Analysis on "State Ownership of Climate Resources"

Climate resources are not scarce resources, nor do they conform to basic characteristics of the legal conception of ＂objects＂ which is used in the legal context. It is a violation of jurisprudence to assign ownership of climate resources. The provisions of local regulation which stipulate that climate resources belong to the state and government therefore has the jurisdiction over the climate probe activities, which is not only counter to higher laws, but also goes against the Constitution. That makes the provisions invalid. Besides, state ownership of climate resources also creates the possibility for the state to take on liabilities for damage caused by climate disasters. The motivation for the above provisions in local regulation is to acquire the administrative approval rights and economic benefits hiding behind those rights. So the basic principles for exercising state power should be in line with basic jurisprudence and conform with provisions of the Constitution and higher laws.

State ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Chinese listed companies

While the relationship between state ownership and firm performance has been widely researched, the empirical evidence has provided mixed results. This study applies panel data regression techniques to 10,639 firm-year observations of nonfinancial Chinese listed firms during 2003–2010 to examine the relationship between state ownership and firm performance. The results show that state ownership has a U-shaped relationship with firm performance. The Split Share Structure Reform in2005–2006 played a positive role in enhancing the relationship between state ownership and firm profitability ratios. Although state ownership decreased significantly after 2006, it remains high in strategically important industry sectors such as the oil, natural gas and mining sector and the publishing, broadcasting and media sector. The findings reveal that a higher level of state ownership is superior to a dispersed ownership structure due to the benefits of government support and political connections. The Split Share Structure Reform made previously nontradable shares legally tradable, improving corporate governance and reducing the negative effect of non-tradable state shares.

The Impacts of State Ownership on Information Asymmetry:Evidence from an Emerging Market

This study examines the effect of corporate ownership on information asymmetry as measured by bid-ask spread in the emerging markets of China. Government ownership has significant and positive impacts on bid-ask spread during the period 1995-2000, but disappears afterward during 2001-2003. The finding that state ownership raised bid-ask spread in the early period is consistent with recent studies on emerging markets including China, which indicate that firms with higher state ownership tend to have a greater deviation between cash flow rights and control rights(eg, Wei et al., 2005). This implies that lower state ownership is associated with lower information asymmetry in the market, an economic consequence of significant economic reform and privatization regarding the market microstructure. However, with more active control transfers andemergence of private controlling shareholders, regulatory changes in ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms, and thus an improved legal and institutional environment, the link between the government ownership and information asymmetry turns to be insignificant in the later period. These results have important implications for transparency and information disclosure policies as well as privatization in emerging markets.

Are state ownership and auditors' locality determinants of asset write-downs? Evidence from China

After issuing the 1998 Accounting Standards, Chinese regulators implemented additional regulations in 2001 governing write-downs of impaired assets and required assessment of recoverable amounts for four additional asset categories. As the recoverable value cannot be obtained objectively, management can discretionally assess the magnitude of write-downs to affect bottom-line profit. This study used 7258 firm-year observations in China from 1998 to2005 to examine whether the percentage of asset write-downs by statecontrolled firms differs from non-state-controlled firms, conditional upon more conservative financial reporting rules, and investigate whether local auditors support managerial decisions on asset write-downs. The empirical findings support the tendency of state-controlled ownerships to have lower asset write-downs. Local auditors also support managerial decisions on asset write-downs, especially when the companies are controlled by local governments.

Game analysis of control right of state-owned shares under the background of the mixed ownership

Since the Third Plenary Session of the 18 th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the concept of the mixed ownership economy has received extensive attention from all sectors of society, which has effect on a coming new round of reformation on enterprise property. However, in order to take control of the state-owned shares in the end making the state ownership economy become the principal position and to enlarge the scale of state-owned shares, which guides the common development with the non-public sectors of the economy, how to determine the proportion of state-owned shares? Under the background of the mixed ownership reformation, the article explains the mixed ownership by explaining how to enlarge the state-owned assets controlling scale and how to improve the stateowned company 'economic effi ciency and how to protect the interests of small shareholders. The final conclusion is that the SASAC should use the thinking of relative holdings, instead of the absolute control thinking, and should make use of the games among the large shareholders and the pyramidal ownership structure to make the pattern of ownership diversify.

