To address the issue of information asymmetry between the two parties and moral hazard among service providers in the process of service outsourcing,this paper builds the Stackelberg game model based on the principal-...To address the issue of information asymmetry between the two parties and moral hazard among service providers in the process of service outsourcing,this paper builds the Stackelberg game model based on the principal-agent framework,examines the dynamic game situation before the contract being signed,and develops four information models.The analysis reveals a Pareto improvement in the game’s Nash equilibrium when comparing the four models from the standpoint of the supply chain.In the complete information scenario,the service level of the service provider,the customer company’s incentive effectiveness,and the supply chain system’s ultimate profit are all maximized.Furthermore,a coordinating mechanism for disposable profit is built in this study.The paper then suggests a blockchain-based architecture for the service outsourcing process supervision and a distributed incentive mechanism under the coordination mechanism in response to the inadequacy of the principal-agent theory to address the information asymmetry problem and the moral hazard problem.The experiment’s end findings demonstrate that both parties can benefit from the coordination mechanism,and the application of blockchain technology can resolve these issues and effectively encourage service providers.展开更多
The purpose of this study is to quantify the rice harvest losses in China and to evaluate the impacts of machinery and harvest outsourcing services on these losses,given the background of high-speed mechanization and ...The purpose of this study is to quantify the rice harvest losses in China and to evaluate the impacts of machinery and harvest outsourcing services on these losses,given the background of high-speed mechanization and outsourcing services.Data were collected from a national survey conducted in 2016 by the research team in conjunction with the Research Center for the Rural Economy of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of China.A non-parametric method was used to test whether combine harvesting and outsourcing services could significantly reduce harvest losses.Next,quantile regression was used to estimate the real effects of machinery and outsourcing services on harvest losses.The analysis yielded four main study outcomes.First,the harvest loss rate of rice in China was 3.65%.Second,mechanical reaping and winnowing caused greater losses than manual methods,while the opposite was true of field transportation.Third,combine harvesting increased the losses.Fourth,the effects of an outsourcing service on losses differed among the different harvesting methods.Outsourcing services increased losses in segmented harvesting but they reduced losses in combine harvesting.展开更多
The aim of this study was to find out what types of services Finnish distribution companies were purchasing and what is the future trend related to them. Results were gathered from Finnish distribution companies using...The aim of this study was to find out what types of services Finnish distribution companies were purchasing and what is the future trend related to them. Results were gathered from Finnish distribution companies using questionnaire. Theoretical background was collected from literacy to get more information of benefits and risks. Results indicate that purchasing services especially from independent service providers is increasing. Also the benefits are greater than the risks related to service purchasing.展开更多
International outsourcing is an important way to realize intra-product division of labor. China's industrial upgrade and policy efforts directed at outsourcing are not entirely endogenous but have a dependent path...International outsourcing is an important way to realize intra-product division of labor. China's industrial upgrade and policy efforts directed at outsourcing are not entirely endogenous but have a dependent path prone to be captured and locked at the low end of the global value chain by developed countries at the chain's high end. In light of the stage and reality of China's economic development, we should not only upgrade manufacturing outsourcing but also grasp service outsourcing opportunities. We should implement a strategy of coordinated development of manufacturing and service outsourcing rather than hastily transforming China from a "factory of the world" into an "office of the world." Balancing services with manufacturing and linking the global value chain with the domestic value chain is the best tool to address the problem of China's uneven regional development and establish a multi-tiered modern industrial system.展开更多
The paper provides information about the concept and the characteristics of the service outsourcing. It also analyzes the service outsourcing classification and the modem economy theory of the service outsourcing. Thr...The paper provides information about the concept and the characteristics of the service outsourcing. It also analyzes the service outsourcing classification and the modem economy theory of the service outsourcing. Through the analysis, we hope to provide the foundation for further study.展开更多
Certain outsourcing services for agricultural management in China,such as pest control in grain production,have experienced prolonged sluggishness,contrasting with the relatively high level of outsourcing services obs...Certain outsourcing services for agricultural management in China,such as pest control in grain production,have experienced prolonged sluggishness,contrasting with the relatively high level of outsourcing services observed in harvesting,land preparation,and sowing.This study examines the feasibility of implementing whole-step outsourcing in grain production by conducting a case study of rice and maize production in Jiangsu,Jilin,and Sichuan provinces in China.The provision of outsourcing services hinges on two essential conditions:technological advancements fostering specialized production and economies of scale,coupled with a market size sufficient to realize the aforementioned potential economies of scale.The results showed that outsourcing pest control or harvesting services had varying economies of scale.The outsourcing services in pest control were less common than in harvesting services,and their marginal growth space of the economies of scale with technological change was also smaller.Determined by the operational characteristics of pest control itself,the market scale of its professional services is small.Therefore,achieving the whole-step outsourcing of grain production necessitates not only technological innovation but also effective policy interventions to overcome the constraints of market scale.Such interventions include(1)optimizing crop layouts between planning regions and reducing land fragmentation and(2)supplying timely and effective inter-regional agricultural information for service providers aided by information technology.展开更多
In a manufacturing company, certain departments can be characterized as production departments and others as service departments. This paper expands and simplifies the results by the author and his co-author (Lowenth...In a manufacturing company, certain departments can be characterized as production departments and others as service departments. This paper expands and simplifies the results by the author and his co-author (Lowenthal & Malek, 2005; 2013), by explaining in a simple way how to obtain the fair-price per unit to pay to external suppliers that replace service departments. The paper also proves that replacing several service departments at once produces exactly the same fair-price per unit if they were replaced sequentially.展开更多
基金Province Keys Research and Development Program of Shandong(Soft Science Projects)[No.2021RKY01007]Major Scientific and Technological Innovation Projects in Shandong Province[No.2018CXGC0703].
