期刊文献+
共找到5篇文章
< 1 >
每页显示 20 50 100
Executive Compensation: Is It Right?
1
作者 Elizabeth Enow Foma 《Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing》 2012年第12期1873-1878,共6页
Issues are arising regarding the large amount of money provided to top executives in many compames tor Uaetr bonuses and incentives. These huge amounts for executive compensation are being questioned in comparison to ... Issues are arising regarding the large amount of money provided to top executives in many compames tor Uaetr bonuses and incentives. These huge amounts for executive compensation are being questioned in comparison to the dividends received by stockholders. Four companies are analyzed: Citigroup, Starbucks, General Electric (GE), and Kraft Foods. Present issues faced by Citigroup show that the company's provision in their executive compensation is not acceptable, On the other hand, Starbucks, GE, and Kraft Foods are the companies that follow legal rules provided by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in providing compensations to executives. Thus, they are good exemplars to other companies. 展开更多
关键词 EXECUTIVE stockholders COMPENSATION bonuses INCENTIVES
下载PDF
Extensions to the Controlling Stockholder's Governance Model
2
作者 Renfan Liu 《Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing》 2006年第2期48-53,共6页
Under the assumptions that investment return increases with the increase of the cash-flow rights held by the controlling stockholder, and the increase of investment return decreases the marginal profit-diverting cost.... Under the assumptions that investment return increases with the increase of the cash-flow rights held by the controlling stockholder, and the increase of investment return decreases the marginal profit-diverting cost. This paper designs a model to show that: below a threshold level, with the increase of the cash-flow rights held by the controlling stockholder, the profit-diverting shares will probably go up, and the Tobin's Q of a listed company maybe go down; Only after that threshold point, does the profit-diverting share become a decreasing function of the cash-flow rights held by the controlling stockholder, and hence does Tobin's Q become an increasing function of the cash-flow rights held by the controlling stockholder. 展开更多
关键词 controlling stockholder cash-flow rights profit-diverting
下载PDF
The Analysis of the Governance Effect of Chinese Public Corporation Based on Capital Structure
3
作者 Maohua Xie 《Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing》 2006年第4期61-70,75,共11页
Under the existed system, the capital structure is the basis of the corporate governance, the structure of the corporate governance is the reflection of the capital structure. The choice of the capital structure decid... Under the existed system, the capital structure is the basis of the corporate governance, the structure of the corporate governance is the reflection of the capital structure. The choice of the capital structure decides the level of the corporate governance to a great degree. This paper discusses the governance effect of Chinese public corporation in the view of capital structure. At last, the author suggests that the government should change the state of state-owned stock which takes a great proportion, make the state-owned stocks and corporation stocks enter and circulate in the market, develop investment banks, promote the stockholder's rights to circulate and recombine, enhance the supervision and the management of the stock markets, perfect the mechanism of the market's operation, set up the mechanism of the way to protect to pay back the debt, perfect the system of bankruptcy and develop the way of bond-financing, offset the drawbacks of the indirect-financing among banks and so on. All of the advice was given to perfect the public company's capital structure and improve the efficiency of the corporate governance. 展开更多
关键词 capital structure stockholder's right structure creditor's right structure corporation management
下载PDF
The Research about Earnings Management Incentives of Listed Companies in China
4
作者 Qian Huang Shuzhuo Li 《Chinese Business Review》 2005年第9期73-75,共3页
This paper overviews earnings management incentive of listed companies and finds the incentives of cost in transactions with stockholders, a comparative performance advantage and a rational response to that market beh... This paper overviews earnings management incentive of listed companies and finds the incentives of cost in transactions with stockholders, a comparative performance advantage and a rational response to that market behavior which is anticipated. This paper tells us that even if there were no agency problems, earnings management should exist all the time. 展开更多
关键词 earnings management incentives stockholder listed companies
下载PDF
CEO Compensation of Listed Companies in China
5
作者 Lingling Guo Pingxin Wang 《Journal of Systems Science and Information》 2008年第3期195-203,共9页
Recently many researches suggest that CEO compensation is not only related to performance. And this relation is non-linear. This paper analyzes CEO compensation, salary and stockholding value with BP neutral network w... Recently many researches suggest that CEO compensation is not only related to performance. And this relation is non-linear. This paper analyzes CEO compensation, salary and stockholding value with BP neutral network with the data from listed companies during 2003--2005 in China. The results are: 1) The fitness of network outputs are 91.09%, 97:23% and 78.44% respectively; 2) The accurate of forecast improves 92.72%, 92.08% and 53.89% respectively comparing with the results of multi-regression model. 展开更多
关键词 CEO compensation CEO salary CEO stockholding value BP neutral network
原文传递
上一页 1 下一页 到第
使用帮助 返回顶部