State Ownership and Firm Performance： A Revisit

The low efficiency of state-owned enterprises （SOEs） is widely accepted by academics. However, the accounting literature shows that non-SOEs are more likely to engage in earnings management, which artificially boosts their financial performance. This suggests that the higher financial performance in non-SOEs may be merely cosmetic. This study compares the real financial performance between SOEs and non-SOEs, while the real performance is obtained by estimating the level of earnings management and removing it from the reported financial performance. The result shows that there is no significant difference in real performance between SOEs and non-SOEs. This study sheds new light on the debate over the efficiency of SOEs and the relationship between ownership structure and financial performance.

非国有董事治理积极性与国有企业审计意见决策

如何发挥非国有董事治理积极性以提高国有企业审计意见质量,实现国有资产保值增值,是深化国有企业改革亟需研究的问题。以2013—2022年A股国有企业上市公司为样本,构建离散选择模型,以投非赞成票代理非国有董事治理积极性。研究发现,非国有董事治理积极性越高,越能够提示应计盈余管理风险,审计师越倾向出具非标准审计意见;第一大非国有股东持股比例越高,混改国有企业股权集中度越低,非国有董事治理积极性与审计意见谨慎性的关系越显著。经过稳健性检验,研究结论不变。进一步研究发现,非国有董事积极履行治理职能导致审计意见质量提高有利于混改国有企业资产保值增值,实现国有企业混改主要目标。研究结论对于国有企业审计师正确决策审计意见、非国有董事有效维权、政府监管部门和混改国有企业充分尊重非国有董事治理的积极性、实现国有企业改革目标,均具有启示意义。

非国有资本参股对国有企业数字化转型的影响研究

国有企业推进数字化转型在促进自身发展升级时也能产生广泛的社会价值。基于2007—2020年上市企业数据,对非国有资本参股与国有企业数字化转型的关系及其内在机理进行实证分析。研究结果表明:国有企业在数字化转型中面临情境式困境,非国有资本参股通过加强企业创新动力、激发高管企业家精神与完善人才激励机制促进数字化转型,从而实现国有经济的高质量发展,但其效果会因国有企业特征、非国有资本特征以及外部环境特征有所差异。

论生态环境损害赔偿制度的法理基础与规范构造

理解生态环境损害赔偿制度,须从环境治理体系和治理能力现代化的整体视域展开,同时,还要厘清生态环境与自然资源、生态环境损害与损害赔偿、赔偿请求权与赔偿诉权等核心概念。既有理论将自然资源国家所有权作为生态环境损害赔偿中的实体权利基础,然而,不论是公权说、私权说,还是二阶结构说、三层结构说,都不周延。因为生态环境损害赔偿制度存在二元构造,即赔偿请求权区别于赔偿诉权,赔偿请求权中基于自然资源所有权的物上请求权区别于侵害生态环境的侵权之债请求权,赔偿诉权中程序意义上的提起生态环境损害赔偿诉讼区别于实体意义上的救济自然资源所有权。这种二元构造客观上源于生态环境中单体自然资源的结构面向与整体生态功能的功能面向存在区分,其学理基础在于承继和发展了传统所有权的解释范式,其核心内容是对生态环境类的损害进行类型化。为此,该制度可从两个方面予以展开。长期而言,须仰仗制定中的生态环境法典规定生态环境损害赔偿的系列内容;当务之急,则是借助司法解释促进这些内容的适度法制化。

非国有股东参与治理影响国有企业战略激进度吗?

