The South-to-North Water Diversion (SNWD) Project is a significant engineering project meant to solve water shortage problems in North China. Faced with market operations management of the water diversion system, th...The South-to-North Water Diversion (SNWD) Project is a significant engineering project meant to solve water shortage problems in North China. Faced with market operations management of the water diversion system, this study defined the supply chain system for the SNWD Project, considering the actual project conditions, built a decentralized decision model and a centralized decision model with strategic customer behavior (SCB) using a floating pricing mechanism (FPM), and constructed a coordination mechanism via a revenue-sharing contract. The results suggest the following: (1) owing to water shortage supplements and the excess water sale policy provided by the FPM, the optimal ordering quantity of water resources is less than that without the FPM, and the optimal profits of the whole supply chain, supplier, and external distributor are higher than they would be without the FPM; (2) wholesale pricing and supplementary wholesale pricing with SCB are higher than those without SCB, and the optimal profits of the whole supply chain, supplier, and external distributor are higher than they would be without SCB; and (3) considering SCB and introducing the FPM help increase the optimal profits of the whole supply chain, supplier, and external distributor, and improve the efficiency of water resources usage.展开更多
This paper examines a decentralized admission control system with partial capacity sharing in a hospital setting. The admission decision is made by each physician who is assigned a number of dedicated inpatient beds. ...This paper examines a decentralized admission control system with partial capacity sharing in a hospital setting. The admission decision is made by each physician who is assigned a number of dedicated inpatient beds. A physician can “borrow” beds from other physicians if his dedicated beds are all occupied. We seek to understand the impact of the “borrowing cost” on physicians’ admission behavior. We find that (i) If the borrowing cost is low, a physician tends to admit lower-risk patients when either his or others’ capacity utilization is higher;(ii) If the borrowing cost is moderate, a physician tends to admit higher (lower)-risk patients when his (others’) capacity utilization is higher;and (iii) If the borrowing cost is high, a physician tends to admit higher-risk patients when either his or others’ capacity utilization is higher. We then empirically test and validate these findings. Our work demonstrates that when designing strategic admission control systems, it is important to quantify and perhaps then influence the magnitude of the borrowing cost to induce a proper level of competition without sacrificing the benefit of resource pooling.展开更多
In this paper, we present an innovative non–linear, discrete, dynamical system trying to model the historic battle of Salamis between Greeks and Persians. September 2020 marks the anniversary of the 2500 years that h...In this paper, we present an innovative non–linear, discrete, dynamical system trying to model the historic battle of Salamis between Greeks and Persians. September 2020 marks the anniversary of the 2500 years that have passed since this famous naval battle which took place in late September 480 B.C. The suggested model describes very well the most effective strategic behavior between two participants during a battle (or in a war). Moreover, we compare the results of the Dynamical Systems analysis to Game Theory, considering this conflict as a “war game”.展开更多
Speculative behaviors have burgeoned in various business settings whereby it is costly for consumers to purchase directly from sellers.This paper examines the values of two typical speculative behaviors,scalping and l...Speculative behaviors have burgeoned in various business settings whereby it is costly for consumers to purchase directly from sellers.This paper examines the values of two typical speculative behaviors,scalping and line-sitting,against a backdrop of markets with resale.We establish a two-stage model in which a monopolist seller sells an item(product or service)to consumers in the first stage,and the item can be traded on a resale platform in the second stage.Speculators have no interests in consumption but incur lower costs in pm-chasing and reselling processes than consumers.In the scalping model,they buy the item first and resell it later to make profits.In the line-sitting model,they earn incomes by serving as surrogates of consumers in purchasing.We first find whether the two phenomena emerge critically depends on the value of consumers'entry cost.Our main results indicate that both speculative behaviors can bring benefits to the seller and resale platform by a demand expansion effect,although through different mechanisms.Under scalping,the entry of speculators as additional buyers always boosts demand in both stages,and achieves a win-win outcome for the seller and platform,although less consumers remain in the market and the resale price decreases.Under line-sitting,demand is enlarged and profits rise in both stages,only when consumers find purchasing directly more time-and money-consuming,because they need to pay an extra service fee to speculators.Moreover,the consumer population gets better off from the two speculative behaviors when their entry cost is relatively high.When both models emerge,scalping may be preferable to line-sitting for the seller,resale platform and consumers,if the cost advantage of speculators in resale transactions is more evident.展开更多
Product diffusion refers to the phenomenon that the later demand is dependent on the early sales. To investigate how a firm's advance selling strategy is affected by the effect of product diffusion, we consider a mon...Product diffusion refers to the phenomenon that the later demand is dependent on the early sales. To investigate how a firm's advance selling strategy is affected by the effect of product diffusion, we consider a monopolist seller who sells a fashionable product in a market that comprises of myopic and strategic consumers over two periods (i.e., the advance selling season and the regular selling season). For a linear product diffusion effect we fred that, when the effect of product diffusion is positive, the seller may set an extremely high advance selling price to induce the strategic consumers to purchase in the regular selling season, which is counter-intuitive. Moreover, the optimal procurement quantity for the seller may increase in the negative effect of product diffusion and decrease in the amount of strategic consumers. When we extend our model to consider a concave quadratic product diffusion effect, however, the optimal procurement quantity is concave in the amount of strategic consumers. Numerical studies are further presented to discuss the managerial insights.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grants No.50379009,90924027and41101509)the National Social Science Foundation of China(Grant No.10AJY005)the Research Innovation Program for College Graduates of Jiangsu Province of 2009(Grant No.CX09B_057R)
文摘The South-to-North Water Diversion (SNWD) Project is a significant engineering project meant to solve water shortage problems in North China. Faced with market operations management of the water diversion system, this study defined the supply chain system for the SNWD Project, considering the actual project conditions, built a decentralized decision model and a centralized decision model with strategic customer behavior (SCB) using a floating pricing mechanism (FPM), and constructed a coordination mechanism via a revenue-sharing contract. The results suggest the following: (1) owing to water shortage supplements and the excess water sale policy provided by the FPM, the optimal ordering quantity of water resources is less than that without the FPM, and the optimal profits of the whole supply chain, supplier, and external distributor are higher than they would be without the FPM; (2) wholesale pricing and supplementary wholesale pricing with SCB are higher than those without SCB, and the optimal profits of the whole supply chain, supplier, and external distributor are higher than they would be without SCB; and (3) considering SCB and introducing the FPM help increase the optimal profits of the whole supply chain, supplier, and external distributor, and improve the efficiency of water resources usage.
