Internal Control Management and Risk Prevention Measures of State-Owned Enterprises

As an important pillar of national economic development,state-owned enterprises,their operational efficiency,and risk management ability are directly related to the stability and security of the national economy.As an important part of enterprise management,internal control management plays an irreplaceable role.Especially in the current domestic and international economic situation is complex and changeable,market competition is increasingly fierce environment,to strengthen the internal control management of state-owned enterprises and risk prevention measures is particularly important.This paper starts with the importance of internal control management and risk prevention for state-owned enterprises,and analyzes the problems and strategies in the internal control management and risk prevention of state-owned enterprises,in order to build a more comprehensive and efficient risk management system for state-owned enterprises to adapt to the ever-changing market environment and realize sustainable development.

State-Owned Capital Participation in Private Enterprises:A Perspective of Debt Financing

This study takes debt financing as the entry point and explores the impact of state-owned capital participation in private enterprises from the perspectives of“unarticulated rules”and“articulated rules”.The study finds that state-owned capital participation significantly reduces the debt financing costs of private enterprises and expands the scale of their debt financing.This conclusion remains valid after a series of endogeneity and robustness tests.Further analysis of the mechanism reveals that state-owned capital participation improves the debt financing of private enterprises through multiple channels:Enhancing their social reputation,mitigating the“statistical bias”they face,optimizing their information quality,and reducing the“shareholder-creditor”agency problems.This paper conceptualizes these benefits as the“complementary advantages of heterogeneous shareholders”.This not only constructs a theoretical framework for“reverse mixed-ownership reform”but also better narrates the Chinese story of“mixed-ownership reform”by adopting a more universally applicable theory of equity structure.Additionally,the paper supplements existing research on the macro-and meso-level relationship between the government and the market by exploring the government’s positive role at the micro-level.

Research on Influencing Factors and Countermeasures of Risk Control of State-Owned Enterprises under the Background of Big Data

This study explores the risk control and response strategies of state-owned enterprises in the context of big data.Global economic uncertainty poses new challenges to state-owned enterprises,necessitating innovative risk management approaches.This article proposes response strategies from four key aspects:establishing a proactive risk management culture,building a foundation in technology and data,conducting big data-driven risk analysis,and implementing predictive analysis and real-time monitoring.State-owned enterprises can foster a proactive risk management culture by cultivating employee risk awareness,demonstrating leadership,and establishing transparency and open communication.Additionally,data integration and analysis,leveraging the latest technology,are crucial factors that can help companies better identify risks and opportunities.

Analysis of the Relationship between Ultimate Controlling Shareholders and Private Enterprises＇ Business Performance

In China, major shareholders of private listed enterprise could control its production and operation by virtue of few resources which makes it possible for ultimate controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders＇ rights and interests.In this paper, we studied the relationship between ultimate controlling shareholders and business performance of private enterprises based on the theory of ultimate controlling shareholders and made relevant conclusions and recommendations.

Tracing Ultimate Shareholders＇ Double Control Chain in Listed Companies- Using the Theory of Organizational Routine Evolution

Based on the epistemology and methodology of organizational routine evolution, this paper presents a systematic analysis on how ultimate shareholders control listed companies by means of equity control chain in a pyramid structure and social capital control chain hidden in social networks. First, this paper examines the internal logic of ultimate shareholders＇ double control chain and designs an iterative model for dynamic evolution intent proceeding from ultimate shareholders ＇degree of intent for social capital control. Finally, with the case study of Inner Mongolia Caoyuan Xingfa Co., Ltd., this paper reveals the process and mechanism of ultimate shareholders＇ creation of double control chain.

A Research on the State-owned Enterprise’s Anti-Corruption Risk Prevention Mechanism and Internal Control Construction

Since the commence of 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the CPC Central Committee represented by General Secretary Xi Jinping, has attached unprecedented importance to anti corruption construction and has strengthened the investigation degree on the disciplinary offence behaviors of the party member the leading cadres, which kills rampant misbehaviors around the people from the source. State-owned enterprises are the pillar of the national economy, which should respond to call of the country, in a bid to strengthen the construction of honest and integrity, prevent risks, and build a perfect internal control mechanism. Focusing on the state-owned enterprise’s anti-corruption risk prevention mechanism and internal control construction, this paper conducts a research aiming at starting a discussion.

