As it is impossible to assume complete rationality in a social dilemma situation, the assumption of bounded rationality is appropriate. Under the bounded rationality, it would be reasonable to assume that one behaves ...As it is impossible to assume complete rationality in a social dilemma situation, the assumption of bounded rationality is appropriate. Under the bounded rationality, it would be reasonable to assume that one behaves according to the heuristics principle. The group identity effect in a social dilemma situation might be very important in order to attain cooperation. The aim of this study was to clarify how to promote a cooperative behavior by avoiding a social dilemma situation. The group heuristics was taken into account, and it was explored how the group heuristics promotes a cooperative behavior in a social dilemma situation. As a result of a two-person game theory experiment, the group heuristics was found to play an important role in a social dilemma situation, and enhance a cooperative behavior. For the following three cases, the higher cooperation rate was attained at the latter half of the experiment： （a） mutual in-group condition, （b） one-way in-group condition, and （f） one-way unknown condition （in-group）. In conclusion, the consciousness of in-group membership might help to promote actively mutual cooperation.展开更多
Revolutions,typical cases of crucial social transformations,cannot be realized successfully without a large number of activists.Therefore,creating conditions favorable for acquiring enough participants should be an im...Revolutions,typical cases of crucial social transformations,cannot be realized successfully without a large number of activists.Therefore,creating conditions favorable for acquiring enough participants should be an important topic of Marxist social science.In particular,this problem includes the “free-ride,” because the benefits of revolutionaries’ activities are gained not only by the activists but also by all other members.The paper analyzes problems such as this one,applying non-cooperative game theory to social dilemma problems.This leads to some interesting results.In this research,the problem of the workers’ choice between unity or freeride is first defined using numerical examples of the gain structure.It is defined again in a more generalized form using other parameters.In so doing,we express both the cost of participating in the movement and the gains from the concession of the ruling class.Because this analysis focuses on the importance of the number of participants,the concession of the ruling class is framed as a function of the number of participants.The results of this analysis revealed that the economic base and superstructure accurately correspond in some game structures but not in others.In other words,the social dilemma presents either as a case of prisoners’ dilemma or as a chicken game.Furthermore,this paper analyzes the influence of group size,and it was revealed that groups with a large number of members,such as a ruled class,find it particularly difficult to unite.This phenomenon is called the “large group dilemma.” In these ways,this research shows that the aforementioned type of game theory can be used to analyze the difficulties and possibilities of social movements.展开更多
In this paper, we introduce an asymmetric payoff distribution mechanism into the evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game （PDG） on Newman Watts social networks, and study its effects on the evolution of cooperation. Th...In this paper, we introduce an asymmetric payoff distribution mechanism into the evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game （PDG） on Newman Watts social networks, and study its effects on the evolution of cooperation. The asymmetric payoff distribution mechanism can be adjusted by the parameter α： if α〉 0, the rich will exploit the poor to get richer; if α 〈 0, the rich are forced to offer part of their income to the poor. Numerical results show that the cooperator frequency monotonously increases with c~ and is remarkably promoted when c~ 〉 0. The effects of updating order and self-interaction are also investigated. The co-action of random updating and self-interaction can induce the highest cooperation level. Moreover, we employ the Gini coefficient to investigate the effect of asymmetric payoff distribution on the the system＇s wealth distribution. This work may be helpful for understanding cooperative behaviour and wealth inequality in society.展开更多
The non-cooperative action in the social dilemma situation might, at the worst case, lead to violation of social rules （or regulations）. A repetitive N-person social dilemma game that permit the participants to chan...The non-cooperative action in the social dilemma situation might, at the worst case, lead to violation of social rules （or regulations）. A repetitive N-person social dilemma game that permit the participants to change jobs between organizations （groups） and mutually interact between groups was carried out to investigate how ＂limitation for job change＂, ＂cost for job change＂, and ＂incentive （enhancement of personal career）＂ affected the cooperation. The cost for job change effectively worked for the enhancement of cooperation. When the cost for job change was not necessary, the cooperative behavior was enhanced. When the cost for job change was necessary, it tended that a non-cooperative action was selected. When the limitation and the cost for job change were imposed, and the participants were provided with the incentive for cooperation, the cooperation rate was the highest. A significant interaction between the incentive condition （enhancement of personal career） and the limitation for job change was also clarified.展开更多
文摘As it is impossible to assume complete rationality in a social dilemma situation, the assumption of bounded rationality is appropriate. Under the bounded rationality, it would be reasonable to assume that one behaves according to the heuristics principle. The group identity effect in a social dilemma situation might be very important in order to attain cooperation. The aim of this study was to clarify how to promote a cooperative behavior by avoiding a social dilemma situation. The group heuristics was taken into account, and it was explored how the group heuristics promotes a cooperative behavior in a social dilemma situation. As a result of a two-person game theory experiment, the group heuristics was found to play an important role in a social dilemma situation, and enhance a cooperative behavior. For the following three cases, the higher cooperation rate was attained at the latter half of the experiment： （a） mutual in-group condition, （b） one-way in-group condition, and （f） one-way unknown condition （in-group）. In conclusion, the consciousness of in-group membership might help to promote actively mutual cooperation.
