,using the listing auction micro bidding-level data in Beijing from 2013 to 2018.We construct a model for the relationship between quitting price and land,bidder's characteristics,housing market conditions and competitive intensity(including private and public signals),then we use OLS for identification.We find that competitive intensity increases the quitting price by causing competition and interaction between bidders.More importantly,we find evidence of cheating behavior in the land market.Results show that bidders have higher quitting prices when they are in a joint venture,and when a central SOE developer or a top 10 developer exist in the joint venture.We also find different behavior of developers in the short run and long run.Our research contributes to the literature of land auctions by analyzing the price formation process and developers'behavior.We also provide supporting evidence for the government to make adjustments of the auction system and identify the cheating developers.
文摘This paper aims to assess the Initial Investment Valuation Methodology of the local regulator, facing the results of auctions, due to the high occurrence of low clearing prices observed from 2003 to 2008 and the high percentage of auctions without any bidder recently. The regulator investment forecasted defines the maximum value of Yearly Allowed Revenue and the bidder that offers the lowest YAR value wins the auction. The first type of analysis considers project cost, location, execution deadline, transmission line extension and type of all actions from 1999 to 2015, totalling about 3.361 billion USD. It was not found any correlation of those variables and the result of the actions. The second analysis compared the equipment and the additional costs breakdown of the regulator investment forecast with the real investment in projects from 2009 to 2013 and it rarely surpasses 5%. Suggestions are proposed based on the analysis.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.70329001 and No. 70321001)
文摘Demand uncertainty is a key factor for the seller's decision making, especially in the e-business environment, for the website to sell products through the online auction. In this paper, two kinds of demand uncertainties are considered: the consumer regime uncertainty and the inherent randomness of the market environment. Then, how to use a novel business model and group-buying auction (GBA) is analyzed in such a market environment. Based on the comparison of the GBA and the posted price mechanism, some conditions that favor the GBA are provided.
基金partially supported by the Science and Technology Development Fund,Macao SAR (0050/2020/A1)the National Natural Science Foundation of China (62103411, 72171230)。
文摘In the era of big data,there is an urgent need to establish data trading markets for effectively releasing the tremendous value of the drastically explosive data.Data security and data pricing,however,are still widely regarded as major challenges in this respect,which motivate this research on the novel multi-blockchain based framework for data trading markets and their associated pricing mechanisms.In this context,data recording and trading are conducted separately within two separate blockchains:the data blockchain(DChain) and the value blockchain(VChain).This enables the establishment of two-layer data trading markets to manage initial data trading in the primary market and subsequent data resales in the secondary market.Moreover,pricing mechanisms are then proposed to protect these markets against strategic trading behaviors and balance the payoffs of both suppliers and users.Specifically,in regular data trading on VChain-S2D,two auction models are employed according to the demand scale,for dealing with users’ strategic bidding.The incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)model is deployed to the low-demand trading scenario,while the nearly incentive-compatible monopolistic price(MP) model is utilized for the high-demand trading scenario.With temporary data trading on VChain-D2S,a reverse auction mechanism namely two-stage obscure selection(TSOS) is designed to regulate both suppliers’ quoting and users’ valuation strategies.Furthermore,experiments are carried out to demonstrate the strength of this research in enhancing data security and trading efficiency.