Mixed oligopoly,state-owned banks’shareholding reform and foreign capital penetration

This paper examines the impact of the policy on eliminating the ratio of foreign shareholding in banks in a mixed oligopoly model.Its analytic results show that state-owned banks should encourage privatisation along with an increasing proportion of the domestic share in multinational banks.Furthermore,we argue that the increase in domestic stockholding of multinational banks raises domestic private firms’profits but decreases their social welfare in the deposit market.The results of numerical simulation show that when the quantity of private banks is fixed,foreign banks tend to enlarge their stake and strengthen their controlling power.

Study on Correlative Issues about State-owned Enterprises Restructuring in Resource-based Cities in China

The ＂sediment＂ formed in the process of long-term development of the resource-based cities not only restricts the economic structure trans/brmation, but also increases the difficulties for restructuring the state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, it makes current ways of reforming staffs＇ identity replacement and managers＇ shareholding mode inefficient in state-owned enterprises reformation in resource-based cities. According to the characteristics of resource-based cities and property right reform theory, cash and share right compensation for the different staffs in the process of staffs＇ identity replacement have been identified. In addition, different profitable investment policies have also been suggested. For managers＇ share holding, the stimulant share ownership should be adopted principally, at the same time corresponding restrictions should be set up for managers＇ investment share ownership due to share ownership structure.

公司法上的受信义务:评新《公司法》的相应修改

新《公司法》关于受信义务的规定体现了创新精神:一是突出了关联交易、公司机会和竞业限制的重要性,完善了程序规则,重组了公司管理者的禁止性行为;对注意义务的界定突破了该条无法进入司法裁判的困境;将公司控股股东、实际控制人纳入了受信义务体系,并将股东代表诉讼扩及公司全资子公司。二是增加了董事、高管对第三人的赔偿责任。三是增加了董事责任保险。但新《公司法》依然与现实需求存在差距:一是关联交易的规定依然缺乏实质公平的裁判标准;公司机会缺乏界定,将导致司法审判困难;竞业限制不能适应现代企业;管理报酬未被纳入忠实义务,司法审判无据可循。二是注意义务规定不周延,未能对管理者的经营义务与监管义务区别对待。三是审计委员会取代监事机构的情形,股东代表诉讼之先诉请求不明确。新《公司法》关于受信义务的上述修改和问题有必要进行系统性分析与评估,从中也能间接省察今后的完善方向。

新《公司法》弘扬企业家精神的制度回应

新《公司法》增加“弘扬企业家精神”的立法目的表明了公司法需要更好地发挥鼓励投资创业、保护企业家权益以及推进创新精神的重要制度功能。在公司法语境下,企业家最接近于控股股东或者实际控制人。公司法语境下的“企业家精神”可以从个体、组织和社会三个层面来理解和把握。新《公司法》在立法目的、准入制度、治理机制以及问责机制等方面体现出“弘扬企业家精神”的重要创新。公司法对于控制权的妥当规制是“弘扬企业家精神”的关键制度,新《公司法》构建了控制权识别规则、控制权行使规则和控制权责任规则。下一步需要提升控制权识别规则的可操作性,完善控制权取得方式和权利内容的规定,并以合规制度和容错机制为企业家铸造“安全港”。

高管纵向关联与企业价值——“隧道效应”还是“监督效应”

高管纵向关联是加剧了大股东对小股东的利益侵占还是增强了对管理层的监督,是公司治理方向的一个重要问题。以2004—2019年上市公司为样本,手工整理了关联高管的详细信息。研究发现,高管纵向关联与企业价值呈显著负相关关系。机制检验结果表明,高管纵向关联通过加剧大股东掏空发挥了“隧道效应”。进一步研究显示,高管纵向关联与企业价值的负相关性在非国有企业、信息披露程度低的企业以及所处地区法律环境差的企业中更为明显;并且,存在高管直接纵向关联以及董事长纵向关联的公司往往表现出更低的企业价值。文章丰富了纵向关联高管的研究成果,对于提升上市公司治理水平具有重要实践意义。