文摘Revolutions,typical cases of crucial social transformations,cannot be realized successfully without a large number of activists.Therefore,creating conditions favorable for acquiring enough participants should be an important topic of Marxist social science.In particular,this problem includes the “free-ride,” because the benefits of revolutionaries’ activities are gained not only by the activists but also by all other members.The paper analyzes problems such as this one,applying non-cooperative game theory to social dilemma problems.This leads to some interesting results.In this research,the problem of the workers’ choice between unity or freeride is first defined using numerical examples of the gain structure.It is defined again in a more generalized form using other parameters.In so doing,we express both the cost of participating in the movement and the gains from the concession of the ruling class.Because this analysis focuses on the importance of the number of participants,the concession of the ruling class is framed as a function of the number of participants.The results of this analysis revealed that the economic base and superstructure accurately correspond in some game structures but not in others.In other words,the social dilemma presents either as a case of prisoners’ dilemma or as a chicken game.Furthermore,this paper analyzes the influence of group size,and it was revealed that groups with a large number of members,such as a ruled class,find it particularly difficult to unite.This phenomenon is called the “large group dilemma.” In these ways,this research shows that the aforementioned type of game theory can be used to analyze the difficulties and possibilities of social movements.
基金Project supported by the Major State Basic Research Development Program of China (Grant No. 2004CB318109)Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University of China (Grant No. NCET-07-0787)the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 70601026)
文摘In this paper, we introduce an asymmetric payoff distribution mechanism into the evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game （PDG） on Newman Watts social networks, and study its effects on the evolution of cooperation. The asymmetric payoff distribution mechanism can be adjusted by the parameter α： if α〉 0, the rich will exploit the poor to get richer; if α 〈 0, the rich are forced to offer part of their income to the poor. Numerical results show that the cooperator frequency monotonously increases with c~ and is remarkably promoted when c~ 〉 0. The effects of updating order and self-interaction are also investigated. The co-action of random updating and self-interaction can induce the highest cooperation level. Moreover, we employ the Gini coefficient to investigate the effect of asymmetric payoff distribution on the the system＇s wealth distribution. This work may be helpful for understanding cooperative behaviour and wealth inequality in society.
文摘The non-cooperative action in the social dilemma situation might, at the worst case, lead to violation of social rules （or regulations）. A repetitive N-person social dilemma game that permit the participants to change jobs between organizations （groups） and mutually interact between groups was carried out to investigate how ＂limitation for job change＂, ＂cost for job change＂, and ＂incentive （enhancement of personal career）＂ affected the cooperation. The cost for job change effectively worked for the enhancement of cooperation. When the cost for job change was not necessary, the cooperative behavior was enhanced. When the cost for job change was necessary, it tended that a non-cooperative action was selected. When the limitation and the cost for job change were imposed, and the participants were provided with the incentive for cooperation, the cooperation rate was the highest. A significant interaction between the incentive condition （enhancement of personal career） and the limitation for job change was also clarified.