以2008—2020年国有上市制造企业为样本,手工收集非国有股东控制权数据构建非国有股东参与治理指标,分析股权和控制权非对等配置逻辑下非国有股东参与治理对国有企业战略激进度的影响,分析结果显示二者呈倒U型关系。因此,混合所有制改革不仅仅是股权层面的混合,更要考虑非国有股东控制权比例的合理安排,才能更好地发挥不同所有制资本的协同治理效应。进一步的分析结果显示,高金字塔层级组国有企业、地方国有企业及低市场化程度地区国有企业中的上述关系更为明显。该结论对国有企业混合所有制改革中推动非国有资本融入内部治理机制有一定的参考价值。

逆向混改助力民企创新——国有资本参股对民营企业双元创新投入的影响研究

逆向混改有利于提高民营企业创新投入吗?以A股民营控股上市公司为样本考察国有资本参股的逆向混改对民营企业双元创新投入的影响后发现:首先,国有资本参股对于民营企业双元创新投入存在异质性影响,即能够显著提高民营企业开发式创新投入,而对探索式创新投入无明显作用(国企“两利一率”考核压力影响了国有资本参股对民营企业探索式创新投入的作用);其次,缓解融资约束与提高风险承担能力是上述关系的作用机制;再次,制度环境、行业竞争和技术董事数量等情境因素会影响国有资本参股对民营企业开发式创新投入的治理效果;最后,国有资本参股能够通过提高开发式创新投入的方式提高民营企业价值。通过揭示国有资本参股对民营企业双元创新投入的影响及其作用机理,回应了国有产权对民营企业创新作用的研究分歧,也拓宽了混合所有制改革思路。

非国有股东委派董事会影响国有企业分红水平吗?

现金分红是回报投资者的重要方式,对于构建高效有序的资本市场至关重要。混合所有制改革后,非国有股东进驻国有企业并取得董事会权力有助于改善治理行为,这能否提升国有企业的现金分红水平呢?基于上述问题,将非国有股东董事会权力与国有企业分红纳入同一解释模型,并进行实证检验。研究发现,非国有股东董事会权力的取得能够显著提升分红水平;当派出超额董事时,分红水平将进一步提升;机制分析表明,这一作用主要是通过减轻国有企业政策负担和降低代理成本得以实现;异质性分析发现,该结果在地方国有企业和实际控制人权力较大的条件下更为显著。

股权激励对国企创新投入的影响研究——基于混合所有制改革背景

选取2014—2019年沪深混改国企为研究样本,实证检验高管和核心技术及业务人员股权激励与企业创新投入的关系。结果表明:非国有股权制衡在影响高管股权激励促进创新投入的作用上表现为双重调节效应,在地方国企中更为明显。高管政治晋升激励对高管股权激励与创新投入关系的影响因国企层级而不同,在地方混改国企表现为正向调节效应,在混改央企表现为负向调节效应。研究结论为高管股权激励通过公司治理渠道影响企业创新提供了证据。

国企混改路径创新:从中长期实现共同富裕

共同富裕是社会主义的本质要求,是中国式现代化的重要特征。推进共同富裕离不开构建高水平社会主义市场经济体制,国有企业作为中国特色社会主义市场经济的根基,促进共同富裕就要稳步推进国有企业混合所有制改革,做强做优做大国有企业。本轮国企混改推动了国有经济与市场经济融合发展,在提高国企运行效率、推动经济增长等方面取得显著成效。但不同的改制路径也暴露出新的问题,员工权益保护不足、效率与公平关系处理不当、绩效薪酬体系不合理等影响着共同富裕的实现进程。从整体上市、引入战略投资者、员工持股、国企债务等方面分析国企混改现存问题对我国共同富裕实现进程产生的影响;并从发挥国企产业引领作用、深化国有经济科技创新驱动效应、找准国企职能定位、健全企业治理结构、优化营商环境、推进分配体系现代化等角度提出政策建议——国企混改应从模式创新入手推动国企高质量发展,在保持经济增长韧性与可持续性的同时,以中长期改善民生为导向,推动中国共同富裕目标尽早实现。

环境规制、所有制结构与技术创新——兼论国企改革的作用

环境保护可以促进资源节约、推动技术进步,因此,基于环境保护优化经济结构成为经济发展的必然趋势。波特假说认为,环境规制在改善环境的同时也推动了企业技术创新和竞争力的提升,能够实现环境保护和经济发展的共赢。本文在控制了市场竞争强度、企业家精神等重要解释变量下,试图回答所有制结构在我国是否影响了波特效应。研究发现,尽管环境规制在一定程度上能促进企业加大技术创新,但从企业经济性质考察,环境规制的波特效应受所有制结构的影响,实际效果被降低了。可能的原因是当前我国的市场竞争环境还不够高效,环境规制对国有企业和民营企业产生了不同的效应,从整体上拖累了企业技术创新。因此有必要加快推进国有企业改革,改善市场竞争环境,依法加强环境规制,降低因企业性质差异而产生的不同环境规制影响。