控股股东股权质押、企业金融化与企业创新

以2012—2020年我国A股非金融上市企业为样本,考察控股股东股权质押、企业金融化与企业创新之间的关系。研究结果表明:控股股东股权质押抑制企业创新,并且在控股股东持股比例低的企业和市场化进程低的地区更为显著;控股股东股权质押导致企业金融化动机增强,而企业金融化挤出企业创新,表现出更强的投机套利动机;控股股东股权质押存在金融化和融资约束两条渠道抑制企业创新,一方面通过促进企业金融化挤出企业创新,另一方面通过加剧融资约束抑制企业创新。

控制权争夺动因和社会资本参与影响研究——以奥马电器的控制权争夺为例

控制权是公司治理机制及利益相关者实现利益最大化的核心因素,因此,控制权争夺成为各利益相关者博弈的主题。在控制权争夺的过程中,公司大股东和公司创始团队的社会资本运作能起到不可忽视的作用。基于控制权争夺动因和社会资本影响的视角,通过对奥马电器控制权争夺的案例研究,以社会资本理论、公司治理理论、委托代理理论为基础构建理论框架,探究奥马电器被控股的成因,分析奥马电器控制权争夺的历程和公司价值的发展趋势,重点剖析社会资本在奥马电器的控制权争夺过程中产生的影响。研究发现:社会资本对企业发展具有促进利益共享、降低交易成本、高度集中控制权等益处,是企业获得控制权不能忽视的关键因素。同时对于控制权争夺过程中企业价值如何更好发展提出了可行性建议和启示。

非控股大股东退出威胁与多元化经营:抑制还是促进?

该文基于2007—2021年沪深两市A股上市公司的样本,检验了非控股大股东退出威胁对企业多元化经营的影响。研究发现:非控股大股东退出威胁发挥治理效应约束企业多元化扩张,主要作用机制是减少管理层在职消费和抑制控股股东掏空行为;异质性检验发现,当公司管理层持股、存在实际控制人、信息环境质量高及处于竞争性行业时,退出威胁对多元化的抑制作用更显著;拓展性检验发现非控股大股东退出威胁降低了企业非相关和相关多元化程度,且对非相关多元化的减少更显著,并提升了多元化经营价值。

债务融资对终极股东行为影响的实证分析——基于内部控制质量的门限效应和调节效应

集中股权结构的上市公司中,终极股东对其他中小股东有一定的利益侵害动机,债务融资作为公司治理的一个重要环节,研究其对终极股东行为的影响是一个值得探究的问题。以我国523家非金融类上市公司2007-2022年的面板数据为样本,考虑内部控制质量的门限效应与调节效应,实证检验了债务融资对终极股东掏空行为的促进或抑制效应。研究发现:(1)银行债务、商业信用和长期债务对终极股东掏空行为具有显著的促进效应;当内部控制质量分别大于门限值860.160、873.700、873.700时,此类效应减弱;(2)短期债务对终极股东掏空行为具有显著的抑制效应;当内部控制质量大于门限值873.700时,此效应得到加强;(3)商业信用、长期债务、银行债务对于国有企业中终极股东掏空行为的促进效应,受到内部控制质量的反向调节。研究结论为上市公司制定健全的内部治理环境策略以及为债权人制定合理的借贷策略从而促进上市公司高质量发展提供了参考依据。