文摘To address the issue of information asymmetry between the two parties and moral hazard among service providers in the process of service outsourcing,this paper builds the Stackelberg game model based on the principal-agent framework,examines the dynamic game situation before the contract being signed,and develops four information models.The analysis reveals a Pareto improvement in the game’s Nash equilibrium when comparing the four models from the standpoint of the supply chain.In the complete information scenario,the service level of the service provider,the customer company’s incentive effectiveness,and the supply chain system’s ultimate profit are all maximized.Furthermore,a coordinating mechanism for disposable profit is built in this study.The paper then suggests a blockchain-based architecture for the service outsourcing process supervision and a distributed incentive mechanism under the coordination mechanism in response to the inadequacy of the principal-agent theory to address the information asymmetry problem and the moral hazard problem.The experiment’s end findings demonstrate that both parties can benefit from the coordination mechanism,and the application of blockchain technology can resolve these issues and effectively encourage service providers.
基金the 2015 Special Scientific Research Project of Grain Public Welfare Industry,China(201513004-2)the research grant from the Murata Science Foundation,JSPS KAKENHI,Japan(JP19H03063)the scholarship from China Scholarship Council(CSC201906350150)。
文摘The purpose of this study is to quantify the rice harvest losses in China and to evaluate the impacts of machinery and harvest outsourcing services on these losses,given the background of high-speed mechanization and outsourcing services.Data were collected from a national survey conducted in 2016 by the research team in conjunction with the Research Center for the Rural Economy of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of China.A non-parametric method was used to test whether combine harvesting and outsourcing services could significantly reduce harvest losses.Next,quantile regression was used to estimate the real effects of machinery and outsourcing services on harvest losses.The analysis yielded four main study outcomes.First,the harvest loss rate of rice in China was 3.65%.Second,mechanical reaping and winnowing caused greater losses than manual methods,while the opposite was true of field transportation.Third,combine harvesting increased the losses.Fourth,the effects of an outsourcing service on losses differed among the different harvesting methods.Outsourcing services increased losses in segmented harvesting but they reduced losses in combine harvesting.
文摘The aim of this study was to find out what types of services Finnish distribution companies were purchasing and what is the future trend related to them. Results were gathered from Finnish distribution companies using questionnaire. Theoretical background was collected from literacy to get more information of benefits and risks. Results indicate that purchasing services especially from independent service providers is increasing. Also the benefits are greater than the risks related to service purchasing.
文摘International outsourcing is an important way to realize intra-product division of labor. China's industrial upgrade and policy efforts directed at outsourcing are not entirely endogenous but have a dependent path prone to be captured and locked at the low end of the global value chain by developed countries at the chain's high end. In light of the stage and reality of China's economic development, we should not only upgrade manufacturing outsourcing but also grasp service outsourcing opportunities. We should implement a strategy of coordinated development of manufacturing and service outsourcing rather than hastily transforming China from a "factory of the world" into an "office of the world." Balancing services with manufacturing and linking the global value chain with the domestic value chain is the best tool to address the problem of China's uneven regional development and establish a multi-tiered modern industrial system.
文摘The paper provides information about the concept and the characteristics of the service outsourcing. It also analyzes the service outsourcing classification and the modem economy theory of the service outsourcing. Through the analysis, we hope to provide the foundation for further study.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(72103088)the National Social Science Fund of China(20&ZD094 and 21&ZD101).
文摘Certain outsourcing services for agricultural management in China,such as pest control in grain production,have experienced prolonged sluggishness,contrasting with the relatively high level of outsourcing services observed in harvesting,land preparation,and sowing.This study examines the feasibility of implementing whole-step outsourcing in grain production by conducting a case study of rice and maize production in Jiangsu,Jilin,and Sichuan provinces in China.The provision of outsourcing services hinges on two essential conditions:technological advancements fostering specialized production and economies of scale,coupled with a market size sufficient to realize the aforementioned potential economies of scale.The results showed that outsourcing pest control or harvesting services had varying economies of scale.The outsourcing services in pest control were less common than in harvesting services,and their marginal growth space of the economies of scale with technological change was also smaller.Determined by the operational characteristics of pest control itself,the market scale of its professional services is small.Therefore,achieving the whole-step outsourcing of grain production necessitates not only technological innovation but also effective policy interventions to overcome the constraints of market scale.Such interventions include(1)optimizing crop layouts between planning regions and reducing land fragmentation and(2)supplying timely and effective inter-regional agricultural information for service providers aided by information technology.
文摘In a manufacturing company, certain departments can be characterized as production departments and others as service departments. This paper expands and simplifies the results by the author and his co-author (Lowenthal & Malek, 2005; 2013), by explaining in a simple way how to obtain the fair-price per unit to pay to external suppliers that replace service departments. The paper also proves that replacing several service departments at once produces exactly the same fair-price per unit if they were replaced sequentially.