The Adoption and Maintenance of Executive Stock Option Plan （ESOP）＂ Company Characteristics Evaluation in Indonesia

This paper investigates company characteristics associated with the adoption and maintenance of executive stock option plan （ESOP） proxied with the proportion of stock options. In order to develop and inform public policies of executive stock options, it is important to understand some of the factors that will drive a company＇s decision in order to adopt an ESOP. First, an analysis evaluates what kind of company＇s characteristics is associated with these plans. Second, an analysis examines the company characteristics that predict the adoption of such plans. This paper contributes to that stream of accounting research by identifying several factors to the adoption of ESOP. The study finds that intellectual capital （consisting of human capital efficiency （HCE）, structural capital efficiency （SCE）, and capital employed efficiency （CEE））, risk, and financial constraints （FC） affect the adoption and maintenance of stock option plans, these conditions will be increasingly supported in companies that experience relatively rapid growth. HCE, risk, and FC are significant predictors of the adoption and maintenance of ESOP. The companies who have some difficulties in observing human capital＇s behavior are more likely to adopt executive stock options, and based on our theoretical review, this is a rational course of action. Firms with higher levels of business risks are less likely to shift some of the risks to employees through stock-based compensation, whereas firms with higher variability in total shareholder returns are more likely to adopt executive stock options. Overall, our results suggest that higher monitoring costs prompt firms to adopt and maintain ESOP.

Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Stock-price Informativeness

This study examines the impact of employee stock ownership plans(ESOPs)on stock-price informativeness in Chinese stock markets.Its findings indicate that firms implementing ESOPs experienced an average 11.89 percent increase in stock-price informativeness.The plans improved stock-price informativeness through increased external attention and supervision.An event study shows that ESOPs gave rise to an announcement effect,driven by anticipated performance improvements and the novelty associated with ESOPs.A mechanism analysis demonstrates that the implementation of ESOPs attracted market attention,and the increased market supervision resulting from this mitigated the moral hazards of management associated with ESOPs.Plans with more positive signals exerted a greater influence.Notably,ESOPs that prioritized management incentives gained more recognition in the market.As the incentive effects of ESOPs were weaker than those of equity incentive plans and the ESOPs lost novelty over time,the annual announcement effect diminished gradually.These findings underscore the necessity of strengthening ESOP incentives for continued optimization of priceefficiency.