基金This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.71720107003,72033003 and 71722008)。
文摘This paper examines a decentralized admission control system with partial capacity sharing in a hospital setting. The admission decision is made by each physician who is assigned a number of dedicated inpatient beds. A physician can “borrow” beds from other physicians if his dedicated beds are all occupied. We seek to understand the impact of the “borrowing cost” on physicians’ admission behavior. We find that (i) If the borrowing cost is low, a physician tends to admit lower-risk patients when either his or others’ capacity utilization is higher;(ii) If the borrowing cost is moderate, a physician tends to admit higher (lower)-risk patients when his (others’) capacity utilization is higher;and (iii) If the borrowing cost is high, a physician tends to admit higher-risk patients when either his or others’ capacity utilization is higher. We then empirically test and validate these findings. Our work demonstrates that when designing strategic admission control systems, it is important to quantify and perhaps then influence the magnitude of the borrowing cost to induce a proper level of competition without sacrificing the benefit of resource pooling.
文摘In this paper, we present an innovative non–linear, discrete, dynamical system trying to model the historic battle of Salamis between Greeks and Persians. September 2020 marks the anniversary of the 2500 years that have passed since this famous naval battle which took place in late September 480 B.C. The suggested model describes very well the most effective strategic behavior between two participants during a battle (or in a war). Moreover, we compare the results of the Dynamical Systems analysis to Game Theory, considering this conflict as a “war game”.
基金The authors thank the editor(s)and referees for their guidance and suggestions that help improve the quality of the paperThis work was partly supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.71871198,71821002,71931009 and 72125004the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation under Grant No.2020M681905.
文摘Speculative behaviors have burgeoned in various business settings whereby it is costly for consumers to purchase directly from sellers.This paper examines the values of two typical speculative behaviors,scalping and line-sitting,against a backdrop of markets with resale.We establish a two-stage model in which a monopolist seller sells an item(product or service)to consumers in the first stage,and the item can be traded on a resale platform in the second stage.Speculators have no interests in consumption but incur lower costs in pm-chasing and reselling processes than consumers.In the scalping model,they buy the item first and resell it later to make profits.In the line-sitting model,they earn incomes by serving as surrogates of consumers in purchasing.We first find whether the two phenomena emerge critically depends on the value of consumers'entry cost.Our main results indicate that both speculative behaviors can bring benefits to the seller and resale platform by a demand expansion effect,although through different mechanisms.Under scalping,the entry of speculators as additional buyers always boosts demand in both stages,and achieves a win-win outcome for the seller and platform,although less consumers remain in the market and the resale price decreases.Under line-sitting,demand is enlarged and profits rise in both stages,only when consumers find purchasing directly more time-and money-consuming,because they need to pay an extra service fee to speculators.Moreover,the consumer population gets better off from the two speculative behaviors when their entry cost is relatively high.When both models emerge,scalping may be preferable to line-sitting for the seller,resale platform and consumers,if the cost advantage of speculators in resale transactions is more evident.
文摘Product diffusion refers to the phenomenon that the later demand is dependent on the early sales. To investigate how a firm's advance selling strategy is affected by the effect of product diffusion, we consider a monopolist seller who sells a fashionable product in a market that comprises of myopic and strategic consumers over two periods (i.e., the advance selling season and the regular selling season). For a linear product diffusion effect we fred that, when the effect of product diffusion is positive, the seller may set an extremely high advance selling price to induce the strategic consumers to purchase in the regular selling season, which is counter-intuitive. Moreover, the optimal procurement quantity for the seller may increase in the negative effect of product diffusion and decrease in the amount of strategic consumers. When we extend our model to consider a concave quadratic product diffusion effect, however, the optimal procurement quantity is concave in the amount of strategic consumers. Numerical studies are further presented to discuss the managerial insights.