“双向混改”情境下非控股股东治理机制与资本配置效率

本文在区分“双向”混合所有制改革两类混改情境的基础上,基于正式制度与非正式制度视角,从股权治理、高层治理、网络治理三个维度构建非控股股东治理参与度模型,考察了非控股股东参与治理与企业资本配置效率的内在关系。研究表明:在“双向”混改情境下,非控股股东参与治理能提高企业的资本配置效率;非控股股东参与治理提高国有企业的资本配置效率主要体现在制衡效应而非资源效应,非控股股东参与治理提高民营企业的资本配置效率主要体现在资源效应而非制衡效应;非控股股东参与治理能够通过缓解国有企业预算软约束和抑制国有企业过度投资来提高国有企业资本配置效率。本文有利于从“双向”混合所有制改革的视角引导非控股股东更好发挥治理作用。

股权质押、市场时机选择与企业风险承担——以信息技术行业为例

以2013—2020年沪深两市A股信息技术行业上市公司为样本,实证分析控股股东股权质押及其时机选择对上市公司风险承担的影响,并探究不同质押率下的影响程度。实证结果发现,控股股东股权质押对上市公司风险承担产生正向影响,且影响程度对质押率较高的公司更为显著;市场时机选择在控股股东股权质押对上市公司风险承担的影响中起调节作用,股权质押对企业风险承担的正向作用随着市场时机的增大逐渐减弱,并在达到某一临界值后转变为负向作用。研究结果对于规范上市公司控股股东股权质押行为、缓解企业融资约束和提升企业价值等具有启示。

控股股东股权质押对年报前瞻性信息披露的影响研究

近年来,随着上市公司股权质押的数量越来越多,控股股东股权质押和市值盈余管理成为研究热点。基于此,以上市公司控股股东股权质押作为研究对象,选取2013—2022年我国A股上市公司所发布的年度财务报告为样本,利用上市公司股权质押数据,从文本信息的内容和态度偏好程度进行挖掘。结果表明:控股股东进行股权质押后在年度报告中披露更多的积极信息和有利股价的预测信息,而控股股东为了控制风险,具有强烈粉饰年度报告的动机。进一步研究发现,粉饰年度报告采用的手段主要是增加乐观信息的陈述,上市公司面临外界质疑时将会披露更多的乐观文本信息。

控股股东财务资助与企业价值创造——基于民营上市公司的经验证据

党的二十大报告再次重申“两个毫不动摇”,为民营企业价值创造提供强有力的政策支持,而融资方式是影响企业价值的重要因素之一。控股股东财务资助凭借其融资成本低、内部风险可控等优势,成为民营企业融资新渠道。以2007—2021年沪深A股民营上市公司为样本,实证检验了控股股东财务资助对企业价值创造的影响。研究结果发现,控股股东财务资助对企业价值创造具有显著的正向影响。作用机制研究表明,控股股东财务资助通过降低税收负担激发企业价值创造。异质性分析表明,控股股东财务资助对企业价值创造的促进作用随着产品市场竞争程度的提高而增强,且对小规模企业的影响更加明显。研究既丰富了控股股东财务资助的经济后果及企业价值创造影响因素方面的文献,又为相关部门制定政策制度提供参考以及民营上市公司有效融资提供了理论依据。

共同机构所有权能抑制控股股东的私利行为吗

基于A股上市公司2007—2021年数据,考察共同机构所有权在企业第二类代理问题中发挥的作用。研究发现,共同机构所有权显著抑制控股股东私利行为,该结论经Heckman两阶段、PSM等内生性与稳健性检验后依旧成立,说明共同机构投资者扮演监督者,而非合谋者角色。机制分析显示,共同机构投资者对控股股东具有更低的监督成本,可以通过退出威胁与委派董事的方式抑制控股股东私利行为。进一步研究发现,对非国有性质的企业来说,上述抑制效应程度更大。共同机构所有权能提升企业价值,且共同机构所有权与第一大股东持股比例的交乘项越大,企业价值越高,意味着共同机构投资者通过监督控股股东提升企业价值,呼应主旨结论。因此,建议监管部门积极引导和规范共同机构所有权,以缓解中国控股股东与中小股东的利益冲突,同时企业也应当充分利用共同机构所有权的信息优势,大力促进企业间协作,不断提升企业价值。