“逆向混改”能降低民营企业债务违约风险吗

以2008-2022年沪深A股民营上市公司为研究对象,探讨了国有股权参股是否以及如何对民营企业债务违约风险产生影响。研究发现,国有股权参股能够有效抑制民营企业的债务违约风险。机制检验发现,国有股权参股通过提供资源支持、发挥治理效应和防范内部风险来降低民营企业债务违约风险。进一步分析发现,当外部经济政策不确定程度严重和企业信息披露质量较差时,国有股权参股对民营企业债务违约风险的抑制作用更加明显。以“逆向混改”为切入点,探究民营企业债务违约风险的影响因素,拓展了混合所有制改革这一宏观经济政策对微观企业行为的经济后果,为促进民营企业高质量发展和防范系统性金融风险提供了经验证据。

家族所有权涉入与企业国际化--基于企业规模与国资参股的视角

家族所有权涉入对企业国际化的影响通常被认为是线性的。关于两者之间是否存在非线性关系,现有研究尚未得出一致结论。基于中国创业板和中小板上市家族企业2013-2019年的平衡面板数据,采用多元回归分析,并结合门槛模型,探讨家族所有权涉入的不同阈值水平对企业国际化的影响。分析结果表明,家族所有权涉入与企业国际化之间存在非线性关系,企业规模、国资参股具有双重门槛效应,在这两种情境特征下家族所有权涉入对企业国际化会产生不同程度的影响。进一步分析结果表明,在2020-2022年的样本中,家族所有权涉入对企业国际化的积极影响有所减弱,这说明外部风险与极端环境会对家族企业的国际化策略具有明显影响。此外,不同经济区域的家族企业,其所有权涉入对国际化的影响表现出明显的异质性。研究结论为家族企业更好地面向国际化经营提供了新的理论支撑与实践启示。

混合所有制改革与内部资本市场效率

基于2008-2021年国有集团成员企业数据,研究了混合所有制改革对集团内部资本市场效率的影响及作用机制。结果显示,混合所有制改革对国有企业集团的内部资本市场效率有显著的提升作用。机制检验发现,混合所有制改革通过非国有股东委派董事和提高内部控制质量提升了内部资本市场效率。混合所有制改革对集团内部资本配置效率的提升作用在非国有股东向企业委派董事时更显著,但非国有股东委派董事比例过高反而无法提升内部资本市场效率。进一步分析得出,在集团多元化程度高、市场竞争程度低时,混合所有制改革对内部资本市场效率有更大的提升作用。

技术许可与混合所有制改革占优策略研究

以产品异质性为视角,探讨国有企业与外资企业间的技术许可对国有企业混合所有制改革占优策略的影响。结果表明,当国有企业掌握成本降低技术并对外资企业技术许可时,国有企业技术许可会促使政府提高其占优民营资本参股水平;当外资企业掌握成本降低技术并对国有企业技术许可时,外资企业技术许可会促使政府降低国有企业占优民营资本参股水平。同时,产品差异化程度也会影响技术许可发生前后的国有企业占优民营资本参股水平。当市场规模较大时,占优民营资本参股水平与产品差异化程度呈倒U型非线性关系。

国有资本参股能抑制民营企业股价崩盘风险吗?

从稳定资本市场的角度分析国有资本参股对民营企业股价崩盘风险的影响。结果表明,国有资本参股民营企业,可以显著提高其会计信息透明度,降低民营股东的风险承担意愿,进而降低其股价崩盘风险。进一步研究发现,国有股东的参股比例和委派“董监高”的比例越高,民营企业的股价崩盘风险越低。这说明民营企业引入国有资本进行“逆向混改”,可以促使资源朝向更有经营效率的企业流动,提升资本市场的资金配置效率。